2019年7月22日,在20/20 Communications, Incorporatedv Lennox Crawford and others, No.18-10260一案中,美国第五巡回上诉法院(以下简称法院)认为,涉案仲裁协议缺乏明确无误的相反约定,故集体仲裁的可仲裁性应由法院而非由仲裁员决定。因此,法院推翻了地区法院作出的认为应由仲裁员决定集体仲裁的可仲裁性的裁定,并撤销了地区法院对条款解释裁决(即仲裁员作出的认定集体仲裁禁止条款无效的条款解释裁决)作出的确认裁定。
一、背景介绍
20/20 Communications是一家全国性的直销公司,该公司聘用现场销售经理,其聘用条件是签署公司的仲裁协议,除其他条款外,该协议规定禁止员工进行集体仲裁,即员工同意仅就其个人行为提起仲裁,而不能就集体或共同行为提起仲裁。
一些现场销售经理提交了单个仲裁请求,但随后又作出修改,提出相同的集体请求。作为回应,20/20 Communications向美国德克萨斯州北部地区联邦地区法院(以下简称地区法院)提起了20/20 Commc’ns, Inc. v. Blevins, No. 4:16-cv-00810-Y (N.D. Tex.)(Means, J.) 案(以下简称Blevins案),请求该法院宣布是否可以进行集体仲裁是应当由法院而非由仲裁员决定的事项,并宣布集体仲裁禁止条款确实能够排除集体仲裁。在该申请待决期间,一些员工要求其各自的仲裁员作出条款解释裁决,裁定集体仲裁禁止条款违反《全国劳工关系法》的规定。随后,有6名仲裁员作出了条款解释裁决,其中一个仲裁员认为集体仲裁禁止条款在《全国劳工关系法》下不可执行。
20/20 Communications随后向地区法院提起20/20 Commc’ns, Inc. v. Crawford, No. 4:17-cv-929-A (N.D. Tex.)(McBryde, J.)案(以下简称Crawford案),请求撤销仲裁员作出的认定集体仲裁禁止条款无效的条款解释裁决。但是,地区法院驳回了20/20 Communications的请求并对条款解释裁决作出确认。20/20 Communications对地区法院的该裁定提出上诉。
随后,地区法院在Blevins案中认为,仲裁协议授权仲裁员而不是法院决定集体仲裁的可仲裁性,并相应驳回了20/20 Communications的请求。同样,20/20 Communications对地区法院的该裁定提出上诉。
法院对Blevins案和Crawford案的上诉进行审理。
二、法院认定
法院认为,在当事人约定将某些争议提交仲裁时,法院自然地期待那些当事人通过仲裁员而非法院解决争议。然而,在仲裁协议没有明确无误的相反约定时,一些关于可仲裁性的门槛问题通常留给法院来决定(参见Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 530 (2019)(citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995))案)。例如,如果当事人对是否同意仲裁存在争议,那么这些关于合同成立的问题就被认为是“门槛”问题,推定应当由法院而不是由仲裁员决定(参见Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68–69 (2010)案)。
本案上诉提出的主要问题是,在缺乏明确无误的措辞将此类可仲裁性问题(集体仲裁的可仲裁性)提交给仲裁员而非法院的情况下,集体仲裁是否与合同成立一样,是必须由法院决定的门槛问题(The principal question presented in these appeals is whether the availability of class arbitration, like contract formation, is a gateway issue that a court must decide, in the absence of clearand unmistakable language subjecting such questions of arbitrability to anarbitrator rather than a court)。
迄今为止,最高法院和本案法院都未曾就集体仲裁的可仲裁性是否属于此类门槛问题作出决定(参见 Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S.Ct. 1407, 1417 n.4 (2019)案)。但是,其他一些巡回上诉法院处理过此种问题,且均认为集体仲裁的可仲裁性是一个门槛事项(参见Del Webb Cmtys., Inc. v. Carlson, 817 F.3d 867, 877 (4th Cir. 2016)案;Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel.LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2013) 案;Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., 907 F.3d 502, 506–07 (7th Cir. 2018)案;CatamaranCorp. v. Towncrest Pharmacy, 864 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir. 2017) 案;Eshagh v. Terminix Int’l Co., L.P., 588 F. App’x 703, 704 (9th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) 案;以及JPay, Inc. v. Kobel, 904 F.3d 923, 935–36 (11thCir. 2018)案)。
法院赞同其他巡回法院的观点,认为在缺乏明确无误的相反语言时,集体仲裁的可仲裁性是应由法院而非由仲裁员决定的门槛问题。与其他巡回法院一样,本案法院认为,由于集体仲裁与单个仲裁在根本上存在区别,关于以集体形式而非以单个形式对争议进行仲裁的决定是一个可仲裁性的门槛问题(We agree with our sister circuits and hold today that class arbitrability is a gateway issue for courts, not arbitrators, to decide, absent clear and unmistakable language to the contrary. Like our sister circuits, we regard the decision to arbitrate a dispute as aclass, rather than on an individual basis, as a threshold question of arbitrability, because class arbitrations differ from individual arbitrations in fundamental ways)。
如最高法院重复指出的那样,“仅由或代表个别被提及的当事人进行仲裁是一般规则,而集体仲裁是该一般规则的例外。”(参见Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348 (2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979))案)。在集体仲裁中,“仲裁员的裁决不仅对单个仲裁协议的当事人具有约束力,而且还对缺席当事人的权利作出裁定。”(After all, in a class action, “[t]he arbitrator’s award no longer purports to bind just the parties to a single arbitration agreement, but adjudicates the rights of absent parties as well.”)(参见Stolt-NielsenS.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010)案)。
集体仲裁与单个仲裁之间不仅是形式的区别,它还会产生重大的实际和本质性影响。集体诉讼大大增加了争议的规模和复杂性(参见AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011))。这不仅因为有更多当事人参与其中,正如其他巡回法院所观察到的,集体仲裁引发了重要的正当程序方面的担忧(参见,例如Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 598; Catamaran, 864 F.3d at 972)。因为集体仲裁不仅约束被提及的当事人,还约束不计其数的未被提及的当事人,正当程序要求缺席当事人“能得到通知,被给予听审的机会和选择退出集体的权利。”(参见AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 349案)。集体仲裁会增加仲裁费用并降低仲裁效率(参见Catamaran, 864 F.3d at 972)。
另外,与诉讼相比,仲裁的优势在于对当事人隐私和机密的保护。在集体仲裁中隐私和机密会收到威胁,从而使“当事人在约定仲裁时的设想受阻”(参见Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 686案和 Catamaran, 864 F.3d at 971–72 (same)案)。
因此,本案法院赞同其他巡回法院的观点,认为集体仲裁的可用性是基本的可仲裁性问题,集体仲裁的可仲裁性是一个门槛事项。随后,法院进一步审议本案当事人是否已经明确无误地约定由仲裁员决定该事项。
本案上诉所涉及的仲裁条款只允许单个仲裁,并在法律允许的最大范围内禁止集体仲裁。其中规定:“当事人同意,在法律允许的最大范围内,本协议禁止仲裁员将他人的请求合并为一个程序。这意味着,仲裁员将只审理个别请求,在法律允许的最大范围内,无权将仲裁程序作为集体或共同行为,也无权在一个仲裁程序中向一群雇员提供救济([T]he parties agree that this Agreement prohibits the arbitrator from consolidating the claims of others into one proceeding, to the maximum extent permitted by law. This means that an arbitrator will hear only individual claims and does not have the authority to fashion a proceeding as a class or collective action or to award relief to a group of employees in one proceeding, to the maximum extent permitted by law)。”
法院认为,该集团仲裁禁止条款不仅在法律允许的最大范围内禁止集团仲裁,而且还排除了当事人试图打破集体仲裁问题由法院而非仲裁员决定这一推定的任何设想(We conclude that this class arbitration bar operates not only to bar class arbitrations to the maximum extent permitted by law, but also to foreclose any suggestion that the parties meant to disrupt the presumption that questions of class arbitration are decided by courts rather than arbitrators)。
法院认为,涉案仲裁协议中缺乏明确无误的措辞授权仲裁员决定集体仲裁的可仲裁性(In all events, we find nothing in the arbitration agreement that gives such authority to the arbitrator with the clear and unmistakable language required by Supreme Court precedent)。
作为被上诉人的雇员援引了仲裁协议中赋予仲裁员各种一般权力的以下三个条款:
“如果雇主和雇员在与本协议的成立或含义有关的问题上存在分歧,仲裁员将听取并解决这些可仲裁性问题(If Employer and Employee disagree over issues concerning the formation or meaning of this Agreement, the arbitrator will hear and resolve these arbitrability issues)。”
“当事人所选定的仲裁员应当根据《美国仲裁协会解决劳资争议的国家规则》(或其后续规则)管理仲裁,除非这些规则与本协议不一致,在这种情况下,本协议的条款将适用。(The arbitrator selected by the parties will administer the arbitration according to the National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes (or successor rules) of the American Arbitration Association (‘AAA’) except where such rules are inconsistent with this Agreement, in which case the terms of this Agreement will govern. (Emphasis added.))”
“除下述规定外,雇员和雇主,代表其关联公司、继任者、继承人和受让人同意,他们之间的所有争议和请求……应完全由具有约束力的最终仲裁决定。(Except as provided below, Employee and Employer, on behalfof their affiliates, successors, heirs, and assigns, both agree that all disputes and claims between them . . . shall be determined exclusively by final and binding arbitration. (Emphasis added.))”
雇员们认为,这三个条款可以解释为授权仲裁员决定关于可仲裁性(例如集体仲裁)的门槛问题。例如,根据上述被援引的第一个条款,集体仲裁的可仲裁性(或许还有一个具体的问题,即集体仲裁是否被“法律允许”)可以认为是关于协议“含义”的争议。上述被援引的第二个条款也可以被认为与本案有关,考虑到《美国仲裁协会关于集体仲裁的补充规则》规定仲裁员有权决定集体仲裁的可仲裁性。而上述第三个条款则宽泛地载明:“他们之间的‘所有’争议和请求”应当由仲裁员决定。根据本案法院以往的裁决,其措辞可以说足够宽泛,包括与集体仲裁的可仲裁性有关的争议(参见Robinson v. J & K Admin. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 817 F.3d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 2016)案)。(Divorced from other provisions of the arbitration agreement (most notably, the class arbitration bar), these three provisions could arguably be construed to authorize arbitrators to decide gateway issues of arbitrability such as class arbitration. Under the first provision cited by the employees, for example, the availability of class arbitration (and perhaps even the specific question of whether the class arbitration bar is “permitted by law”) is arguably a dispute over the “meaning” of the agreement. The incorporation of AAA rules in the second cited provision is also arguably relevant here, considering that Rule 3 of the AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration provides that the arbitrator is empowered to determine class arbitrability. And the third provision states in broad terms that “all disputes and claims between them” shall be determined by the arbitrator, language arguably capacious enough under this court’s previous rulings to include disputes over class arbitrability. See Robinson v.J & K Admin. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 817 F.3d 193, 196 (5th Cir. 2016))。
然而,对于这些条款是否明确无误地授权仲裁员决定集体仲裁的可仲裁性,法院认为这是一个最终没有必要回答的问题。因为在将这些条款与涉案的集体仲裁禁止条款进行对比时,法院得出结论认为,这些条款都没有通过必要的明确无误的语言表明,应当由仲裁员而非由法院决定集体仲裁的可仲裁性问题。(Whether these provisions, standing alone, clearly and unmistakably empower the arbitrator to decide questions of class arbitrability is a question we ultimately need not answer, however. Because when we compare these provisions with the class arbitration bar at issue in this case, we conclude that none of them state with the requisite clear and unmistakable language that arbitrators, rather than courts, shall decide questions of class arbitrability.)
首先,这三个条款中的后两个都包含明确的例外条款。这些例外条款明确否定这些条款与仲裁协议其他条款相冲突时(例如在本案中与集体仲裁禁止条款相冲突)可能产生的任何影响(These exception clauses expressly negate any effect these provisions might have in the event they conflict with any other provision of the arbitration agreement—as they plainly do here in light of the class arbitration bar)。即使抛开例外条款,这三个条款也未具体提及集体仲裁的具体事项。相比之下,集体仲裁禁止条款则明确禁止仲裁员对争议进行集体仲裁,只允许对个人请求进行仲裁。
因此,法院认为,雇员们所援引的条款没有明确无误地摆脱被集体仲裁禁止条款所增强的如下法律推定,即应由法院而非由仲裁员决定集体仲裁的可仲裁性问题(Accordingly, the provisions cited by the employees do not clearly and unmistakably overcome the legal presumption—reinforced as it is here by the class arbitration bar—that courts, not arbitrators, must decide the issue of class arbitration)。
综上所述,鉴于本案拟进行的集体仲裁是应当由法院而非由仲裁员决定的门槛事项,因此,就上诉人对Blevins案的上诉,法院推翻了地区法院的裁定并根据本意见将案件发回。就上诉人对Crawford案的上诉,法院撤销了地区法院的裁定并将案件发回并指示地区法院驳回案件。(In Blevins, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In Crawford, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand with instructions to dismiss the case as moot, in light of our holding today that the proposed class arbitration in this case is a gateway issue for the court, rather than the arbitrator, to decide.)
三、评论
在当事人约定将某些争议提交仲裁时,法院自然地期待那些当事人通过仲裁员而非法院解决争议。然而,在仲裁协议没有明确无误的相反约定时,一些关于可仲裁性的门槛问题通常留给法院来决定。本案涉及的问题是,在缺乏明确无误的措辞的情况下,集体仲裁的可仲裁性问题是否是应当由法院决定的门槛问题。
迄今为止,最高法院和本案法院都未曾就集体仲裁的可仲裁性是否属于此类门槛问题作出决定。为此,本案法院(第五巡回法院)法院赞同其他巡回法院的观点,认为在缺乏明确无误的相反语言时,集体仲裁的可仲裁性是应由法院而非由仲裁员决定的门槛问题。鉴于涉案仲裁协议中缺乏明确无误的相反语言,故集体仲裁的可仲裁性应当由法院决定。