2019年10月17日，在Leidos Inc v Hellenic Republic [2019] EWHC 2738(Comm)一案中，英格兰及威尔士高等法院王座法庭商事法庭裁定《1996年仲裁法》第103条第（2）款第（f）项的中止仲裁裁决与中止仲裁裁决的执行之间没有本质区别。该内容是《纽约公约》中拒绝执行仲裁的重要理由之一，申请人在申请执行裁决时，若对该内容存疑则应当对此进行披露，否则构成重大过失，法院拒绝判付其巨额法律费用。
一、背景介绍
本案涉及在被申请人撤回其撤销单方命令（without notice / ex parte）以允许申请人执行仲裁裁决之后，英国法院被要求处理与执行仲裁裁决有关的诉讼费用的分配。
本案的主要焦点在于以下法条：
《纽约公约》
第五条
一 . 裁决唯有于受裁决援用之一造向声请承认及执行地之主管机关提具证据证明有下列情形之一时，始得依该造之请求，拒予承认及执行： ……
(戊) 裁决对各造尚无拘束力，或业经裁决地所在国或裁决所依据法律之国家之主管机关撤销或停止执行者。
New York Convention
Article V
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
…
(e) The award has notyet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.
英格兰及威尔士《1996年仲裁法》第103条第（2）款第（f）项
（2）如果被对方证明以下事项，则裁决可被拒绝承认或执行—
…
（f）裁决尚未对当事各方具有约束力，或已由作出裁决的国家或法律所依据的国家的主管当局撤销或中止。
Arbitration Act 1996, s 103 (2) (f)
(2)Recognition or enforcement of the award may be refused if the person against whom it is invoked proves—
…
(f)that the award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, it was made.
申请人(Leidos)依照就其与被申请人（希腊政府）开发2004年雅典奥运会和残奥会期间使用的公共安全系统的合同产生的争议而进行的ICC仲裁之后，在2013年获得了数额为4000万欧元的仲裁裁决。被申请人在希腊法院对该裁决提出异议。在希腊最高法院审理案件期间，申请人采取措施在希腊执行了该裁决，希腊最高法院发布了一项临时命令要求在希腊最高法院对从雅典上诉法院提交的上诉作出决定之前中止执行该裁决。（The court SUSPENDS the enforcement of the arbitrary decision dated 2-7-2013 of the International Arbitrary Court of the International Trade Chamber in the case 16394/GZ/MHZ, until a decision of the Supreme Court is delivered on the petition for cassation dated 14-3-2018,exercised by the petitioning party against the decision 3567/2017 of the Appeal Court of Athens and on condition of the hearing of the petition for cassation on 3-12-2018.）在希腊，只有在希腊最高法院作出裁决后，希腊才能执行裁决（"enforcement of the Award in Greece is not possible until the Supreme Court renders its decision"）。“直到对上诉申请作出判决为止，仲裁裁决的执行已中止。这意味着，就希腊的法令而言，直到希腊最高法院对上诉申请作出判决为止，Leidos不能对国家的私有财产采取强制性措施来满足其要求。”（"the enforcement of the arbitration award has been suspended until the judgment on the appeal application is issued. This means that, as far as the Greek legal order is concerned, Leidos cannot impose compulsory measures against the private property of the State to satisfy its claim which is accepted by the arbitration award, until a judgment has been given by the Supreme Court on the application for appeal"）。
申请人随后试图在英格兰执行该裁决，并获得了Teare J根据《1996年仲裁法》第101条的规定批准的一份准予执行的单方（without notice/ex parte）命令。在申请期间申请人并未向法院披露可能存在适用《1996年仲裁法》第103条第（2）款第（f）项的情形。
《1996年仲裁法》第101条
（1）《纽约公约》的裁决应被认为对裁决当事人具有约束力，并可以据此以在英格兰和威尔士以及北爱尔兰的任何法律程序中进行抗辩，抵销或其他此类方式。
（2）《纽约公约》的裁决可以经法院准许，以与法院的判决或命令相同的方式执行，具有相同的效力。
关于“法院”的含义，请参阅第105条。
（3）若法院给予准许，可根据裁决书作出判决。
Arbitration Act 1996, 101
(1)A New York Convention award shall be recognised as binding on the persons as between whom it was made, and may accordingly be relied on by those persons by way of defence, set-off or otherwise in any legal proceedings in England and Wales or Northern Ireland.
(2)A New York Convention award may, by leave of the court, be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order of the court to the same effect.
As to the meaning of “the court” see section 105.
(3)Where leave is so given, judgment may be entered in terms of the award.
被申请人提议直至希腊最高法院最终解决该问题之前应该中止该命令。但在申请人方面坚持除非被申请人就该裁决支付全额保证金，否则申请人不会同意中止诉讼。被申请人拒绝了申请人的要求，并根据《1996年仲裁法》第103条第（2）款第（f）项规定申请撤销单方命令，因为裁决已根据希腊最高法院的命令中止执行拒绝执行。此后，在撤销请求开庭审理之前，希腊最高法院驳回了被申请人对裁决的最终上诉，并撤销了诉讼中止（On 20 June 2019, the Greek Supreme Court handed down judgment dismissing The Hellenic Republic's final appeal by way of challenge to the Award.）。
希腊最高法院对希腊政府的异议予以驳回，并取消了对执行的中止，其结果是，希腊政府不再有任何事实依据以抗辩该裁决依照《1996年仲裁法》第103条的执行。《1996年仲裁法》第103条仅规定了执行裁决的有限的几个的抗辩理由，并且（与未披露有关的程序性问题以外）仅是申请中确定的撤销的唯一理由第103条第（2）款第（f）项已经不存在了。（The effect of the dismissal by the Greek Supreme Court of The Hellenic Republic's challenge, and the lifting of the suspension on enforcement, was that there was no longer any available ground on which it could realistically be argued by The Hellenic Republic that the Award should not be enforced pursuant to the provisions of s. 103. That section provides for only a limited number of grounds of challenge to the enforcement of an award, and (leaving aside procedural questions relating to non-disclosure) the only ground for challenge identified in the application to set aside (s. 103 (2) (f)) had fallen away.）
然后，被申请人支付了赔偿金，达成了同意令（consent order）并撤回了撤销申请，但仍需要审理费用问题。（"[3] AND UPON the agreement, in principle, of the Defendant to withdraw the Set Aside Application subject to recovery of its costs of the Set Aside Application [4] AND UPON the listing of a half-day hearing 11 October 2019 to determine the issue of the award of costs relating to the Enforcement Order and the Set Aside Application "）。
因此，费用是唯一尚待确定的未决问题，需要在法庭庭审上确定。
二、法院认定
本案的情况是，申请人已开始执行程序，并获得了单方执行命令；该命令尚未撤销；反驳该命令的实质性理由已经消失；并且该裁决随后已经支付。在这种情况下，申请人是胜诉方，根据《英国民事诉讼规则》的第44条的一般规则是除非法院应根据案件的所有情况做出一些不同的命令，否则被申请人应支付申请人的费用。但是法院可以考虑所有情况，包括所有当事方的行为后做出不同的命令。当事方的行为包括诉讼程序之前和之中的行为，以及当事方提出，继续进行的或提出异议的主张或观点是否合理。（The general principles concerning the Court's discretion as to costs are set out in CPR 44.2. The court has a discretion as to whether costs are payable by one party to another. The general rule, as set out in CPR 44.2 (2) (a), is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party, but the court can make a different order.CPR 44.2 (4) requires the court to have regard to all the circumstances, including the conduct of all the parties. Under CPR 44.2 (5), the conduct of the parties includes conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings, as well as whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular allegation or issue.）在本案中问题出在申请人在申请期间申请人并未向法院披露可能存在适用《1996年仲裁法》第103条第（2）款第（f）项的情形。
申请人称，在希腊最高法院判决后撤回的强制执行申请和撤销申请中，其是胜利方，而且第103条第（2）款第（f）项是否适用是属于法院的裁量权。不仅如此，由于希腊法院没有中止该裁决，而只是中止了该裁决的执行。因此第103条第（2）款第（f）项在此不适用，而不披露与不适用的法律条文的有关情形并没有什么问题，并且其诉讼过程中的行为也并无不合理之处。（Apart from contending that there could be no non-disclosure relating to a section that was in applicable, Leidos gave anumber of reasons why any non-disclosure was immaterial or at any event forgivable. Leidos also contended that it had not acted unreasonably in refusing the offer of The Hellenic Republic to stay enforcement of the Teare Jorder: it was reasonable for Leidos to ask for security as a condition of a stay.）被申请人提出反驳，认为因为法院在仲裁地中止了裁决，因此第103条第（2）款（f）项显然适用。希腊最高法院随后作出的驳回上诉的决定，没有有溯及力地证明申请人在提出强制执行申请时的行为是正当的，也没有使被申请人提出申请的决定不合理。（The Hellenic Republic argued that the enforcement application was misconceived when made and that the set aside application was justified when it was made. Section 103 (2) (f) was clearly applicable, because there had been a suspension of the Award by the court in the seat of the arbitration. The subsequent decision of the Greek Supreme Court, dismissing the challenge to the Award, did not retrospectively justify Leidos's conduct in making the enforcement application, or render unjustified The Hellenic Republic's decision to make the set aside application. Still less did it make Leidos the successful party in any relevant sense. No application should have been made whilst the suspension was in place.）
法院认为，总的来说，结合案情来看，上诉人是胜利方，因此应当适用一般的费用规则。法院考虑的点是是否应该作出不同的费用裁定。（I think that in these circumstances it is correct to regard Leidos as the successful party. Accordingly, the general rule is that The Hellenic Republic should pay Leidos' costs. The question, therefore, is whether or not the court should make some different order bearing in mind all the circumstances of the case.）
关于第103条第（2）款第（f）项的“由作出裁决的国家或法律所依据的国家的主管当局撤销或中止”是否适用于本案希腊最高法院暂时中止在对实质性异议作出裁定前裁决的执行方面，法院的观点是毫无疑问该项适用。希腊最高法院的命令是中止裁决以满足第103条第（2）款第（f）项，其效力是直到希腊最高法院对实质性异议作出裁定前阻止裁决的执行，直到希腊最高法院对实质性异议作出裁定。中止（"suspension"）不必是永久性的，其字面表示其只是暂时性的中止。不必将中止表示为具有域外效力，而就像本案的希腊最高法院这样的主管当局明确表示在裁决被裁定之前不得执行该裁决就足够了。关于裁决是否中止的问题必须视为实质问题，而该问题发生在当仲裁地法院在对裁决的异议作出决定之前一直中止执行时。就第103条而言，在中止裁决和中止裁决的执行之间没有本质区别。如果撤销的申请在希腊最高法院的裁决之前得到审理，则该申请很可能会成功，但这并不意味着对强制执行的申请是错误的，因为法院保留了强制执行的裁量权。因此，尽管存在中止，申诉人仍可以请求强制执行，并确定法院应不依照第103条第（2）款第（f）项的规定而强制执行的原因。但是，一旦中止本身消失，关于在本案中是否存在该原因就变得没有意义了。（I had little doubt, however, that the effect ofthe September and October 2018 orders of the Supreme Court were to "suspend" the Award. Those orders prevented any enforcement of the Award, pending the determination of the substantive challenge before the Supreme Court. If this did not qualify as a "suspension" of the Award, then it is difficult to see what would suffice. I do not accept Leidos' argument that the "suspension" has to be permanent in nature. In my view, a suspension denotes something which is temporary. Nor do I accept that it is necessary for the "suspension" to be expressed to have extra-territorial effect: it is sufficient if, as here, the Greek Supreme Court (obviously a "competent authority") makes it clear that there can be no enforcement of the Award pending its determination of the substantive application. Nor do I consider that a suspension of the enforcement of the Award is to be distinguished from a suspension of the award. I agree with Mr Morrison that the question of whether there has been a suspension of the award must be considered as a matter of substance, and that this occurs where the courts of the seat have stayed enforcement pending determination of a challenge to the Award. I also agree that, in the context of s 103 – which is concerned with enforcement and which identifies the circumstances in which enforcement should not or may be refused – it makes no sense to distinguish between suspension of the Award and suspension of the enforcement of an award.）
该条本身是执行《纽约公约》的规定，而考虑到《纽约公约》的起草历史，对“中止”一词没有明确的定义，但业内评注表明，“中止”一词的适用范围确实涵盖了通过司法裁决中止裁决的执行，尽管可以说该裁决不适用于仅因提起撤裁诉讼而自动中止裁决的情况。（These indicate that no clear definition of "suspended" emerges from a consideration of the New York Convention's drafting history. However, these commentaries also indicate that the term "suspended" does extend to the suspension of the enforcement of an award by a judicial decision, albeit that it arguably does not apply where an award is automatically suspended as a result of the mere bringing of an action to set it aside: see e.g. Gaillard and Bermann (eds) Guide on the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Brill 2017); Christoph Liebscher, "Article V (1)(e)" in Wolff (ed), New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Beck/Hart 2012); and Nadia Darwazeh, "Article V(1)(e)" in H Kronke,P Nacimiento, D Otto and NC Port (eds), Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Global Commentary on the New York Convention (Kluwer Law International 2010).）这些评注还提到了许多决定支持“中止”涵盖中止执行裁决的情况的主张。例如，Gaillard和Bermann的《承认及执行外国仲裁裁决公约指南》指出：
a）瑞士联邦法庭的一项裁决认为，“中止”一词涵盖了这样一种情况，即法院“注意到过错有可能影响裁决，因此中止其执行，直到法院审理完撤销裁决的诉讼该问题得到实质解决为止。”；
b）瑞典最高法院的一项裁决认为，“中止”一词是指“在特定情况下，外国当局命令撤销有约束力和可执行的裁决或中止其执行的情况。 ”
但是，即使假设情况下撤销的应用程序很有可能会成功，但这并不意味着强制执行的申请是错误的。第103条中表明的《纽约公约》意图是在所在地法院对裁决的异议，以及对此类异议的确定，都不会自动阻止裁决在其他地方执行。因此，如果有在仲裁地法院的未决撤裁申，则第103条第（5）款规定，另一法院“如认为适当，可将关于认可或执行该裁决的决定暂缓”。如果该申请导致撤销裁决或中止裁决，则适用第103条第2款（f）项，其结果是“可以拒绝”承认裁决。因此，即使在后一种情况下，法院也拥有裁量权，尽管该裁量权是“很窄的”裁量权。因此，尽管有第103条第（2）款（f）项的规定，申请人仍有权要求执行裁决，并查清法院应予以执行的原因。一旦中止本身消失，关于在本案中是否可能存在这种原因的任何疑问就不具有现实意义了。（Subsequent to drafting the above conclusions, I have considered a number of commentaries, referred to below, which discuss the relevant part of the New York Convention and which confirm the view I have expressed. These indicate that no clear definition of "suspended" emerges from a consideration of the New York Convention's drafting history. However, these commentaries also indicate that the term "suspended" does extend to the suspension of the enforcement of an award by a judicial decision, albeit that it arguably does not apply where an award is automatically suspended as a result of the mere bringing of an action to set it aside: see e.g. Gaillard and Bermann (eds) Guide on the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Brill 2017); Christoph Liebscher, "Article V (1)(e)" in Wolff (ed), New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Beck/Hart 2012);and Nadia Darwazeh, "Article V(1)(e)" in H Kronke, P Nacimiento, DOtto and NC Port (eds), Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Global Commentary on the New York Convention (Kluwer Law International 2010).
These commentaries also refer to a number of decisions which support the proposition that "suspended" encompasses the situation where enforcement of an award is suspended. For example, Gaillard and Bermann (eds) Guide on the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Brill 2017) refer to:
a) A decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, which held that the term "suspended" covers a situation in which a court "noticing that a fault is likely to impact the award, prevents its enforcement until such time as the issue is settled substantively by the court examining the action to set aside the award";
b) A decision of the Swedish Supreme Court holding that the term "suspended" refers to a "situation where, after specific consideration of the matter, the foreign authority orders the setting aside of a binding and enforceable award or the suspension of its enforcement."
However, even though, in the hypothetical scenario that I am considering, it is highly probable that the application to set aside would have succeeded, this does not mean that the application to enforce was "plainly misconceived". The scheme of the New York Convention, reflected in s 103, is that neither challenges to an award in the courts of the seat, nor the determination of such challenges, automatically prevent enforcement elsewhere. Thus, if there is an unresolved application to set aside an award to the courts of the seat, s. 103 (5) provides that another court "may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the decision on the recognition or enforcement of the award". If that application has resulted in the setting aside of an award, or its suspension, then s.103 (2) (f) applies, with the consequence that recognition of the Award "may be refused". The court therefore, even in the latter case, has a discretion, albeit one that will be a "narrow" one. It was therefore open to Leidos to seek enforcement notwithstanding the suspension, and to identify the reasons why the court should enforce notwithstanding s.103 (2) (f). Any question as to whether or not such reasons might have existed in the present case became academic once the suspension itself fell away.）
关于申请人在申请单方命令时是否有所隐瞒方面，申请人在申请时必须完全坦率的披露（There was no dispute, and can be no doubt, that the without notice application to Teare J required Leidos to give full and frank disclosure. ）。显然本案当事人没有提起过针对根据第103条第（2）款第（f）项的单方命令强制执行的问题（It seems to me that there was a very clear failure to do so in the present case. None of the witness statements provided to Teare J in support of the without notice application referred to the potential defence to enforcement which was available under s.103 (2) (f) .）。证据中陈述的事实导致本节可能潜在适用，但其并未直接提及第103条第（2）款第（f）项和相关的法律论点（The witness statements of Mr Cockburn and Mr O'Brien both contained sections which addressed full and frank disclosure, and possible arguments that might be advanced by The Hellenic Republic in response to the application.）。该遗漏是实质性的并且有重大责任的，这将导致被申请人无法对此进行答辩。在申请人有重大过失未披露关键事实的情况下，在裁决执行程序开始时判令被申请人支付申请人的重大费用显然不公平。（I agree with The Hellenic Republic that this omission was highly culpable. I also consider that this is a matter which is sufficiently serious that it justifies a departure from the general approach that a successful party is entitled to his costs. The importance of proper preparation of without notice applications, and full and frank disclosure in that regard, has been made clear in many authorities, including those to which I have referred. In the present case, an important legal argument, material to the resolution of the application, was not drawn to the attention of the court, although a number of other arguments were identified. I consider that it would be unjust to require The Hellenic Republic to pay the significant costs claimed by Leidos in circumstances where there was a culpable failure to make disclosure of a highly material matter at the outset of the enforcement proceedings.）此外，如果申请人接受了被申请人提出的在希腊最高法院作出决定之前中止该命令的提议，则双方都将节省成本。因为鉴于存在根据第103条第（2）款第（f）项对执行的抗辩，对保全的要求是不当的，该提议应被合理地接受。（I consider that The Hellenic Republic's proposal should reasonably have been accepted by Leidos, and that this would have resulted in the saving of some costs on both sides, in particular the costs incurred by The Hellenic Republic in issuing their set aside application.The reason why the proposal should reasonably have been accepted is because the demand for security was inappropriate in the light of the existence of a defence to enforcement under s. 103 (2) (f).）但也都不意味着申请人需要负担被申请人的费用。（This does not, however, mean that it would be appropriate to require Leidos to pay any costs to The Hellenic Republic, not least because I do not consider that it would be just to order a successful party to pay the costs of an unsuccessful party.）
最终法院判定其不该命令被申请人支付申请人的费用，也不该命令获胜一方支付失败方的费用。
三、评论
本案的费用赔偿要求非常高，其中包括申请执行的费用。本案最大的启示即在进行单方申请（without notice / ex parte）的时候，需要依照当地法律，对于可能涉及的情况进行完全坦率的披露，否则可能导致就算在实体部分取得胜利，也可能因为程序上的重大过失而在诉讼仲裁费用方面不受到法院的支持。并且由于单方申请另一方并不在场，因此可能导致这使得对方无法对申请内容进行辩护，本身是一种违反正当程序的行为。在法律和《纽约公约》对此问题规定不慎明朗的情况下，当事人若进行单方申请（without notice application/ex parte motion）的时候，也必须处于谨慎将该问题提交法院或者法官判断，否则可能构成重大过失，之后对方若对此反驳，则法院很可能对申请方作出重大不利决定。其次，在整个仲裁和诉讼程序中，当事人都应当注意其行为的合理性，否则可能最终法院会对此进行不利裁判。再就是法院在论证和讨论本问题时候，参照援引了诸多著名的国际仲裁从业人员和学者的著述，这点值得我们特别关注。