您目前的位置: 首页» 研究资料» 印度法院判决重申印度《仲裁法》的自洽性和特殊法地位,其适用优先于一般法(印度案例)

印度法院判决重申印度《仲裁法》的自洽性和特殊法地位,其适用优先于一般法(印度案例)

2019923日,在M/S Dalip Singh Adhikari vs State Of Uttarakh and Another一案中,北阿坎德邦高等法院驳回上诉人就仲裁庭命令的上诉结果的第二次上诉,理由是被上诉的命令已由商业法院作出,《仲裁与和解法》禁止根据本条通过的命令进行第二次上诉,而且《仲裁法》本身是一部自洽的法律(The Arbitration Act is self contained Code. It is special statute. In case of any inconsistency, effect shall be given to the special statute i.e.the Arbitration Act, vis-à-vis the more general statute, namely, the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.),不得援引结合其他法律来进行解释而让第二次上诉变得可能。因此法院驳回上诉人的二次上诉请求。

 

一、背景介绍

上诉人获得了Tanakpur-Jauljibi汽车路的建设合同,并据此签订了包含有仲裁条款的协议。随后,合同被被上诉人终止。201987日,上诉人将本案提请仲裁庭仲裁,仲裁庭作出了维持现状令(status quo order),并于201978日发出该令。本令在德拉敦(Dehradun)商事法院的上诉中受到撤销,依据是1996年《仲裁与和解法》第37条。上诉人不服决定,随即立刻依照2015年《商事法院法》第13条提起上诉。

 

上诉人律师主张,原商业法院的上诉是站不住脚的;仲裁庭没有最终决定根据《仲裁与和解法》第17条来作出判断,而针对仲裁庭根据《仲裁与和解法》第17条作出的指令根据《仲裁与和解法》第37条第2款的规定,提请《仲裁与和解法》第2条第1款(e)项(i)目所定义的法院才是更为可取的;原辖区的主要民事法院(Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction)是《仲裁与和解法》第2条第1款(e)项(i)目中规定的法院;在本案中,原上诉未在原辖区的主要民事法院提出;根据2015年《商事法院法》第10条第3款的规定,原辖区的主要民事法院也可以获得商事法院的权力。上诉人律师主张,在德拉敦商事法院的撤销异议是在不适格法院提起的,因此从法律上来原上诉不构成上诉。因为德拉敦商事法院的上诉受理是一项中间命令,鉴于2015年《商事法庭法》第8条的规定,该受理也不能在更早些时候被异议,因此,本再次上诉适当。(It isargued that the appeal, against the order dated 08.07.2019 of the arbitral tribunal, was filed before the wrong forum therefore, it will not be treated as an appeal in the eye of law; since, admission of the appeal by the Commercial Court, Dehradun was an interlocutory order, in view of Section 8 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 it could not have been challenged, earlier. Hence,it is argued that the instant appeal is maintainable.)其依据的案例是Kandla Export Corporation and another vs.M/s OCI Corporation and another (2018) 14 SCC 715案,主张本再次上诉依《商事法庭法》第8条应被受理。

 

原上诉的依据是《仲裁与和解法》第37条,其规定是:

“ 37.可适用的命令。

1)以下命令(不包括其他任何命令)应向法律授权有权审理原作出命令的的法院提出上诉,即:

a)拒绝根据第8条指示当事方提交仲裁;

b)批准授予或拒绝批准授予第9条项下的任何措施;

c)根据第34条撤销或拒绝撤销仲裁裁决。

2)对于以下仲裁庭的命令也向法院提出上诉——

a)接受第16条第(2)款或第(3)款所指的请求;或

b)根据第17条批准授予或拒绝批准授予临时措施。

3)根据本条在上诉中作出的命令不得有第二次上诉,但本条中的任何规定均不得影响或剥夺向最高法院提出上诉的权利。

“37.Appelable orders.-

(1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the court authorized by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order, namely:-

(a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 8;

(b) granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9;

(c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34.

(2) An appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the arbitral tribunal-

(a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of Section 16; or

(b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under Section 17.

(3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.”

 

就《仲裁与和解法》第37条第2款的规定粗略来看,很明显,针对仲裁庭根据第17条作出的命令应向法院提起上诉。根据《仲裁与和解法》第2条第1款(e)项(i)目,法院的定义如下:

e法院是指

i)如果是国际商事仲裁以外的其他仲裁,则是原辖区的主要民事法院,包括行使普通初审民事管辖权,并有若该案为诉讼案件也有管辖权决定该仲裁的标的问题的的高等法院,但不包括该等普通初审民事管辖权的下级民事法院,或任何小型诉讼法院;

(e)"Court" means-

(i) in the case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district,and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal civil court, or any Court of Small Causes;

 

在本案中,上诉是在商事法院提出的,根据以上两个条款一起审阅的话,是属于其中界定的法院的。问题在于本上诉是否适当。

 

二、法院认定

在本案中涉及两个法案,第一个是《仲裁与和解法》,第二个是《商事法院法》。在Kandla Export Corporation and another vs. M/s OCI Corporation and another (2018) 14SCC 715案中,最高法院提到了Fuerst Day Lawson Limited vs. Jindal Exports Limited (2011) 8 Supreme Court Cases 333案,最高法院判决《仲裁与和解法》是一个自洽的法案(held that the Arbitration Act is self contained Act),判决是,自1940年《仲裁法》到2004年以来,该法都被认为是一部自续的法典,而且1996《仲裁与和解法》主要对仲裁法进行了合并,修正和设计,以使之尽可能地与贸易法委员会《仲裁示范法》保持一致,因此其自洽性只会是更强(Now, if the Arbitration Act, 1940 was held to be a self-contained code,on matters pertaining to arbitration, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996, which consolidates, amends and designs the law relating to arbitration to bring it, as much as possible, in harmony with the UNCITRAL Mode must be held only to be more so)。在认定《仲裁与和解法》的自洽性和穷尽性之后,则还必须使用Tulzapurkar大法官的表述,该法带有否定意味,即仅有在该法中提到的行为才允许行使,而未提及的行为或事情则不允许行使。anegative import that only such acts as are mentioned in the Act are permissibleto be done and acts or things not mentioned therein are not permissible to bedone.)因此该法排除其他法律的适用,不得与其他法律联系起来进行解释。

 

因此,法院得出两种结论:可以这么说,一个是在微观基础上,研究了1996年《仲裁与和解法》第4950条所设计的方案,以及其对1961年文本第6条中规定的上诉所带来的根本性变化,而另一个则是在宏观基础上,考虑1996年《仲裁与和解法》本身是的自洽性与穷尽性。(We, thus, arrive at the conclusion regarding the exclusion of a letters patent appeal in two different ways; one, so to say, on a micro basis by examining the scheme devised by Section 49 and 50 of the 1996 Act and the radical change that it brings about in the earlier provision of appeal under Section 6 of the 1961 Act and the other on a macro basis by taking into account the nature and character of the 1996 Act as self- contained and exhaustive code in itself.

 

Kandla Export Corporation and another vs. M/s OCI Corporation and another (2018) 14 SCC 715案中,最高法院裁定在Sumitomo Corporation vs. CDC Financial Services (Mauritius) Ltd. andOrs., (2008) 4 SCC 91案中,最高法院将《仲裁与和解法》第50条和1956年《公司法》第101)条第(a)款和第10 F条的规定作出了区分,裁定在《仲裁与和解法》第50条中若存在上诉权,则有权审理上诉的法院则可以认定在《公司法》第101)条第(a)款和第10 F条中有上诉权。本案与《仲裁与和解法》第50条规定的上诉平行,《商事法院法》第13条第1款规定了上诉的法院。仅在本案中,由于没有根据《仲裁法》第50条存在有上诉权,因此无处可上诉。(...this Court adverted to Section 50 of the Arbitration Act and to Section 10(1)(a) and 10 F of the Companies Act, 1956, to hold that once an appeal is provided for in Section 50, the Court authorized by law to hear such appeals would then be found in Sections 10(1)(a) and 10 F of the Companies Act. The present case is a parallel instance of Section 50 of the Arbitration Act providing for an appeal, and Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act providing the forum for such appeal. Only, in the present case, as no appeal lies under Section 50 of the Arbitration Act, no forum can be provided for.

 

因此,法院裁定,《仲裁与和解法》是自洽的法典,是特别法,一般法(如2015年《商事法院法》)若与特别法相抵触者,则应适用特别法。(The Arbitration Act is self contained Code. It is special statute. In case of any inconsistency, effect shall be given to the special 8 statute i.e. the Arbitration Act, vis-à-vis the more general statute, namely, the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

 

2015年《商事法院法》第13条的附加条件中,提到了1908年《民事诉讼法》第43号命令,但问题在于是否《仲裁与和解法》第37条第3款,禁止再次上诉。其规定如下:

“ 3.根据本条在上诉中作出的命令不得进行第二次上诉,但本条中的任何规定均不得影响或剥夺向最高法院提出上诉的权利。

"3.No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court."

 

在本案中,根据《仲裁与和解法》第17条作出的命令的上诉已根据第37条第2款在适当的法院进行了异议。根据《仲裁与和解法》第37条第2款,被上诉的命令已由商业法院作出。《仲裁与和解法》第37条第3款禁止根据本条通过的命令进行第二次上诉。(In the instant case an appeal against the order passed under Rule 17 of the Arbitration Act has already been challenged under Section 37(2), before a proper forum. The impugned order has been passed by the Commercial Court, under Section 37 (2) of the Arbitration Act. Section 37 sub-section 3 of the Arbitration Act bars second appeal against an order passed under this section.Therefore, the instant appeal is not maintainable.

 

因此,本上诉不当,法院驳回上诉。

 

 

三、评论

本案在法律解释上,重申印度法院一贯的将《仲裁与和解法》视为自洽且穷尽的法案,法院应仅仅适用其中的规则而不应该将其与其他法律结合起来进行解释。其根本理由是该法是特别法,其他法律是一般法,当二者有冲突时,特殊法优先于一般法得到适用。这种裁判思路的优点在于尽最大可能提供仲裁指引的明确性,在仲裁程序以及对仲裁进行的各种司法程序中,法院都只依照该法进行裁判,减少法律适用的不确定性以及复杂性,符合贸易法委员会《仲裁示范法》支持仲裁裁决和仲裁程序的法理和精神。