2020年3月25日，在Daelim Corporation v Bonita Company Ltd & Ors [2020] EWHC 697 (Comm)一案中，英格兰和威尔士高等法院王座法庭商事法庭认定，由于并不需要本案的涉案禁止令中的限制当事人提起仲裁的权利以达到1996《仲裁法》第44（3）条项下的保全财产目的，所以该部分被撤销，以使得当事人可以依照仲裁条款提起仲裁。
一、背景介绍
本案涉案条款为1996《仲裁法》第10条和第44（3）条，其中第44（3）条的规定较为宽泛，授予法院较大的裁量权。
1996《仲裁法》第10条规定，凡在法律程序授予竞合权利（interpleader）救济，且申请人之间的任何争议涉及其彼此之间达成仲裁的协议，则除非申请人就此标的提起的仲裁将不会中止，否则授予救济的法院应指示该争议点应当依照仲裁协议决定（Where in legal proceedings relief by way of interpleader is granted and any issue between the claimants is one in respect of which there is an arbitration agreement between them, the court granting the relief shall direct that the issue be determined in accordance with the agreement unless the circumstances are such that proceedings brought by a claimant in respect of the matter would not be stayed.）。若本该如此但法院未指示根据仲裁协议确定该问题，则关于裁决是就任何事项提起法律程序的先决条件的任何规定均不得影响法院对该问题的认定（Where subsection (1) applies but the court does not direct that the issue be determined in accordance with the arbitration agreement, any provision that an award is a condition precedent to the bringing of legal proceedings in respect of any matter shall not affect the determination of that issue by the court.）。
第44（3）条规定：“如果案件属紧急情况，法院可应仲裁程序一方当事人或拟议当事人的请求，作出其认为必要的命令，以保全证据或财产”（"if the case is one of urgency, the court may, on the application of a party or proposed party to the arbitral proceedings, make such orders as it thinks necessary for the purpose of preserving evidence or assets"）。
原被告共同签订了《终止和解协议》（termination and settlement agreement ，TSA）以提前终止光船租赁。依照该协议的有关条款， Daelim出租一条散货船给Bonita，而Bonita将该散货船转租给EMIC（本案第二和第三被告合称EMIC）。TSA规定，依照各自租船合同规定的费率应付的租船租金，在EMIC和Bonita未履行的租船期内就损失、损坏和/或杂费的任何和所有请求进行全额和最终赔偿和解决——EMIC向Daelim支付600万美元，向Bonita支付50万美元。
本案涉及的每个光船租船合同均约定依照伦敦海事仲裁员协会（LMAA）条款在伦敦进行仲裁，而TSA则约定依照香港国际仲裁中心（HKIAC）条款在香港进行仲裁。在EMIC与Daelim之间并未发生争议，但在向Bonita进行支付方面产生争议。Daelim担心，如果EMIC向Bonita进行支付，则在最终确定EMIC是否应支付Daelim之前这些资金会灭失。
Daelim向法院提出申请并获得一份单方面禁止令，其中：
（1）第5.1段禁止EMIC将争议金额支付给Bonita；
（2）第5.2段中要求EMIC将款项存入约定的帐户或法院中；
（3）在第5.3段中，法院限制了Bonita根据TSA对EMIC提起争议解决程序的权利。法院随后EMIC对法院作出履行承诺，而法院作出命令，撤销了该禁止令的第5.1和5.2段，但保留了第5.3段。
第一被告Bonita）申请解除原告Daelim的单方面禁止令中的第5.3段，而Daelim则主张第5.3段授予的救济对于要求EMIC向法院付款而言是必要和适当的交换条件，是EMIC承诺的必要和适当的交换条件，并且在此案中没有任何不公正之处。
二、法院认定
法院认为，1996《仲裁法》第44（3）条仅在狭窄范围允许法院在紧急情况下无需仲裁庭许可或有关仲裁协议的其他当事方同意即采取行动的权力，作出必要的证据或财产保全命令。阻止Bonita对EMIC提起争议解决程序并不是要求EMIC向法院支付TSA债务金额的必要条件（Bonita does, however, challenge the court's jurisdiction to grant the relief granted by paragraph 5.3 of the Order in the different sense that it was not, says Bonita, an order falling within the scope of the court's power under s.44(3) to interfere in the arbitral process. That scope is narrow, entitling the court to act, in cases of urgency, without the permission of the relevant arbitral tribunal or the agreement of the other party or parties to the relevant arbitration agreement, so as to make "such orders as it thinks necessary for the purpose of preserving evidence or assets". No point was taken about urgency. The argument concerns the necessity, if any, of the relief granted by paragraph 5.3 of the June Order for the limited and exclusive statutory purpose of preserving assets (this is not a case about preserving evidence).）。
依照Cetelem SA v Roust Holdings Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 618案的认定，法院根据1996《仲裁法》第44（3）条可以作出的唯一的命令是被法院判定为保全证据或资产所必需的命令，因为这样做的目的是尽可能减少对仲裁程序的干预，所以只有存在这样的必要性才能证明法院进行干预是合理的（the only orders that can be made under s.44(3) are orders judged to be necessary for the preservation of evidence or assets: see esp. at [37]-[38], [45]-[47]. Only such a necessity will justify intervention by the court, since the intention is that there be as little interference with the arbitral process as possible）。
Daelim援引The East India Company v Edwards (1811) 18 Ves Jun376案，主张授予的主要救济（即禁止EMIC对Bonita进行支付的禁止令因此要求EMIC支付法院费用）类似于确定竞合权利救济（interpleader relief），而在确定竞合权利救济案件中，通过禁止令以防止债务人在法庭上付清债务后被其他竞争对手的债权人追责这种做法是适当的。但是法院认为这种逻辑在Daelim的申请的语境下是违和的，因为在竞合权利案件中之间，在所有当事人之间，债务人进行支付的法院之前针对案件实体已经受理了对针对债务人之诉，并且针对所有当事人而言也如此，即法院要么已经受理了对针对债务人之诉，要么由于在其不用授予竞合权利救济的情况下即有管辖权的案件中也授予了竞合权利救济（I agree with Mr Phillips QC, is simply out of place in the context of Daelim's application, because it springs from the fact that in an interpleader the court to whom the debtor pays is properly seized of the claim against the debtor on its merits, as between all the parties, either already or by virtue of granting the interpleader relief in a case where it could have been so seized without it.）。
1996《仲裁法》第10条中有一个类似的规定，根据该规定，在授予竞合权利救济的情况下，申请人之间的任何争议点都是申请人之间有仲裁协议的争议点，则除非申请人就此标的提起的仲裁将不会中止，否则授予救济的法院应指示该争议点应当依照仲裁协议决定（where interpleader relief has been granted and "any issue between the claimants is one in respect of which there is an arbitration agreement between them, the court granting the relief shall direct that the issue be determined in accordance with the agreement unless the circumstances are such that proceedings brought by a claimant in respect of the matter would not be stayed."）。假定在债务人和一系列竞争债权人之间，债务人的责任将由法院决定，因此，只有在债权人的权益上的争议点被债权人之间的仲裁协议所覆盖的情况下，才涉及仲裁，而这导致在表面上可根据该协议在他们之间就该争议点进行仲裁。确实，根据《民事诉讼规定》第86.2（2）条，只有在债务人可应诉的适格法院，才可提出确定竞合权利主张，而根据《民事诉讼规定》第86.2（1）条，债务人提出该等主张以请求法院决定实体上应由哪个债权人支付（This assumes that as between the debtor and (at least one of) the rival creditors, the debtor's liability would be a matter to be determined by the court, so arbitration is only involved if the issue which of the creditors was entitled is covered by an arbitration agreement between those creditors, leading prima facie to adirection for an arbitration of that issue between them in accordance with that agreement. Indeed, the interpleader claim (under the CPR a 'stakeholder claim') is only available if the debtor is or could be sued in the court in which it brings that claim (see now CPR 86.2(2)); and by such a claim the debtor calls for the court to determine on the merits which of the rival creditors it should have paid (CPR 86.2(1)).）。
本案并非竞合权利案件（This was not an interpleader claim. Nor on the faceof things could it have been, in this court.）。无论是由Daelim还是Bonita提出，针对EMIC的任何请求都必须是根据TSA在HKIAC仲裁中提出的请求。由于TSA是三方合同，因此，不仅是EMIC，而且竞争对手债权人都可以被列为被申请人（The starting point was (or should have been) that any claim against EMIC, the debtor facing competing demands, had to be a claim in HKIAC arbitration under the TSA, whether brought by Daelim or by Bonita (it could have been either). Since the TSA was a tri-partite contract, the rival creditor could have been named as a respondent, and I think naturally would have been, not only EMIC.）。
无论EMIC是否对Bonita有欠TSA项下的债务，在任何情况下，都没有必要或不应该阻止Bonita开始进行HKIAC仲裁程序，这是解决案件实体争议的适当、自然和约定的手段，以约束EMIC。也不能说必须停止启动这些程序以保全财产，更不用说出于此目的限制Bonita根据香港TSA进行仲裁是有必要的或适当的，但却让Daelim可以自由根据香港TSA进行仲裁（I find it impossible to discern in those circumstances why it was necessary or appropriate to stop Bonita from commencing the substantive proceedings, viz. HKIAC arbitration proceedings, that were the proper, natural and contractual means for resolving on the merits, so as to bind EMIC, whether EMIC owed the TSA debt to Bonita. Nor can I identify how it might be said that stopping those proceedings from being commenced was required for the purpose of preserving some asset, let alone why it was necessary (or appropriate) for that purpose (or at all) to restrain Bonita from starting an arbitration under the TSA in Hong Kong but leave Daelim free to do so.）。
因此，第5.3段绝不应该被批准并被撤消，而且1996《仲裁法》第44（3）条所指的法定目的而言，保全财产本身并没有必要，也没有必要作为第44（3）条所授予的主要救济的交换条件。
此外，法院指出，如果法院不接受Bonita的主要论点，法院将驳回其其他论点。Daelim提出的关于单方面禁止令的方面的主张中没有任何不公正之处，而且在撤销第5.1和5.2段之后第5.3款也不再发挥作用。
由此，法院撤销了禁止令的第5.3段。
三、评论
本案主要是根据事实作出判决的，但本案也涉及根据1996《仲裁法》第44（3）条所涉及的禁制令所涵盖的保全财产的识别，而本案中唯一可能的财产为EMIC可能对Bonita拖欠的债务。然而，Daelim在单方申请中主张禁止令的目的不是保全TSA债务（若拖欠Bonita），而是保护Daelim主张的其享有债权，并在这个争议点被解决之前有权获得保全。尽管如此，EMIC达成的任何付款协议均以B和D都同意为条件，而他们并未有这种同意，所以对该债权而言并没有实际可识别的资金。因此，法院出于尊重TSA约定的仲裁条款起见，撤销了第5.3段。