2019年12月20日，在Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v OOO "Insurance Company Chubb" & Ors [2019] EWHC 3568 (Comm)一案中，英格兰和威尔士高等法院王座法庭商事法庭判决拒绝授予原告禁诉令，并认定若有适用于整个合同的准据法，则在仲裁条款中选定仲裁地不足以使整个合同的准据法不适用于仲裁条款。因此，当事人约定仲裁地为伦敦并不代表英格兰法即是该仲裁协议的准据法，而且选择伦敦作为仲裁地并不意味着英格兰和威尔士高等法院有优先权来决定在俄罗斯的诉讼是否违反仲裁条款，该等权力属于仲裁员。

一、背景介绍

原告Enka是一家建筑和工程企业。第一被告Chubb Russia，俄罗斯保险公司；第二至第四被告人都是隶属于Chubb保险集团的保险公司。

PJSC Unipro（E.ON Russia）于2011年与Energoproekt公司签订了一份关于Berezovskaya发电站的锅炉和辅助设备安装工程合同。Energoproekt又雇佣原告从事与锅炉和辅助设备安装有关的作业，于2012年签订作业合同。作业合同中没有关于准据法的明确规定，但其中的仲裁条款规定，与协议有关的任何争议均应根据《国际商会（ICC）仲裁规则》解决，仲裁地为伦敦。被告参与原告在Berezovskaya发电站作业的保险和再保险。2016年2月该发电站发生火灾。

第一被告在俄罗斯莫斯科商事法院对原告和其他10名共同被告提起诉讼，要求其赔偿与涉案Berezovskaya发电站的火灾有关的损失。原告对四名被告在英格兰及威尔士高等法院提起禁诉令申请，主张该在俄罗斯进行的诉讼违反仲裁协议，禁止被告在俄罗斯继续进行诉讼。

双方当事人承认仲裁协议有效和有拘束力，而分歧点在于（1）仲裁协议的准据法是英格兰法还是俄罗斯法，以及（2）本案的诉讼是否属于侵权之诉，因而不再仲裁协议约定的范围之内。

原告提起禁诉令（anti-suit injunction）申请的依据是，依照The Angelic Grace [1995] 1 Lloyd'sRep 87案：

“ ...如果一方申请禁制令以限制另一方当事人违反英格兰法管辖的仲裁协议而在外国法院进行的诉讼，只要该禁制令及时提出并且该外国诉讼程序进展程度尚不深入，则英格兰法院在授予该禁制令时无需对此有任何区别，……授予禁制令的理由是……如果没有该禁制令，在损害赔偿显然无法得到充分救济的情况下，原告将被剥夺其合同权利。对此的管辖权当然是依裁量而定的，不是理所当然的，但是需要有充分的理由说明为什么在某案中不应行使该管辖权。”

"...where an injunction is sought to restrain a party from proceeding in a foreign court in breach of an arbitration agreement governed by English law, the English court need feel no diffidence in granting the injunction, provided that it is sought promptly and before the foreign proceedings are too far advanced.... The justification for the grant of the injunction ... is that without it the plaintiff will be deprived of its contractual rights in a situation in which damages are manifestly an inadequate remedy. The jurisdiction is of course discretionary, and is not exercised as a matter of course, but good reason needs to be shown why it should not be exercised in any given case."

二、法院认定

1、仲裁地的选择

本案存在明示仲裁协议，争议点是仲裁协议准据法是合同实体法俄罗斯法，还是仲裁地法英格兰法。依照Sulamérica Cia Nacional de Seguros SAv Enesa Engenharia SA [2012] EWCA Civ 638, [2013] 1 W.L.R. 102, [2012] 5 WLUK495 案，这是一个合同解释问题，取决于所有合同条款，并且应当依照具体情况和商业常识来进行判断（Irespectfully agree with Lord Neuberger MR at [51] in Sulamérica that whether the proper law of an arbitration agreement is that of the country whose law is to apply to the contract generally, or that of the country specified as the seat of the arbitration if a seat be specified, is a matter of contractual interpretation, so that inevitably "the answer must depend on all the terms of a particular contract, when read in light of the surrounding circumstances and commercial common sense".）。若有适用于整个合同的准据法，则在仲裁条款中选定仲裁地这点可能不足以使整个合同的准据法不适用于仲裁条款（… the burden of the case law exemplified by Sulamérica and C v D [2007] EWCA Civ 1282, [2008] 1 All ER(Comm) 1001, is that a choice of seat is not always sufficient to convey a choice of law for the arbitration agreement that is different to a choice of law for the contract as a whole if there is one. Put the other way round, where there is seemingly a choice of law for the contract as a whole, for example a classic "this contract" governing law clause, a choice of seat in the arbitration clause may not be enough on its own to cause that choice of law to be read down so as not to apply to the arbitration agreement that is a part of the contract.）。

ICC仲裁是超国家的（delocalised）机构仲裁。ICC规则第18.1条规定：

The place of the arbitration shall be fixed by the Court, unless agreed upon by the parties.

仲裁地由仲裁院确定，但当事人另有约定者除外。

 因此，事先选择伦敦作为仲裁地，而不是在发生争议之后商定伦敦为仲裁地，并不表示其选择英格兰法作为仲裁协议准据法。仲裁协议准据法可能是俄罗斯法（I do not regard an agreed choice of London for the purposes of Article 18.1 in advance rather than only after a dispute had arisen as of any moment for present purposes; and if it had been chosen only after the fact, I do not think it would even be arguable that it conveyed or implied a choice of English law as governing law for clause 50.1.Indeed, I do not think the choice of London under Article18.1 of the ICC Rules is of any real moment at all for present purposes… I do not agree in the circumstances of this Contract and a choice of ICC arbitration that a mutual decision to seat that ICC arbitration not in Russia indicates negatively… a rejection of the possibility that Russian law might govern the scope of the arbitration clause.）。

2、仲裁员所扮演的角色

参照Midgulf International Ltd v Groupe Chimique Tunisien [2009] EWHC 963 (Comm), [2009] Lloyd's Rep 411案，法院认定，根据ICC规则第18.1条选择伦敦作为仲裁地并不意味着本案法院有优先权来决定在俄罗斯的诉讼是否违反仲裁条款，进行该等认定的权力属于仲裁员。此外，用以确定该等权利的先决条件——即决定合同准据法的权利也属于仲裁员（The apriori superior claim to determine whether the Moscow Claim is brought in breach of clause 50.1 of the Contract in fact would be that of the arbitrators. As an issue within that, or on its own, theirs too the apriori superior claim to determine the governing law of the Contract generally and of clause 50.1 in particular.）。如果原告在向俄罗斯法院起诉以确定本案在《纽约公约》项下的仲裁义务范围和仲裁协议准据法问题后仍不满足，则若时间允许，原告可以直接开始仲裁。然而，原告在知道存在有人可能会因为大火而对其提出索赔的实际可能性后的18个月内都未采取任何行动，也没有证据表明第一被告会违反仲裁裁决（If Enka was not content to litigate the issue of the scope of the obligation to arbitrate, and within that or separately the question of governing law, before a Russian court, in the event the Moscow Arbitrazh Court, as part of a New York Convention application, the obvious course was for it to commence arbitration, unless time did not allow so that it needed the urgent intervention of the court.If Enka was not content to litigate the issue of the scope of the obligation to arbitrate, and within that or separately the question of governing law, before a Russian court, in the event the Moscow Arbitrazh Court, as part of a New York Convention application, the obvious course was for it to commence arbitration, unless time did not allow so that it needed the urgent intervention of the court. But time did allow, as I made clear when setting out the facts. Enka did nothing for over 18 months after first being on notice of at least the real possibility that it might face a claim in Russia in respect of the Berezovskaya fire.）。

本案特殊情况在于，在禁诉令期间，被告可以在法院申请中止禁诉令，无论是通过协议的方式，还是法院确定存在有效仲裁条款以涵盖实体争议因而在外国法院提出的诉讼是在该涵盖范之内还是之外，因此Nori Holding Ltd v Public Joint-StockCo Bank Otkritie Financial Corp [2018] EWHC 1642 (Comm), [2018] 6WLUK 635案不适用于本案（But in Nori Holding, the defendant bank's position was that the LCIA arbitrations were improperly commenced and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction: see at [24]. I respectfully disagree that there is any difficulty, logical or practical, over applying to stay an anti-suit injunction claim in court, where either it is agreed or the court has determined that there is a valid and binding arbitration clause and the substantial dispute is as to its scope and whether therefore the target claim in a foreign court falls within or outwith that scope.）。

本案中，由于第一被告在禁诉令请求申请中实质参与本案，因此丧失了根据1996《仲裁法》第9条规定的申请中止诉讼程序的权利。对于以后案件的当事人，禁诉令程序的被告若承认仲裁协议的存在和效力，但仅就其适用范围有争议却又不希望法院审理这一点的，则应根据1996《仲裁法》第9条申请中止诉讼程序。如果其不这样做，那么依照The Angelic Grace案，本来这点原本可以、并且也表面上应由仲裁员来作出决定而不是法院来作出决定的事实，将不会对其在法院抵御该反诉讼请求（anti-suit claim）起到任何效果。然而，原告没有经本案提交ICC仲裁庭管辖而是在法院出庭应诉以希望法院执行该协议也是一个不利于其申请禁诉令的一个重要因素。（Allthat said, I would suggest for the future that an anti-suit injunction defendant who, like the defendant in The Angelic Grace and Chubb Russia here, accepts the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement sued upon and takes only a point on its scope, with or without a logically prior point on its governing law, but who wishes come what may that this court not determine that point in the first instance, should apply for a stay under s.9 of the 1996 Act, and should expect that if he does not do so the fact that the point could and prima facie should have been put to arbitrators for determination will not assist him in resisting the anti-suit claim in court.）

3、The Angelic Grace案的适用范围

本案中被告主张，The Angelic Grace案的禁诉令的法理的前提是存在有对于准据法是英格兰法的仲裁协议的违约行为，而本案涉案合同的准据法是俄罗斯法。但是法院拒绝接受其主张，并认为本案实质争议是，本案被告在俄罗斯提起的诉讼是否使其违反了其承认但主张其范围未涵盖到该诉讼的仲裁义务（侵权之诉而非违约之诉）。关键问题是法院是否已经取得了该争议的管辖权（seized），以使其有适当的权力处理此案。若如此，而且法院也对本案被告作出不利认定、并且认定本案原告迅速采取行动、并且其违反仲裁协议而提起的诉讼进展程度尚不深入，则法院应要求本案被告证明存在强力的理由（strong reason）说明为什么其不应受限，而应继续无视关于其受影响范围的最终裁决。依照The Angelic Grace案，不论仲裁协议本身或是其范围受英格兰法管辖都如此。（That better view is, in my judgment, that what matters in a case where the substantive dispute is whether the proceedings brought by the anti-suit injunction defendant put him in breach of an obligation to arbitrate he acknowledges but says does not extend to the claim he is thus pursuing, is whether this court is properly seized of that dispute so as to make it appropriate for it to determine the same. If it is so seized, determines the dispute against the anti-suit defendant and finds that the anti-suit claimant has acted promptly and the proceedings brought in breach are not far advanced, then the court indeed should require the anti-suit defendant to demonstrate strong reason why he should not be restrained from carrying on regardless, in substance defying that final ruling against him as to scope. That should be so in principle, whether the arbitration agreement and therefore the question of scope is governed by English law or not. It is not a parochial principle for the specially robust enforcement of English law contractual obligations; it is a willingness robustly to require a contract breaker to cease and desist who was properly before the court for a determination of whether he was breakingh is contract.）

法院认为原告的主张缺乏实质性内容。原告的延误和未能进行仲裁足以构成强力的理由而让法院拒绝授予其禁诉令。第一被告在俄罗斯提起的诉讼是合理的，并诚实信用地认为该诉讼不在仲裁条款的覆盖范围之内，而且还有原告在该诉讼中自认的俄罗斯法是仲裁协议准据法。综合考虑各种情况，本案法院认为其自身不是决定该仲裁协议覆盖是否原告在俄罗斯诉讼中的责任的适当法院。

三、评论

本案中法院的观点是，结合本案的案情和各种因素来看，法院认为对在俄罗斯的诉讼发出禁诉令较不恰当。首先，选择仲裁地并不意味着选择仲裁协议准据法；其次，第一被告在俄罗斯的诉讼是诚实信用的，第一被告还提出其在俄罗斯的诉讼不受仲裁条款管辖，而且在俄罗斯的诉讼中原告自认俄罗斯法是仲裁协议准据法。因此，本案的核心争议点——即仲裁协议准据法到底是英格兰法还是俄罗斯法，这个问题由俄罗斯法院认定更为恰当，因此英格兰法院拒绝发出禁诉令。

本案的一个特别之处还在于法院强调了仲裁地法和仲裁协议准据法的区别，并且在认定这个问题的时候似乎给予实体协议准据法很大的权重，这值得我们进一步进研究。