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毛里求斯最高院的驳回撤销仲裁裁决的裁定上诉至英国枢密院(英国案例)

20191219日,在 Peepul Capital Fund II LLC & Anor v VSoft Holdings LLC (Mauritius) [2019] UKPC 47一案中,英国枢密院司法委员会驳回被申请人基于违反正当程序和公共秩序的撤裁请求,其理由是仲裁员在结案陈词提交期间的干预并未阻止被申请人提出其主张,而且客观分析被申请人确实放弃了其对申请人依照《股东协议》所提出的主张的抗辩,而并非仅针对额度弃权。此外,即使仲裁员对被申请人的律师的陈述的理解错误也并未对被申请人造成了重大不利,并且也并无任何公共政策作为依据以撤销该裁决。枢密院在本案中指出毛里求斯仲裁法在当事人向枢密院进行上诉的权利存在改进空间。

一、背景介绍

VSoft是在毛里求斯注册成立的公司,是在美国乔治亚州注册成立的VSoft Corporation的控股公司之一, 是仲裁案件的被申请人。

Peepul是毛里求斯公司,Millenium是英属维尔京群岛公司,二者合称投资者 是仲裁案件的申请人。

投资者在2006年向VSoft进行大额投资。VSoft的发起人、PeepulVSoft之间的关系受《投资协议》约束。依照《投资协议》Peepul可在日后选择从对其VSoft股权请求发起人协助退出Peepul后要求进行发起人协助退出。 经过协商,VSoft,发起人和投资者达成的两项协议(合称《退出协议》),同意投资者退出VSoft:第一个协议是《终止协议》,其目的在于以终止原《投资协议》;第二个协议是《股东协议》,其内容是投资者为放弃其在VSoft的股份需要分三期支付其价款。

《股东协议》中详细列明了将投资者的股权转换为现金的商定机制,规定投资者应将其股份无保留地交还给VSoft进行取消,但并未约定明确的交换日期或期限。公司董事会假定该交还的股份应在第一批付款日期之前交还,理由是根据协议约定,第一批产品的付款方式是由VSoft在注销日注销投资者的股本后签发按需本票。而投资者并未如约交还。

投资者后致函发起人以交还并注销其股票,通知并要求对其授予《股东协议》规定的可转换股或优先股,其理由是基于其拖延付款的第一批股票,可转换股份应有VSoft 51%的投票权。 对此,当事人律师的共识是投资者的VSoft股份在实际上从未被取消过,而VSoft也从未发行过《股东协议》约定的可转换股或优先股。 

VSoft20121114日致函通知投资者该公司正在采取措施发行可转换股或优先股以将VSoft 51%的投票权授予投资者,并且公司正在处理根据附表确定新的股权投资者和债务银行家,以偿还协议的金额。该信函标题提及《股东协议》,其中的附表内容是投资者为放弃其在VSoft的总股本而要分三期支付的情形。

VSoft的律师在2013524日的另一封信函中写道:我方客户声明其有完整意愿遵守《股东协议》的条款,并将根据《股东协议》支付贵方客户的款项。

因此,尽管投资者交还的股份的时间晚于《股东协议》所隐含的要求,但VSoft还是在仲裁开始之前以书面形式两次确认了该协议。

2013614日,PeepulVSoft送达了法定要求,要求其根据本票支付第一批股份的价款,以及根据《股东协议》应支付的其他款项,包括第二批股份的价款。 Peepul2013812日在毛里求斯最高法院提出了针对VSoft的清盘申请。

根据双方达成的临时仲裁协议,VSoft和投资者同意根据《毛里求斯国际仲裁法》在毛里求斯通过仲裁解决其争议。仲裁开庭审理时,虽然仲裁协议中约定的要仲裁的争议点的范围很广,但是投资者仅根据《股东协议》提出主张,并且双方均主张《投资协议》已终止。

在庭审中,VSoft的董事长兼首席执行官和发起人之一屡次表示其希望VSoft应该按照《投资协议》而不是《股东协议》向投资者进行支付。VSoft的律师主张,由于信函未遵循《股东协议》中的投资者从VSoft退出的步骤,因此仲裁庭需要考虑投资者的还款要求需要适用哪份法律文件以及哪种法律制度,且不能完全排除《投资协议》适用的可能。 然而,VSoft的律师之前多次确认,投资者的要求是根据《股东协议》作出的。

最终,仲裁员介入并解释其暂时的观点,即VSoft的律师当时首次提出VSoft的责任可能不按照《股东协议》的规定而是依照《投资协议》而产生,这与VSoft的信函内容不符,特别是与确认上述《股东协议》的信函不符。 仲裁员认为律师与征求其委托人的指示,以决定是否继续这么主张,并对此给予休庭15分钟。

休庭之后,VSoft的律师返回并主张其立场始终是,其作为被申请人对申请人的主张无异议,但是,被申请人的困难在于目前这个特定阶段,我方正处于实施阶段,在这个程度上,被申请人不反对仲裁员认定我方在该阶段中所处的位置,并依照由仲裁员认定的程序,根据该特定事项来确定所应支付的金额。 我方不知道申请人的答复会是如何。Our position Mr Arbitrator as regards the observations made by Sir Hamid and as regards the two documents and the Shareholders Agreement, is as follows and has always been as follows, that the respondent does not dispute the claim of the claimants and I personally I would like to dispel any impression if ever there was an impression, that the claim was [not] (added in error) in dispute. The claim is not in dispute. I would also like to dispel the impression that I was not putting the case of the claimants to the respondent to the claimants, in as much as we are not disputing the claims of the claimants. My instructions have always been that we are not disputing the claim of the claimants. But the difficulty of the respondent is at this particular stage, where are we in the implementation process and to that extent, the respondent has no objection that you Mr Arbitrator, determines where we are within the process and determines the amount payable according to that particular process which is to be identified by you. I don't know, what is the response on behalf of the claimants.VSoft的律师继续说道:正如我方所言,该主张没有争议,但对该主张的定量的决定方面存在争议。在此情况下,我方希望寻求仲裁员的协助。 这是我方的立场。“As I say the claim is not in dispute but it is the determination of the quantification of that claim, and we would like to seek your assistance, in the present matter. This is our position.”)此后不久,VSoft的律师确认了VSoft没有继续进行反诉。

投资者的律师答复道,鉴于VSoft显然放弃了《股东协议》项下主张的抗辩,因此其几乎不需要补充什么。 他确定主张的费用和损害赔偿内容似乎无争议,并认为仲裁员的需要做的是根据《股东协议》计算应付款项的利息。 笔录显示VSoft的律师对此无异议。仲裁的主要部分是VSoft在《股东协议》项下的责任问题无争议,仲裁员将这个问题留给当事各方,让其就现存的数额问题提交书面意见以作出认定这一基础上结案的。

VSoft20141114日向仲裁庭提交有关其对额度的主张的信函,主张投资者的主张应限定《投资协议》(而非《股东协议》)项下的原先投资的金额的有息偿还。

仲裁员在裁决书中载明最初同意提交仲裁的争议点,总结了投资者的主张,并指出上文引用的VSoft的律师的案件主张不存在争议而仅是其量化的确定方面有争议的自认。其结论是,不再需要再去认定原先要仲裁的争议,因为原争议涉及责任的定性问题而不是赔偿额的定量问题,并最终支持了投资者对主张的额度,认定其符合《股东协议》。

二、法院认定

2008《毛里求斯国际仲裁法》大体脱胎于《联合国贸易法委员会国际仲裁示范法》,其第392)条仅给出了非常有限的撤裁理由,其中包括仲裁员选任和仲裁程序缺乏通知,一方当事人无法陈述其主张,仲裁裁决与毛里求斯的公共政策相抵触,仲裁裁决违反自然正义规则或仲裁程序中严重侵害一方的权利裁决。即使满足其中的一个或多个理由,法院也有裁量权来酌情决定是否撤销仲裁裁决。

VSoft的撤裁申请理由是,在庭审结束后,独任仲裁员与VSoft的律师进行了简要交流,仲裁员的理解是VSoft放弃了对其主张的辩护,而当事人只是在额度上还有争议。 VSoft表示,其律师没有这么做,而仲裁员之后在未对案件的实质争议点作出任何裁决的情况下,就对VSoft作了不利认定,这违反了第392)(b(iv)条规定的自然公正规则; 此外,VSoft还主张,在律师提交代理意见之前,仲裁员进行了干预,这相当于第392)(a(ii)条的不当干预以使得VSoft无法提出主张;最后,该裁决违反第392)(b)(ii)条的毛里求斯的公共政策。

1、毛里求斯最高法院

VSoft之后向毛里求斯最高法院申请撤销该裁决,法院驳回了VSoft提出的撤裁申请,并裁定仲裁员在结案陈词提交期间的干预并未阻止VSoft提出其主张;VSoft确实放弃了其对投资者依照《股东协议》所提出的主张的抗辩,而并非仅针对额度弃权;并无任何公共政策依据以撤销该裁决;应维持冻结令以保护裁决的执行;在裁决执行之前应维持反诉讼禁令以维护VSoft根据该裁决需要支付的付款以及相应的股权转让的利益。

VSoft不服该裁定,依法上诉至英国枢密院司法委员会。

2、英国枢密院司法委员会

VSoft的主要主张是,从前后语境出发而客观地考虑,VSoft的律师在休庭后提交的陈述只是对VSoft的主张的继续维持。尽管其是以最简短的摘要的形式作出的,这也不构成对VSoft的主张的抛弃。 此外,就算对此有任何疑问,VSoft在之后给仲裁庭的信函以简单的形式对投资者的主张限定为依照《投资协议》的原先投资的金额的(而不是依照《股东协议》的)简单有息偿还。仲裁员本应对这些问题作出裁决但却没有如此,违反了自然公正的规则,对VSoft产生了严重不利。

枢密院不同意该说法。 首先,VSoft的律师在休会后接受指示的主张,客观上结合前后语境解释是VSoft在所有方面放弃了对投资者就《股东协议》提出的主张的抗辩,但数额除外。 诚然,VSoft在仲裁中的主张始终是断然否认投资者根据《股东协议》应有权获得任何东西。当VSoft的律师两次指出该主张没有争议时,其指代的是投资者的主张,该主张仅根据《股东协议》提出。VSoft的律师在休庭前的结案陈词中试图推翻先前的共同点,指出当事方之间的法律关系继续受《投资协议》约束,这促使了仲裁员的介入。

VSoft的律师在口头庭审结束时的陈述的含义不受VSoft20141114日提交的有关其对额度应限定在《投资协议》(而非《股东协议》)项下的主张的信函内容的影响。 仲裁员在裁决中认为该信函与VSoft的律师在庭审结束时所作的让步完全不符,并认为其计算明显具有误导性,并在其对法律费用的裁决上反映了这种看法。 枢密院认为,仲裁员有权并以这种方式处理VSoft11月信函。 口头审理结束后,仲裁的有关赔偿责任问题的部分已经结束,不能允许VSoft通过稍后写的一封信重新开启这些问题,该信只应被理解为仅针对未偿数额问题。The meaning of Mr Chetty’s submission at the end of the oral hearing cannot be affected by the content of VSoft’s letter setting out its case on quantum on 14 November 2014, more than amonth later. It is evident from the Award that the arbitrator considered that letter to be wholly inconsistent with the concessions which Mr Chetty had made at the end of the hearing. He regarded it as a “patently misleading computation” and his dim view of it was reflected in his order as to costs. In the Board’s view the arbitrator was both entitled and correct to treat VSoft’s November letter in that way. The part of the arbitration dealing with issues of liability had been concluded at the end of the oral hearing, and it was not open to VSoft to try to reopen those issues by a letter written later, which was supposed to be directed only to the issue of quantum which remained outstanding.

即使假设休庭结束后VSoft的律师的口头陈述是对VSoft的立场的重申,而非弃权,仲裁员也不因为其以不同方式对此进行解释而违背自然公正原则。 根据具体情况评估,仲裁员有权对该陈述进行客观解释。 投资者的律师清楚地表达了其解释,明确表示了对VSoft的律师所承认的内容的理解,而VSoft的律师没有对此提出反对。 投资者的信函指出根据其根据《股东协议》所主张的应付款额计算利息,理由是依照其理解对其主张的责任认定方面并无未决争议。 从任何角度看,这都是对VSoft的律师所说内容的合理解释,而《毛里求斯国际仲裁法》第39条的任何内容都不旨在使当事方仅依照案件的实体部分提出撤裁请求,或者仅因为其不同意裁决就有权使最高法院或英国枢密院司法委员会推翻该裁决。Even if it were arguable that Mr Chetty’s oral submission following the adjournment was a reiteration rather than an abandonment of VSoft’s case, the arbitrator committed no breach of the rules of natural justice by interpreting it otherwise. He was entitled to give it an objective interpretation, as assessed in the particular context. His interpretation was plainly shared by counsel for the Investors who set out his understanding of what Mr Chetty had conceded in clear terms, without demur from Mr Chetty. The letter from the Investors setting out their calculation of interest with reference to the sum they had claimed was due under the Shareholders Agreement was predicated on the understanding that no issue of liability remained outstanding in relation to that claim. This was, on any view, a reasonable interpretation of what Mr Chetty had said, and nothing in section 39 of the MIAA is designed to enable a party to challenge a decision of the arbitrator purely on its merits, or to enable the Supreme Court or the Board to overrule such a decision, merely because it disagrees with it.

最后,即使仲裁员对VSoft的律师的陈述的理解是完全错误的,枢密院也不认为该错误理解导致不处理赔偿责任的定性问题就违反了自然公正规则,这对VSoft造成了重大不利。(Finally, the Board is not persuaded that, even if the arbitrator’s understanding of Mr Chetty’s submission had been plainly wrong, so that his decision not to address liability issues was a breach of the rules of natural justice, this caused any substantial prejudice to VSoft. 

首先,VSoft的律师表示,该裁决对VSoft造成了两个重大不利。 首先是VSoft失去了将其责任限制在如其11月的信中所述的偿还原始投资及其利息的机会;其次是,VSoft失去了基于利息应仅在投资者以迟交方式投标的日期之后才根据《股东协议》产生,因此利息额度应该降低的机会。枢密院认为,二者都站不住脚。就第一个不利而言,不论是在诉状、仲裁期间提供的证据、或意见均未有任何丝毫的依据可以支持VSoft支付《股东协议》规定的交还股份的责任已不再受《股东协议》约定这一主张。 对于投资者违反《股东协议》的主张仅仅基于其延迟退回其股权,但此后VSoft的两次来信确认《股东协议》,然后再次在仲裁书中确认《股东协议》。As to the first, nothing in the pleadings, the evidence or the submissions tendered during the arbitration offered the slightest basis for a conclusion that the Shareholders Agreement had ceased to govern the liability of VSoft to pay for the surrender of the shares under the Shareholders Agreement, namely US$17 million plus interest. The only complaint that the Investors had committed a breach of the Shareholders Agreement lay in their late surrender of their equity shares, but the agreement had thereafter been subsequently affirmed by VSoft twice incorrespondence and then again in its pleadings in the arbitration.)就第二个不利而言,VSoft自己在11月份的信函中都并未试图提出该主张,其在其他任何时候都并未试图提出该主张。必须认定11月份的信函包含了VSoft希望就额度提出的所有主张,而其中并不包括这一点。As to the second head of prejudice, namely a slightly reduced interest liability under the Shareholders Agreement, this was not a claim which VSoft even sought to pursue under the heading of quantum in its November letter, or at any other time, either during or following the end of the arbitration hearing. It must be supposed that the November letter contained everything which VSoft wished to say about quantum,and this point was entirely absent from it.

其次,VSoft向枢密院的第二个主张是,指出即使VSoft的律师在休庭结束后发表的意见具有放弃其根据《股东协议》对赔偿责任的辩护的效果,这也是由于仲裁员的干预而无法正确提出其主张的结果。 为此,投资人律师引经据典说明了仲裁员可以合法中止律师的情况。 但是,枢密院认为,在本案中,仲裁员没有中止律师,其对VSoft的律师在其结案陈词中所采取的手段只是表明其临时观点,及其指出这与客户以前的信函的明显不一致之处,并仅让VSoft的律师去接受当事人指示后再回来继续案件的审理。 在短暂的休庭后,VSoft的律师仍然可以继续提出VSoft的主张。仲裁员没有施加任何压力让其放弃或削减任何部分的主张。因此,枢密院认同毛里求斯最高法院拒绝撤裁的第二个理由,即在结案陈词提交期间,仲裁员的干预并未阻止VSoft提出其主张。In the present case, however,the arbitrator did not stop counsel. He expressed a clearly provisional view about the course being taken by Mr Chetty in his closing submissions and its apparent inconsistency with his client’s previous statements in correspondence,and merely invited Mr Chetty to take instructions before continuing. Mr Chetty remained at liberty to continue to present VSoft’s case after that short adjournment. He was placed under no pressure of any kind by the arbitrator to abandon or curtail any part of it. Accordingly the Board finds itself in agreement with the Supreme Court in rejecting this second ground for setting aside the award.

此外,VSoft主张该裁决违反毛里求斯的公共政策,理由是该裁决使投资者获得了双重赔偿,投资者由于交回股权而获得了全额款项以及利息,而该裁决中没有任何条款确保投资者在获得支付时不会继续享有其作为VSoft股东的其他利益。枢密院不支持该主张,理由是投资者已于201210月交还了要注销的股票,并且在两年后,在仲裁结束前,VSoft没有得到任何投资回报。似乎可能的话,由于VSoft没有采取必要的行政措施(例如从会员名册中删除投资者的姓名)股票实际上并未被取消,因此投资者在获得支付有可能可以继续享有其作为VSoft股东的其他利益,但这也是VSoft自己可以掌控和处理之事。股份至今仍由VSoft持有以待注销,并且仲裁员无需下达任何命令要求投资者将其交割以作为收取裁决判付款项的条件。The Investors had surrendered their shares for cancellation in October 2012 and had, by the end of the arbitration two years later, received nothing in return from VSoft. If, as appears probable, the shares had not in fact been cancelled, because VSoft had not taken the administrative steps necessary to do so, such as for example removing the Investors’ names from the register of members, this was a matter within VSoft’s own control. The shares remain with VSoft for cancellation to this day, and the arbitrator needed to do nothing by way of an order for their delivery up by the Investors as a condition for receiving payment of the amounts due under the Award.

因此,枢密院裁决驳回对毛里求斯最高法院拒绝撤裁裁定的上诉。

三、后记

在本案后记,枢密院认为本案这种当事人若对毛里求斯最高法院的裁决不服则有权(as of right)向枢密院上诉的规定非常异常,特别是依照《UNCITRAL示范法》上诉的机会非常多。通常情况下,这种上诉需要法院授权,而不是当事人的一种权利。枢密院认为,“该上诉,不太可能会经受住实质许可的要求”("this is an appeal which would, in the Board’s view, have been unlikely to have withstood a substantive requirement for permission.")。此外,“枢密院不知道立法机关为什么授予了这么不同寻常的普遍上诉权。本案的耗时甚久,至少可以引起关于通过法律修正案来缩减上诉程序的思考。”("The Board does not know what factors in the mind of the legislature underlay the conferral of a right of appeal in such unusually broad terms. But the extended chronology of the present litigation might at least be thought sufficient to give pause for thought about some tightening of the appellate process by way of amendment."

四、评论

本案是被申请人在毛里求斯最高法院的撤裁申请上诉失败,进而依法在英国枢密院司法委员会进行上诉。本案枢密院的管辖权主要基于其是很多英国前殖民地的终审法院(也是回归前的香港的终审法院)。枢密院司法委员会与英国最高法院合署办公,并且其法官也都是英国最高法院的大法官和其他的普通法系法域的精英大法官,其裁定对整个普通法系都具有特别强的拘束力和说服力。

本案中毛里求斯《毛里求斯国际仲裁法》规定当事人有权有权(as of right)向枢密院上诉,但是又在第44条规定了该程序适用《毛里求斯(枢密院上诉)令1968》(Mauritius (Appeals to Privy Council) Order 1968)的程序,而该令规定法官应审理并批准上诉,因此其实本案中当事人有权上诉的权利还是有所制衡的,并不一定导致程序迟延和司法资源浪费。然而,在枢密院指出这可能存在问题之后,毛里求斯以后是否会修订仲裁法来处理这个问题也值得我们进一步关注。

就本案案情而言,枢密院认为被申请人律师的陈述属于弃权,并且认为仲裁员审理完毕之后有关赔偿责任问题的部分的审理就已经结束,当事人不得再提交材料开启这些问题。此外,即便仲裁员对该陈述理解有误,由于这对被申请人并不造成不利,而且潜在的双重赔偿问题也可以由被申请人自己单方面解决,因此枢密院整体上维持毛里求斯最高法院的裁定。

本案给我们带来的启示是在当事人和律师仲裁过程中应尽量保持前后主张和依据的一致,若有涉及变更请求依据的,以及有异议或者反对的,乃至对此的不明确之处的,都应及时当庭提出,否则法院不大可能支持后续提交的材料可以对此进行澄清。