2019年9月6日，在Rossisa Participações S.A. v. The Reynolds and Reynolds Co., No.3:18-cv-00297 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 6, 2019)一案中，美国第六巡回法院认为，被申请人不是三项仲裁协议的签字方，而且该公司在复杂并购交易（反向三角合并）之后并未与作为签字方的母公司合并，仍是完全独立的子公司和一个独立的法人实体，因此不受仲裁仲裁协议和仲裁裁决的拘束。
一、背景介绍
申请人是ROSSISA PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A.和 CIA. ROSSI DE AUTOMÓVEIS都是巴西公司。申请人在1997年依照三份合同向三个不同实体购买了用于数据处理的电子系统，这三个实体分别是Universal Computer Software, Ltd （，一家百慕大公司）、UniversalComputer Systems, Ltd.（一家百慕大公司）以及Universal Computer Services, Ltda.（UCS Brazil，一家巴西公司）。电子系统无法如约工作，申请人通过巴西法院程序对这三个实体发起了仲裁（被申请人还包括Universal Computer Services, Inc. 和UniversalComputer Systems, Inc.，两个美国公司）。在2014年，巴西法院指定了一名仲裁员。
2015年，申请人向巴西法院申请以The Reynolds and Reynolds Company（Reynolds，一家美国俄亥俄州的公司）来替换前三个实体来作为被申请人。申请人依照Reynolds提交给美国证监会的两份备案文件主张Reynolds与UCS之间确实存在合并，因此Reynolds受到仲裁协议的拘束。根据文件，在2006年，Reynolds公司通过反向三角合并被DCS （Dealer Computer Services, Inc.）所收购，并成为其全资独立子公司。 DCS在2001年收购了UCS（Universal Computer Services, Inc.）。 DCS是该合并后存续的公司。 UCS在1990年代拥有过UCS Brazil，UCS Brazil是其中一份相关合同的当事方之一。然而，Reynolds不是仲裁协议的签字人，目前不在巴西开展业务也从未在巴西开展业务这点上并无争议。
尽管巴西法院已经通知了Reynolds ，但其并未在巴西法院程序或仲裁中出庭。对此，Reynolds主张其没有签订相关合同，因此不是诉讼或仲裁的当事人、继承人或受让人，在巴西法院和仲裁对其无管辖权。独任仲裁员于2017年裁决申请人在对Reynolds案中胜诉。
现在申请人申请美国法院依照《联邦仲裁法》和《美洲国家间国际商事仲裁公约》（该公约中有纳入了《纽约公约》）确认该裁决。美国和巴西都是《美洲国家间国际商事仲裁公约》和《纽约公约》的缔约国。Reynolds以《美洲国家间国际商事仲裁公约》第五条第2款为依据，主张基于该争议无法通过仲裁解决及仲裁违反公共政策这两个理由拒绝承认和执行裁决。《美洲国家间国际商事仲裁公约》第五条规定与《纽约公约》第五条规定类似。
二、法院认定
美国法院首先认定其本身对该案有管辖权（subject matter jurisdiction），理由是美国地方法院依照28 USC§1331拥有管辖权，以认定外国仲裁裁决是否可以对未签署仲裁协议的公司进行适用。
之后，法院确定，依照《美洲国家间国际商事仲裁公约》第一条，如果公司不是合同的当事方，则它不受该合同的仲裁条款的直接拘束（Where a company is not a party to a contract, then it is not directly subject to that contract's arbitration clause）。.依照Accord: Mason v. Mason, 2017-Ohio-5787, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 285案，仲裁问题是合同问题，尽管有强有力的政策支持，当事人也不能被迫对将未经其同意的任何争议提交仲裁。”("[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and, despite the strong policy in its favor, a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate any dispute that he has not agreed to submit.")依照Sapic v. Gov't ofTurkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 358 (5th Cir. 2003)案，仲裁协议仅在极少数情况下适用于非签字方。 Thompson-CSF, 64 F.3d案规定了五种使仲裁协议对非签字人具有拘束力的理论：（1）通过引用而并入。 （2）权利义务承担； （三）代理； （4）揭开公司面纱/人格混同； （5）禁反言。（The Sixth Circuit has recognized five theories for binding nonsignatories to arbitration agreements: (1) incorporation by reference; (2) assumption; (3)agency; (4) veil-piercing/alter-ego; and (5) estoppel. Javitch, 315F.3d at 629, citing Thompson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 776.）而且非签字人受其未签字的仲裁协议拘束的情况是有“证据支持“在合同法一般原则”下其具有同意仲裁的客观意图。如果没有充分罗列以支持基于美国合同法或美国代理法的明确理论的事实，则美国非签字方不可受仲裁拘束。否则，将违反常规和习惯上的有经验的商务人士的预期。（The Second Circuit in Sanhank explained that the instances in which a nonsignatory is bound to the arbitration agreement of another are those where "the totality of the evidence supports an objective intention to agree to arbitrate," under "general principles of contract law." Sanhank, 404 F.3d at 662 ("An American nonsignatory cannot be bound to arbitrate in the absence of a full showing of facts supporting an articulable theory based on American contract law or American agency law. To hold otherwise would defeat the ordinary and customary expectations of experienced business persons.)）
法院结合本案事实，认为申请人的论据的主要问题是，颠倒了因果。理由是母公司和子公司是不同的法人实体，并且合并后的存续公司仍然是具有自己的资产、财产和权利的独立公司。反向三角合并中目标公司的权利和义务未转移，被承担或受影响（See also Medpartners, 748 N.E.2d at 607-08 ("The Ohio Supreme Court has held that parent and subsidiary corporations are distinct legal entities" and that "a surviving corporation after a merger remains a separate and distinct corporation, with its own assets, property and rights"); Binder, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 772 (the rights and obligations of the target company in a reverse triangular merger are not transferred, assumed, or affected)）。 申请人援引的法规仅适用于Reynolds承担UCS的义务，前提是事实上有是Reynolds与DCS（或UCS）之间的合并；然而，事实表明，Reynolds并未与DCS或UCS合并。 相反，它与Racecar（UCS Holding的子公司）合并，结果是Reynolds成为了（仍然存续的）DCS的全资子公司。（The main problem with Petitioners' argument is that it puts the cart before the horse. The statute that Petitioner cites only applies for Reynolds to assume obligations of UCS if there, in fact, was a merger between Reynolds and DCS (or UCS). However, the facts presented show that Reynolds did not merge with DCS or UCS; instead it merged with Racecar, with the result being that Reynolds became a wholly-owned subsidiary of (the still existing) DCS. ） 虽然申请人主张由于Reynolds在美国证监会作出的公开陈述，应认为至少出于本申请的目的，Reynolds已与UCS合并；但是，这样的主张与表明该交易是“反向三角合并”的事实并没有改变本法院关于Reynolds实际上未与DCS或UCS合并的裁定相矛盾。 在Town & Country Salida, 521 F. App'x案中，地方法院依照在宣誓证明书和当事人无争议的陈述，当事方未签署仲裁协议，因而撤消对仲裁裁决）。真相是，申请人的“被认为已经合并”的主张实际上是主张Reynolds被禁反言，不是其没有与UCS合并。 （Petitioners argue that Reynolds should be deemed to have merged with UCS (at least for purposes of the Petition) due to public representations that Reynolds has made. (See Doc. 19 at PAGEID # 368.) However, such an argument does not contradict the facts showing that the transaction was a "reverse triangular merger" or change the finding of this Court that Reynolds did not actually merge with DCS or UCS. See Town & Country Salida, 521 F. App'x at 473 (district court's decision to vacate arbitration award against party because party did not sign the arbitration agreement was properly based on statements in affidavit that were not contradicted by opposing party). Instead, Petitioners' "deemed to have merged" argument is really an assertion that Reynolds should be estopped from claiming that it did not merge with UCS. ）Reynolds本身仍然是一个独立的法律实体，没有承担DCS或UCS的义务的义务。法院以同样的理由驳回了申请人主张的UCS做出的保证对Reynolds产生拘束力的主张。
申请人还主张因为Reynolds使用UCS的商业名称，因此实际上其与UCS合并，因此其应受仲裁协议管辖。法院还驳回了该主张，并且指出相关法规不适用于此处的情况，而是适用于“允许原告在错误使用被告的商标名称或虚构名称时针对实际被告提起诉讼”（Petitioners' cited caselaw demonstrates the flaws in their argument. O.R.C. § 1329.10(C) operates to allow a plaintiff to proceed against the real defendant in interest when the trade name or fictitious name of that defendant is mistakenly used.）。
申请人还主张，其在美国证监会材料中的陈述、两个联邦案件、以及在其网站上将该交易称为“合并”，因此Reynolds基于禁反言原则应受仲裁拘束。法院驳回了该主张，理由是，首先，Reynolds并没有在否认仲裁条款的同时又寻求从协议中直接受益（First, there is no evidence that Reynolds sought "a direct benefit from the [three contracts at issue], while disavowing the arbitration provision." Javitch, 315F.3d at 629. In fact, Petitioners' filings indicate that the contracts were entered in 1997, court proceedings by the Petitioners against the UCS entities started in the early 2000's, and Reynolds' reverse triangular merger with Racecar did not happen until 2006. (Doc. 1 at PAGEID # 2; Doc. 19 at PAGEID #359.)）。申请人只能表明其依赖于美国证监会的文件而者之外没有依赖其他任何陈述。此外，申请人对美国证监会文件的依赖是不合理的，尽管Reynolds的简要描述可能会有误导性，但这并不构成欺诈性的虚假陈述。法院还认为，申请人依照其他案件提出的陈述的司法禁反言主张不适用于本案。（Second, Reynolds apparently simplified how it characterized the reverse triangular merger in the documents that Petitioners highlight. While perhaps misleading, it is a stretch that such statements constitute "a factual misrepresentation," and they are not fraudulent. As in State ex rel. Shisler, there is no evidence of fraud or intentional misrepresentation by Reynolds. Based on the circumstances, this Court finds that Reynolds is not bound to the arbitration agreements on an equitable estoppel theory. Gen.Electric, 285 F. Supp. 2d at 1050-51; State ex rel. Shisler, 909N.E.2d at 615; Sanhank, 404 F.3d at 662.）
申请人还主张该问题由巴西法院对Reynolds作出过裁决，因此美国法院应当尊重巴西法院裁决的既判力。法院驳回了该主张，理由是“在外国法院程序中与该法院无关联且不受管辖的一方可以拒绝出庭，并且在面对随后的确认程序时可以成功地对缺乏管辖权提出抗辩”，因此该判决的既判力在此不适用（The Court agrees with Reynolds that a party named in foreign court proceedings to which they have no contact and are not subject to jurisdiction can refuse to appear in those proceedings and successfully contest a lack of jurisdiction when faced with subsequent confirmation proceedings. Here, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to bind Reynolds to the Brazilian court's "Decision" or the arbitration agreements.）。巴西的判决也未能满足俄亥俄法律下的既判力要求，而申请人也未能在美国执行巴西的判决。法院还认定，由于巴西法院从未拥有适当的管辖权，因此“管辖权合并”原则确实不适用。（Although this Court therefore need not address anything further concerning the res judicata issue, the Brazilian court's "Decision" also appears unable to fulfill other requirements under federal and Ohio state law necessary to give it preclusive effect: • under the federal law factors, it is questionable whether Reynolds was provided a full and fair trial of the issues with respect to the Decision;• under the federal law factors, it is also questionable whether the Decision does not violate public policy;• under Ohio law, it is questionable whether the Decision qualifies as a foreign country judgment because the definition of foreign country judgment is any judgment of a foreign country that grants or denies the recovery of a sum of money (O.R.C.§ 2329.90(B)), yet the Decision does not grant or deny recovery of money; •under Ohio law, a foreign country judgment shall not be recognized and enforced if it is determined that [t]he claim for relief on which the foreign country judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of Ohio (O.R.C. §2329.92(A)(3)); and • under Ohio law, a foreign country judgment shall not be recognized and enforced where, [i]f jurisdiction was based only on personal service, the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.）
最后，申请人主张Reynolds与DCS人格混同，因此应受仲裁拘束的主张。法院驳回了该主张，理由是证据表明二者的实体是分开的实体（Reynolds and DCS—which, again, merged with UCS in 2001, with DCS as the surviving entity post-merger—are not one and the same, but instead have been shown to exist as separate entities. (Docs. 9-1, 9-2, 9-3, 22-1.) Also,Reynolds does not own UCS (or DCS) or any of the parties that contracted with Petitioners.）。
法院驳回了确认裁决申请。
三、评论
虽然一般而言仲裁协议和仲裁裁决对非仲裁协议缔约方并无拘束力，但是也有诸如在通过引用、权利义务承担、代理、揭开公司面纱、禁反言等例外情况下，法院也可能认定仲裁协议对非仲裁协议缔约方有拘束力。本案中，法院的认定依据是涉案该公司在复杂并购之后，其本身并未与作为仲裁协议签字方的母公司合并，而是其完全独立的子公司。由于被申请人法人人格独立，因此母公司的仲裁协议与该公司无关，因而法院拒绝适用例外规定。