2020年1月20日，在Kabab-ji Sal (Lebanon) v Kout Food Group (Kuwait) [2020] EWCA Civ 6一案中，英格兰及威尔士上诉法院认定《国际统一私法协会（UNIDROIT）国际商事合同通则》和英格兰法在禁止口头修改条款方面的禁反言的法理方面没有区别，禁止口头修改条款的有效性例外也一样，即一方当事人因禁反言而不得主张该条款。因为本案涉案协议中有严格的禁止口头修改条款，而本案实体协议由上诉人与被上诉人的子公司订立，而且不存在明确的书面文件表明被上诉人同意参加仲裁，所以该仲裁裁决不得对被上诉人强制执行。

一、背景介绍

上诉人Kabab-ji Sal是一家黎巴嫩公司，已与科威特公司AHFC签订了《特许经营发展协议》（Franchise Development Agreement, FDA）。其中规定协议准据法是英格兰法，并且由诚信原则和公平原则、以及普遍在国际交易中承认的法律原则（principles of law generally recognised ininternational transactions）补充；仲裁地在法国巴黎，机构为国际商会仲裁院（ICC）。

2005年，AHFC成为被上诉人Kout Food Group的子公司，被上诉人也是一家科威特公司。上诉人与AHFC就FDA的履行产生争议。上诉人在法国巴黎国际商会仲裁院总部提起仲裁。然而，上诉人仅针对被上诉人，而非AHFC提起仲裁。仲裁庭裁定，被上诉人是否受仲裁协议拘束需依照法国法认定，但是AHFC与被上诉人之间是否发生实质性权利和义务转移的问题则需要依照英格兰法认定，而仲裁庭的结论是，根据当事人的行为可以推定为权利义务的转让（novation），因此被上诉人成为主要特许经营者，受FDA拘束，并且被上诉人违反了FDA。

被上诉人向法国法院提出了撤裁申请。同时，上诉人根据1996《仲裁法》第101条在英格兰法院申请执行裁决，英格兰法院单方面裁定执行该仲裁裁决。被上诉人根据1996《仲裁法》第103（2）（a）和（b）向英格兰法院申请拒绝承认和执行该裁决并撤销单方面裁定。英格兰法院对某些初步问题进行了审理，并认定仲裁条款的效力以及被上诉人是否加入仲裁的问题的准据法是英格兰法，并认定被上诉人并未成为FDA的当事人，因此也未成为其仲裁协议的当事人。

虽然FDA包含禁止口头修改（No Oral Modification）条款，但上诉人坚持主张被上诉人通过其行为，在现有当事人的明示或默示同意下为成为了FDA的一方当事人。

原审法官指出，由于本案协议准据法是英格兰法，并且由诚信原则和公平原则、以及普遍在国际交易中承认的法律原则（principles of law generally recognised ininternational transactions）补充，而对于“普遍在国际交易中承认的法律原则”仲裁员参照适用2016《国际统一私法协会（UNIDROIT）国际商事合同通则》，但其结论是仲裁庭无法在仲裁协议中添加任何内容，理由是仲裁条款规定，在任何情况下仲裁员都不得使用任何与协议严格措词相抵触的规则。

原审法官适用了Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd [2018] UKSC 24, [2019] A.C. 119, [2018] 5 WLUK 292案中有关禁止口头修改条款的法理，指出禁反言的范围无限扩张以至破坏当事人协议的确定性。然而，原审法官没有就此问题做出最终决定，并指出鉴于FDA要求当事人遵守诚信原则和公平原则要求，如果上诉人可以出示文件证明存在类似书面同意的文件使得被上诉人成为协议的一方，则可能存在一定可能来以诚信原则来将其解释为被上诉人加入FDA的书面同意。因此，原审法官裁定中止上诉人的执行申请，以待被上诉人向法国法院提出的撤裁申请的结果。

上诉人不服，就涉及仲裁协议准据法的初步问题以及被上诉人是否已成为该协议的当事人的一项法院决定提出上诉。被上诉人对原审法官未就初步问题做出最终裁定而提出交叉上诉。

二、法院认定

上诉法院驳回上诉人的上诉，批准了被上诉人的交叉上诉。

在仲裁协议准据法方面，上诉法院认为，根据FDA第1条，该书面协议即包括所有协议条款，其中包括仲裁条款。第15条规定，协议准据法为英格兰法，并且由诚信原则和公平原则、以及普遍在国际交易中承认的法律原则（principles of law generally recognised in international transactions）补充，而仲裁条款本身指出，仲裁员应适用FDA中的规定。根据Moore-Bick LJ in Sulamerica v Enesa Engelharia [2012] EWCA Civ 638; [2013]1 WLR 102案和采纳该案的新加坡的BCY v BCZ [2016] 2 Lloyd's Rep 583案, 除非有相反的表征，否则实体合同的准据法是仲裁协议准据法的有力表征（the governing law of the main contract is a strong indicator of the governing law of the arbitration agreement unless there are indications to the contrary.）。而依照Arsanovia v Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings [2012] EWHC 3702 (Comm); [2013]1 Lloyd's Rep 235案，双方当事人对仲裁条款中无任何内容表明仲裁条款准据法是英格兰法这点并无争议，因此，第1条和第15条的正确解释是准据法条款涵盖了整个仲裁协议，存在有整个FDA的准据法为英格兰法的明确意图（As Andrew Smith J said in Arsanovia at [22]: "Express terms do not stipulate only what is absolutely and unambiguously explicit". If, as I have held, the express words the parties have used in Articles 1 and 15 and the first sentence of Article 14.3, demonstrate a clear intention that the entire FDA including the arbitration agreement, is to be governed by English law, it matters not that this is not spelt out expressly in Article 14 itself. That express choice of English law as governing the entire FDA including the arbitration agreement is not affected by the fact that Article 14.5 provides that the seat of the arbitration is to be Paris. Whatever impact that provision might have on an implied choice of the governing law of the arbitration agreement, it cannot overcome the clear effect of the express terms of the FDA that Article 15 covers not only the FDA but the arbitration agreement.）。仲裁条款规定，仲裁地应为法国巴黎，这一事实并不影响对英格兰法的明确选择。原审法官认为当事人明确选择英格兰法为仲裁协议准据法的判断是正确的，并不用考虑仲裁地对仲裁协议的准据法的作用（Accordingly, in my judgment, the judge was correct in his determination that there was an express choice of English law as the governing law of the arbitration agreement. That conclusion means that it is not necessary to consider KFG's alternative case that there was an implied choice of English law, thereby avoiding deciding the questions whether the correct analysis of Sulamerica is the one for which Mr Diwan QC contends and how the requirement of necessity for business efficacy before a term can be implied can be satisfied in any given case where there is a fallback position of either the law of the country with which the arbitration agreement has its closest and most real connection or the law of the country where the award is made. Since those questions do not require to be answered, it seems to me better to leave them for determination in another case where they are a necessary part of the determination to be made by the Court.）。

在禁止口头修改条款的效果方面，在Rock Advertising案之前的法理为禁止口头修改条款无效。但是，在Rock Advertising案中，Sumption勋爵讨论了该案的一个特别的事实，即《国际统一私法协会（UNIDROIT）国际商事合同通则》确实承认这种条款是有效的，只是存在例外，即在另一方已合理行事，且另一方已经对一方当事人的行为有合理依赖的情况下，一方当事人因其行为而被禁止主张这种条款有效。从Rock Advertising案中可以得出，在禁反言法理上，《国际统一私法协会（UNIDROIT）国际商事合同通则》和英格兰法之间几乎没有什么区别，其并未规定比英格兰法更广泛的排除标准（What emerges is that there is little difference between the UNIDROIT approach and the English approach through the doctrines of estoppel. This is borne out by the example of the exception in the second sentence of Article 2.1.18 given in the Comment on the UNIDROIT Principles.）。而即便《国际统一私法协会（UNIDROIT）国际商事合同通则》的排除标准比英格兰法更广泛，则其也不能用来取代FDA中的禁止口头修改条款，理由是这将与FDA的严格措辞相抵触，这对于诚信原则和公平原则同样适用（Even if, contrary to that conclusion, the UNIDROIT principles are enunciating some broader test for preclusion than that laid down by Lord Sumption JSC, those principles cannot be used to override the No Oral Modification clauses in the FDA. That would be to contradict the strict wording of the FDA, which is prohibited by the last sentence of Article 14.3…Similarly, the principle of good faith and fair dealing, whether in Article 2 of the FDA or Article 1.7 of the UNIDROIT principles, cannot be used to override the clear wording of the No Oral Modification clauses to a greater extent than identified by Lord Sumption JSC. ）。

在本案中，禁止口头修改条款的严格措辞只能在英格兰法作为FDA的准据法允许的范围内，即在满足Rock Advertising案中对禁反言的标准得到满足的范围内，才能被允许被超越；同样，诚信原则和公平原则不能比Rock Advertising案所规定的范围而超越禁止口头修改条款的明确措辞，理由是不能利用诚信原则来重写协议，并且这与合同的明确规定相冲突（The second sentence of Article 2 refers to interpretation of the provisions of the FDA in good faith, but in my judgment that sentence cannot enable the appellant to override the No Oral Modification clauses on broader grounds than laid down in Rock Advertising for two reasons. First, I consider that the analogy with the interpretation of treaties considered by Lord Bingham in the Immigration Officer at Prague Airport case is an apt one. Interpretation in good faith cannot be used to rewrite the FDA so as to dilute the strict wording of the No Oral Modification clauses. The second, related, reason is that to use interpretation in good faith as justifying the overriding of the No Oral Modification clauses in wider circumstances than laid down by Rock Advertising would be to apply a rule which contradicts the strict wording of the FDA, contrary to the last sentence of Article 14.3.）。

Rock Advertising案中对禁反言的标准为（1）以某些文字或行为明确表示对协议的变更是有效的，该文字或行为可是非正式的；（2）对于此目的而言，其标准高于非正式承诺。鉴于被上诉人确实不存以书面形式同意加入仲裁，也不存在被上诉人以书面形式对此作出的同意，因此，FDA中的禁止口头修改条款即意味着，除非被上诉人满足Rock Advertising案中对禁反言的标准，否则被上诉人不成为仲裁中的一方当事人。（Accordingly, given that there was no question of the addition of KFG as a party having been agreed in writing or of any consent in writing to their addition, the No Oral Modification clauses in the FDA would mean that KFG did not become a party to the FDA or the arbitration agreement unless, applying the Rock Advertising test there were "(i)…some words or conduct unequivocally representing that the variation was valid notwithstanding its informality; and (ii) something more would be required for this purpose than the informal promise itself." It is clear from the judge's findings of fact, particularly at [50] to [53] of his judgment that the appellant cannot begin to satisfy the Rock Advertising test. Furthermore, none of the matters now relied upon by the appellant as set out at [43] above, satisfy that test.）。

因此，上诉法院做出最终裁定，认为被上诉人不是FDA或仲裁协议的当事人，因此根据1996《仲裁法》第103（2）条，该仲裁裁决不得针对被上诉人执行

此外，对于原审法院的裁定，上诉法院认为有误。首先，法国法院的撤裁审理与英格兰法院无关，其适用的并不是《纽约公约》而是法国法；其次，初审法院没有考虑到若在法国法院作出裁定之后，将可能出现哪些其他的材料或证据以使得上诉人满足Rock Advertising案中对禁反言的标准而有权对被上诉人执行仲裁裁决作为裁决，即简易判决的标准——上诉人有真实的可以执行该仲裁裁决的前景（the appellant had a real prospect of successfully enforcing the Award）。因为本案上诉人并无法满足这一点，所以原审法官本不应中止程序以待法国法院的认定，而应该直接作出拒绝承认和执行该仲裁裁决终局裁定（I consider that in failing to make that final determination but adjourning the appellant's application for enforcement for a possible further hearing after the determination of the issue of annulment by the Cour d'appel de Paris, the judge erred in principle and in law in two respects. First, he overlooked that the decision of the French Court was not relevant to the questions of English law and its application to the facts which were before the judge. This was a fortiori the position given that the French Court would not apply the Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention test in determining the law of the arbitration agreement, but internal French law. I suppose the only possible relevance of the decision of the French Court would be if it annuls the Award, so that in effect the English proceedings become academic, but that future possibility would be no reason for adjourning the English proceedings at the behest of the Award creditor after three days of hearing on the merits of the application to enforce the Award. The second error the judge made is that he failed to make any assessment as to whether, in the event that the application was restored for further hearing after the determination by the French Court, the appellant had a real prospect of successfully establishing that KFG was a party to the FDA and the arbitration agreement and thus of enforcing the Award as a judgment in this jurisdiction under section 101 of the Arbitration Act 1996. In other words the judge should have considered whether the appellant could satisfy the summary judgment test, in accordance with Honeywell…To the extent that the appellant was arguing for an adjournment until after the determination of the French Court, it was incumbent on the appellant to demonstrate that at a further hearing before the Commercial Court the appellant had a real prospect of successfully enforcing the Award. It is obvious from the judge's findings, particularly at [47] to [53], that, on the material before the judge, there was no such prospect given that the appellant could not begin to satisfy the Rock Advertising test.）。

因此，上诉法院裁定驳回上诉人的上诉，批准了被上诉人的交叉上诉，驳回上诉人的执行申请。

三、评论

在本案中，上诉法院的思路在于将《国际统一私法协会（UNIDROIT）国际商事合同通则》和英格兰法在禁止口头修改条款方面的禁反言的法理方面进行协同解释，并结合事实，在实体协议的解释认定禁止口头修改条款有效，被上诉人不因行为而被纳入实体协议；在仲裁协议的准据法方面，虽然仲裁地在法国巴黎，但是由于实体协议准据法为英格兰法，而且也没有其他有利表征证明英格兰法不是仲裁协议准据法，因此法院认定仲裁协议准据法为英格兰法，在审查被上诉人是否纳入仲裁协议而成为仲裁协议一方时，需要满足英格兰的Rock Advertising案中对禁反言的标准，因此被上诉人不因行为而被纳入仲裁协议。此外，法院强调了在审理案件过程中的独立性，即英格兰法院需要以简易判决的标准来审理案件，如果上诉人因为无法提供被上诉人明确同意参加仲裁的书面材料连这一点都无法满足，就应该彻底驳回其执行申请。然而，若上诉人满足这一点的话，则有可能原审法院的裁定有一定的合理性。

本案给我们带来的另一个启发是，由于本案的实体合同适用英格兰法，并且由诚信原则和公平原则、以及普遍在国际交易中承认的法律原则（principles of law generally recognised in international transactions）补充，但是仲裁地在法国巴黎，因此在法律适用问题上存在较多的混乱情况。本案中出现了例如英格兰法与《国际统一私法协会（UNIDROIT）国际商事合同通则》的解释问题，以及实体准据法英格兰法和仲裁地法法国法之间的冲突问题，特别是仲裁庭基于仲裁地在法国而认定被上诉人是否受仲裁协议拘束需依照法国法认定，但是英格兰法院认定仲裁协议准据法为英格兰法，二者之间存在冲突。因此，在复杂国际商事交易过程中，需要仔细研究以起草适当的准据法条款和选择仲裁地，以免出现本案这样的复杂情况。