2019年11月26日,在Minister of Finance (Inc) v International Petroleum Investment Co [2019] EWCA Civ 2080一案中,英格兰和威尔士上诉法院民事庭在审查上诉人提起的上诉之后推翻了高等法院依照1996《仲裁法》第67条和第68条作出的批准在相关仲裁进行期间中止向法院提出的申请。上诉法院认为由于高等法院法官未能承认上诉人根据第67条和第68条(强制性条款)对《和解裁决书》提出异议的法定权利,从而在错误的法律基础上行使了案件管理权。高等法院法官还错误地行使了自己的裁量权以拒绝作出禁令以限制具有压迫性和无理纠缠的仲裁程序,因而相当于对上诉人行使其向法院提出申请的权利施加了经济处罚。
一、背景介绍
上诉人是马来西亚政府持有的实体(马来西亚财政部;以及1 Malaysia Development Berhad,“1MDB”),被上诉人是阿布扎比政府持有的实体(International Petroleum Investment Company,“IPIC”;以及Aabar Investment PJS,“Aabar”)。
1MDB是一家国有投资实体,是马来西亚财政部的全资子公司。 IPIC是阿布扎比政府间接拥有的投资实体,Aabar由IPIC全资拥有。Najib Razak先生于2009年4月3日至2018年5月9日担任马来西亚总理。上诉人主张Najib Razak先生与他人串谋挪用超过35亿美元的资金,并阻止对其阴谋的调查。上诉人还主张1MDB,IPIC和Aabar是该阴谋的受害者。
双方签订了包含英国伦敦仲裁条款的《投资意向书》。后来双方关系破裂,被上诉人在英国开始仲裁程序,以要求上诉人强制履行其在《投资意向书》项下的义务。仲裁最终由当事人各退让一步而签署《和解契据》(settlement deed)而结案,而《和解契据》中规定最终需根据其内容作出《和解裁决书》(consent award),还规定该裁决确认了《投资意向书》的效力,并载明上诉人对被上诉人的义务和欠款。《和解契据》包含在英国伦敦进行LCIA仲裁的仲裁条款。《和解契据》还包含一系列违约情形,并规定双方放弃“基于管辖权或任何其他原因”对《和解裁决书》提出异议的任何权利。上诉人在2020年12月31日之前做出或开始任何“要求,诉讼,索赔或任何程序”(这似乎包括对第67或68条所指的《和解裁决书》的异议)是违约情形之一。《和解契据》规定,如果被上诉人证明发生了违约事件,由上诉人支付给被上诉人债券的利息和4.81亿美元的应收款(总计接近12亿美元)将立即到期。(The settlement deeds also contained a series of events of default and provided that the parties waived any right to challenge the consent award "on grounds of jurisdiction or for any other reason". The making or commencement of any "demand, action, claim or proceeding whatsoever" by the claimants before 31st December 2020 (which would seemingly include a challenge to the consent award under sections 67 or 68) was one of the events of default. The settlement deeds provided that, if the defendants certifiedthat an event of default had occurred, interest under the bonds and a US$481 million receivable (totalling just less than US$1.2 billion) would become immediately payable by the claimants to the defendants.)
一年后,Najib Razak先生离任马来西亚总理,上诉人停止付款,并向法院提出申请对《和解裁决书》提出异议,依据是1996《仲裁法》第67条(Challenging the award: substantive jurisdiction)和第68条(Challenging the award: serious irregularity)法院有监督管辖权,而《和解契据》和《和解裁决书》由于产生于欺诈和违反公共政策而无效。上诉人主张,被上诉人知道《和解契据》和《和解裁决书》是时任马来西亚总理Najib Razak先生为自己的利益而诱导作出的,二者违背上诉人的利益;上诉人主张,只有在Najib Razak先生停止任职之后,上诉人才可以对该裁决提出异议。被上诉人对此予以否认,并根据《和解契据》开始了第二次仲裁程序。Knowles法官使用案件管理权批准中止上诉人在法院提出的申请,并驳回了上诉人提起签发对第二次仲裁程序的禁止仲裁令的请求。
上诉人针对高等法院根据1996《仲裁法》第67条和第68条根据法院的案件管理权批准中止诉讼的裁定,以及根据1981年《高级法院法》第37条第1款拒绝批准禁令以限制被上诉人继续进行第二起仲裁程序的裁定提起上诉。
关于中止上诉人在法院提出的申请,上诉人主张法官仅确定了根据第67条和第68条中的准予中止诉讼的一项正当理由,即避免不必要的重复(to avoid unnecessary duplication)。上诉人主张,法院程序与随后的第二次仲裁的地位并不相同,法官应更加重视1996《仲裁法》的结构以及1996《仲裁法》第4条和附表1 [2]的规定,依照这些规定第67条和第68条是强制性规定,当事人不得以其他约定对此排除。被上诉人则认为,法律并没有规定第67和68条提出的申请所提出的问题应完全由法院解决。第二次仲裁的各种问题都应由当事合意约定的仲裁庭来处理。
关于拒绝授予禁令来制止第二次仲裁的裁定,上诉人主张法官未运用在Claxton Engineering Services Ltd v. TXM Olaj-es Gazkutato Kft (No 2)[2011] EWHC 345 (Comm), [2011] 2 All ER (Comm) 128 at [34]中规定的正确的两阶段法律测试。法官没有:1、询问第二次仲裁的进行是否侵犯或威胁了上诉人的普通法上的或衡平法上的权利,2、在考虑依裁量对第二次仲裁授予或者不授予禁令之前,没有考虑该次仲裁是否是无理纠缠的、具有压迫性的或不合情理的。而如果法官这样做了则他会得出结论,原告依照第67条和第68条享有的诉权确实因为存在第二项仲裁而受到侵犯,而第二项仲裁本身是无理纠缠的,应该授予禁令。二被上诉人则认为,法官的正确引用并运用了上诉人所谓的两阶段测试。
二、法院认定
上诉法院认为本案涉及4个主要争议点。
在我们看来,在这样的背景下,有以下四个问题需要确定:
i)法官行使其案件管理权以中止法院申请的作法的法律依据是否正确?
ii)如果不是,则该法院是否应行使案件管理权以中止该法院申请?
iii)法官依据第37(1)条行使其裁量权拒绝禁令的作法的法律依据是否正确。?
iv)如果不是,该法院是否应行使其裁量权根据第37(1)条批准禁止第二项仲裁的禁令?
1、法院依照第1996《仲裁法》第67条和第68条是否享有管辖权
上诉法院裁决,依照Reichhold Norway ASAv Goldman Sachs International [2000] 1 W.L.R. 173, [1999] 6 WLUK 418,必须存在令人信服的理由法院才得以依据案件管理权行使1996《仲裁法》第67条和第68条项下的管辖权对申请进行中止。依照Hashwani v OMV Maurice Energy Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1171,[2015] 2 C.L.C. 800, [2015] 11 WLUK 415,仲裁员管辖权的异议的决定权在法院,这也适用于第67条和第68条所规定的异议。法院对仲裁的干预有严格的限制,但根据1996《仲裁法》第4条第1款的规定,针对第67条和第68条的强制性规定,“即使当事人对此有任何相反的约定,该规定仍然有效”(On the other hand, the 1996 Act includes mandatory provisions, described in section 1(b) as "such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest", which according to section 4(1) "have effect notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary".)。因此,法院就这些问题有权干预,而上诉人有权基于第67条缺乏实体管辖权和第68条严重不当行为而对《和解裁决书》提出异议。(Accordingly, in this case, the claimants had a right, which the defendants had agreed they should have, and which had effect notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, to challenge the consent award by making court applications under section 67 for lack of substantive jurisdiction and under section 68 for serious irregularity.)
2、法院的案件管理权
上诉法院裁定,向法院提出的申请将使得法院的监督管辖权高于第二次仲裁的同时管辖权,但其依据错误。高等法院没有注意到:(a)申请人依照第67条和第68条对《和解裁决书》提起异议的权利; (b)异议的理由影响了马来西亚总理订立《和解契据》的权力,因此减损了其中的仲裁协议;(c)法院有责任尽快对第67条和第68条提出的异议作出决定;(d)选择仲裁并不意味着依照第67条和第68条所进行的异议不具有合意;(e)法院根据该法作为国家机构行使其监督作用,而不是仅仅是合意性仲裁程序的延伸;(f)行使第67条和第68条规定的监督管辖权的法院必须迅速采取行动,以避免执行过程中的不确定性和不公正性。(But he failed to recognise, as we have sought already to explain, that: (a) the claimants had a right, which the defendants had agreed they should have, and which had effect notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, to challenge the consent award under sections 67 and 68, (b) the grounds of challenge affected Mr Najib's authority to enter into the deeds of settlement at all and would, therefore, undermine the arbitration agreement contained within them, (c) it is the responsibility of the court to determine challenges under sections 67 and 68, and to do so as promptly as possible, (d) the election to arbitrate could not dictate the position in respect ofchallenges under sections 67 and 68, which were no longer consensual, (e) courts exercising their supervisory role under the 1996 Act do so as a branch of the state, not as a mere extension of the consensual arbitration process,and (f) the court exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under sections 67 and 68 must do so quickly to avoid uncertainty and injustice in the enforcement process.)因此,法官在错误的法律基础上行使了案件管理权。(Accordingly, we are satisfied that the judge exercised his case management power to stay the court applications under sections 67 and 68 on the wrong legal basis.)
3、法院中止申请程序
第67和68条项下的撤裁申请权为对于公共利益非常重要,而法院在解决此类纠纷中扮演着重要的公共职能。(The right to commence and progress properly brought court applications under sections 67 and 68 is necessary in the public interest. The court is performing an important public function in resolvingsuch disputes.)对于法院申请是否应该中止该申请,以便第二次仲裁可以对该等申请的基础事实作出认定这个问题——鉴于在开始和进行法院申请的权利背后存在公共利益,对于该案的中止程序而言并无强力的理由。(the right to commence and progress properly brought court applications under sections 67 and 68 is necessary in the public interest.)此外,优先考虑第二次仲裁是不合逻辑的,因为第二次仲裁是对上诉人的法院程序的回应,上诉人提起该程序的权利是法定的并且不能通过合同取消。(the defendants' commencement of the arbitrations was a reaction to the claimants' court applications. That is not a matter ofsimple timing, but one of substance)当事人自治的原则反对中止程序。(the claimants can properly invoke the parties' agreement in the binding term sheet to the supervisory jurisdiction of the English court under sections 67 and 68.In such circumstances, and bearing in mind the heavy burden on the defendants to justify a case management stay, we regard it as clear that the proceedings should have been allowed to continue.)此外,中止可能导致上诉人不得不在第二次仲裁中为其将面对的巨额财务索赔进行辩护,以便继续其法院申请,这将是过于繁重的负担(the result of imposing a stay is that, in order to continue their court applications challenging the consent award, the claimants must first defend themselves against large financial claims in the second arbitrations.)。
4、法院拒绝授予禁令
上诉法院认为,高等法院法官行使其裁量权拒绝批准禁令的法律依据错误(the judge exercised his discretion to refuse an injunction under section 37(1) on the wrong legal basis)。高等法院法官应该确定继续进行第二次仲裁是否侵犯了上诉人的合法权利,以及继续第二次仲裁是否无理纠缠、有压迫性或不合情理,以便认定是否有理由认为特殊情况下授予禁令是正当的(the first and second questions are whether either the claimants' rights have been infringed or threatened by a continuation of the second arbitrations and/or whether continuation of the second arbitrations would be vexatious, oppressive or unconscionable)。第二次仲裁无疑威胁到上诉人提起法院申请的权利,其本身也是无理纠缠和有压迫性。(the defendants are pursuing the second arbitrations in which they contend (a) that the pursuit of the court applications are themselves events of default under the settlement deeds,[18] and (b) that the events of default in question trigger the claimants' substantial and immediate financial liability. Those claims infringe and threaten the claimants'undoubted legal right to pursue the court applications under sections 67 and 68, and are vexatious and oppressive.)《和解契据》的条款显然旨在于限制上诉人在第一次仲裁中行使其对《和解裁决书》提出异议的法定权利(It is not legitimate for the defendants to seek toenforce the clauses of the settlement deeds that attempt to suppress the court's review of the consent award, to which the parties specifically agreedin the binding term sheet.)因此,旨在于限制第二次仲裁的禁令是合理的。
三、评论
在英国,上诉本身需要法院批准,因此成功率很低。不仅如此,鉴于上诉法院判决的先例拘束力,本案在于阐明1996《仲裁法》第67条和第68条的强行法地位有较强的参考价值。上诉法院认为,第67条规定的当事人根据仲裁庭缺乏实体管辖权的撤裁申请权和第68条规定的当事人根据程序违规的撤裁申请权属于强制性条款,其背后有着深刻的公共利益,不论是法院的案件管理权还是当事人合意不得对其进行剥夺或者减损,这表明了法院在这个问题上的底线和当事人意思自治的界限。