2019年5月29日，在Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanías S.A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v.Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1) 一案中（判决请见：阅读原文），ICSID临时撤销委员会认为，阿根廷未能证明《资助协议》违反任何基本程序规则，也没有提供任何证据说明为什么《资助协议》构成资助者对案件的不当控制或滥用。因此，该委员会得出结论认为，关于《资助协议》和资助者的角色，仲裁庭没有违反任何基本程序规则，阿根廷以存在第三方资助为由提出的撤销裁决的请求被驳回。

在涉案争议中，仲裁程序的申请人获得了第三方资助者Burford的资助，作为被申请人的阿根廷在仲裁程序中以及在之后的撤销程序中提出了多项与此相关的主张和抗辩，本文将当事人争议中与资助有关的主张、抗辩，仲裁庭的意见和撤销委员会的意见整理如下。

一、案情简介

仲裁程序的三个申请人（撤销程序的被上诉人）Teinver S.A.、Transportes de Cercanías S.A.和Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A.（以下统称申请人，）根据1992年9月28日生效的《阿根廷和西班牙促进和保护投资协议》（以下简称“《BIT协议》”），和《解决国家与其他国家国民之间投资争端公约》（以下简称“《ICSID公约》”）将其与阿根廷（仲裁程序的被申请人，撤销程序的上诉人）之间的争议提交ICSID仲裁。申请人称，阿根廷政府将其在两个阿根廷航空公司的投资非法国有化的行为及其采取的其他措施违反了《BIT协议》、国际法、阿根廷法，以及阿根廷向申请人作出的承诺和声明。

在仲裁请求登记后，申请人开始了重组程序，并与Air Comet签订了以Air Comet为受让人的涉及潜在裁决收益的《转让协议》，以及与资助者Burbord签订了《资助协议》。

2010年4月23日，阿根廷通知ICSID及仲裁庭，其通过报纸刊物得知申请人已转让部分ICSID请求给美国的投资基金，并请求仲裁庭要求申请人提供与资助者签署的与协议事项和内容有关的所有可用资料，并提交所有相关文件（Respondent requested that the Tribunal require Claimants to provide all available information regarding the matter and the content of the agreement that was signed with said investment fund, and to also submit all related documentation.）

2010年5月28日，申请人回应称，其没有如阿根廷所言出售请求，也没有任何义务披露其与第三方就仲裁程序的资助费用达成的任何协议，而阿根廷也没有证明其请求的必要性或相关性。（Claimants stressed that they had no obligation to disclose any agreements with third parties with respect to the funding of costs in this proceeding, and that Respondent did not argue the necessity or relevance of its request.）

经过当事人提出的一系列关于提供文件的请求与抗辩中，《资助协议》的条款在仲裁程序中披露。

二、仲裁程序

（1）当事人在仲裁程序中关于第三方资助的观点

在仲裁程序中，被申请人阿根廷提出了管辖权异议，其中一项理由涉及申请人的《资助协议》。阿根廷认为，资助者Burbord在仲裁程序中不仅与申请人具有所谓的“共同法律利益”，而且是似乎是唯一能够从潜在的对阿根廷不利的裁决中获利的当事人。根据阿根廷的观点，Burford不符合《ICSID公约》的基本管辖要求。Burford不是阿根廷的投资者，也不是在西班牙成立的能够援引《BIT协议》提起仲裁的公司。因此，允许Burford从《BIT协议》授权的争端解决机制中获益，违反了《BIT协议》的目标和目的，而且将绕过阿根廷和西班牙对于同意仲裁管辖权的限制。（According to Respondent, Burford does not meet the basic jurisdictional requirements under the ICSID Convention. Burford is not an investor in Argentina, nor is it a company organized in Spain that could invoke the Treaty relied upon by Claimants to institute this arbitration proceeding.Thus, allowing Burford to benefit from a dispute settlement mechanism authorized under the Treaty is contrary to the object and purpose of the latter, and would impermissibly bypass the limits of Argentina’s and Spain’s consent to arbitral jurisdiction.）

另外，在仲裁程序的实体审理阶段，阿根廷认为，申请人的代理律师King & Spalding的授权无效，其中一个理由是：《资助协议》要求由King & Spalding担任代理律师，这是申请人与资助者之间的“共谋（conspiracy）”，具体而言，《资助协议》规定，如果King & Spalding的委托书被修改或终止，Burford有权终止《资助协议》并有权根据该协议第10.1条获得可观的赔偿。

申请人则认为《资助协议》与仲裁庭的管辖权问题无关，并基于如下理由认为阿根廷的主张错误：申请人提起仲裁的立场完全受《ICSID公约》和《BIT协议》的管辖；根据《ICSID公约》、《BIT协议》和国际法，确定管辖权的有关日期为提起仲裁的日期。另外，申请表示其未将索赔出售或转让给Burford，Burford不是仲裁当事人。

（2）仲裁庭的认定

对于阿根廷以存在《资助协议》为由提出的管辖权异议，仲裁庭认为国际判例法向来确认，管辖权通常以案件提交之日作为评定日。“如果法院在案件提交之日享有管辖权，它将继续享有管辖权，不管后来发生什么事件。”（The Court recalls that, according to its settled jurisprudence, its jurisdiction must be determined at the time that the act instituting proceedings was filed. Thus, if the Court has jurisdiction on the date the case is referred to it, it continues to do so regardless of subsequent events.）。”（参见：Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000(Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, February 14, 2002, I.C.J.Reports 2002, p. 3, ¶ 26, Ex. C-762.）

另外，仲裁庭还援引了Compañíade Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentina (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3)案的观点，“通常认为，就提起法律程序的司法管辖权而言，一方是否在国际司法管辖中具有法律地位，应参照所认定的提起此类程序的日期进行确定……该规则的结果是，管辖权一旦确立，就不能被推翻。”（[I]t is generally recognized that the determination of whether a party has standing in an international judicial forum, for purposes of jurisdiction to institute proceedings, is made by reference to the date on which such proceedings are deemed to have been instituted. … This is not only a principle of ICSID proceedings, it is an accepted principle of international adjudication that jurisdiction will be determined in the light of the situation as it existed on the date the proceedings were instituted. Events that take place before that date may affect jurisdiction; events that take place after that date do not. The ICJ developed cogent case law to this effect in the Lockerbie case. (…) The consequence of this rule is that, once established, jurisdiction cannot be defeated. It simply is not affected by subsequent events. Events occurring after the institution of proceedings (…) cannot withdraw the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the dispute.）此外，仲裁庭还援引了CeskoslovenskaObchodni Banka, a.s. (CSOB) v. The Slovak Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4)案的裁定以支持其观点。

因阿根廷的主张所涉及的事件（申请人的重组、《转让协议》和《资助协议》的签订）都发生在提起仲裁之后，据此，仲裁庭认为充分理由驳回阿根廷的管辖权异议。（Based on the fact that each of the allegations made by Respondent concerns an event—the Claimants’ reorganizations, the Assignment Agreement and the Funding Agreement—that postdates the filing of the arbitration, the Tribunal finds this sufficient grounds to reject Respondents’ objection.）

最后，仲裁庭表示将不再处理阿根廷关于《转让协议》和《资助协议》的其他主张，如果这些主张会影响申请人在实体阶段适当提出的请求，但是，这不妨碍当事人就阿根廷的主张提出进一步意见。（The Tribunal will not address Respondent’s remaining allegations regarding the Assignment Agreement and the Funding Agreement as they concern Claimants’ standing, without prejudice to further submissions by the Parties in respect of the Respondent’s allegationsin so far as they affect the merits of Claimants’ claims, as appropriate, during the merits stage.）

对于阿根廷提出的认为代理律师King & Spalding的授权无效的主张，仲裁庭认为，对King & Spalding的授权委托书有效，无需出具新的授权委托书。关于阿根廷提出的申请人和资助者存在“共谋”的主张，仲裁庭认为阿根廷的主张不仅对申请人，而且对其律师和资助者都提出了严重的指控，但阿根廷没有提供证据支持其论点。（The Tribunal has found that the powers of attorney are valid and that there was no obligation to seek a new power of attorney. In light of this finding, it is not necessary to make findings in respect of Respondent’s “conspiracy” argument relating to the powers of attorney. The Tribunal considers it important to note that Respondent provided no evidence to support this argument, which makes serious allegations not only about Claimants, but also their counsel and third-party funders. Respondent entirely failed to substantiate its “conspiracy” argument and it is inconsistent with the evidence.）

首先，关于共谋的主张，尽管《资助协议》最初是申请人与Burford之间的私下协议，但该协议被披露给作为潜在裁决受让人Air Comet的重组管理人，该重组管理人同意了《资助协议》并请求法院批准。经法院批准，《资助协议》的存在被公开。考虑到Air Comet的重组程序与申请人的重组程序以及《转让协议》之间的密切联系，仲裁庭认为，可以合理的假设各申请人的重组管理人都充分地意识到《资助协议》的存在。（First, regarding the notion of conspiracy, although the Funding Agreement was originally a private agreement between Claimants and Burford, it was disclosed to the re-organization administrators for Air Comet who agreed with the Funding Agreement and requested its approval by the court,99 which approved the Funding Agreement.100 By way of its court approval ,the Funding Agreement became public and must have been known by there-organization administrators for Claimants (Mr. Arqued was a re-organization administrator for both Air Comet and for Teinver). In view of the close inter-relationship between the Air Comet insolvency proceedings and those of Claimants and the Assignment Agreement, it is reasonable to assume that the re-organization administrators for each of Claimants were fully aware of the Funding Agreement.）

其次，阿根廷的论点似乎是，如果申请人请求出具新的授权委托书，可能让Burford得知申请人在进行破产程序并导致Burford解除《资助协议》。对此，仲裁庭表示，Burford不太可能不知道申请人的财务状况并继续密切关注其发展。无论如何，没有迹象表明，Burford曾将申请人的破产作为终止《资助协议》的依据。另外，就《资助协议》的潜在终止而言，申请人与Burford之间关系的相关性还不明确。重组管理人无论在过去还是现在都清楚地知道存在《资助协议》，并已确认King & Spalding有权在此次仲裁中代表申请人，合理的假设是，这符合申请人的债权人的利益。（However, it is highly unlikely that Burford was not already fully aware of Claimants’ financial status and continued to monitor it closely, given its financial interest in doing so. In any event, there is no indication that Burford ever treated the insolvency of Claimants as a basis for terminating the Funding Agreement (it appears that their financial interests are well protected in that agreement). Further, the relevance of the relationship between Claimants and Burford as far as a potential termination of the Funding Agreement is concerned is unclear. The re-organization administrators were, and are, clearly aware of the Funding Agreement and have confirmed King & Spalding's authorization to represent Claimants in this arbitration because, it is logical to assume, this is in the interests of Claimants’creditors.）

因此，仲裁庭表示其不会根据阿根廷提出的“共谋”论点而改变其对委托授权书效力的认定。（Accordingly, the Tribunal would not vary its finding on the validity of the powers of attorney based on Respondent’s additional “conspiracy” argument.）

2012年12月21日，仲裁庭裁定驳回阿根廷的管辖权异议。2017年7月21日，ICSID仲裁庭作出了多数裁决（共同仲裁员Dr.Kamal Hossain提交了异议意见），裁定阿根廷支付3.207亿美元的损害赔偿，以及裁决前后的复利利息和350万美元的法律费用和开支。

值得一提的是，仲裁员Dr. Kamal Hossain对裁决提交了异议意见，该仲裁员对资助持反对态度，认为本案资助者涉及“帮诉”，“帮诉”长期以来在英国法中被认为违反公共政策，涉及“帮诉”的合同可能无效。（The Funder‘s role in this case may well be characterized as “champerty”, which has long been considered under English common law as being against public policy as it encourages vexatious litigation. A contract may be void for champerty, though it may not strictly amount to criminal offence.）该仲裁员还认为，不管采用哪种合理解释，资助者Burford都不能被认定为受BIT保护的投资者，在这种情况下，仲裁庭无权向不属于BIT下的投资者且未进行BIT所保护的“投资”的一方（如Burford）授予裁决收益。（Burford cannot, on any reasonable construction be characterized as an investor entitled to protection under the BIT. The Tribunal cannot, in these circumstances, be considered to have jurisdiction to grant an award to a party, such as Burford, which is not an investor under the BIT and has made no “investment” which can claim to be protected by the BIT.）

阿根廷不服仲裁裁决，根据《ICSID公约》第52（1）条基于如下三个理由请求撤销裁决：（1）仲裁庭明显超出权限（违反《ICSID公约》第52（1）（b）条）；（2）严重违反了基本的程序规则（违反《ICSID公约》第52（1）（d）条）；（3）裁决未阐明所依据的理由（违反《ICSID公约》第52（1）（e）条）。其中在第二个理由中，除其他外，阿根廷认为申请人由第三方资助的事实严重违反了基本的程序规则。

三、撤销程序

（1）当事人在撤销程序中关于第三方资助的观点

阿根廷指出，《资助协议》相当于将资助者Burford替代成为仲裁的真正当事人，基于帮诉和助诉原则的资助协议是一种程序滥用，既违反了公共政策，也违反了国际法和《ICSID公约》。根据阿根廷的观点，仲裁庭未能核实《资助协议》是否遵守适用于第三方资助的良好做法，以避免出现任何利益冲突和对仲裁进行不当控制的情况。在存在非法的《资助协议》的情况下，仲裁庭仍决定行使管辖权，这严重背离了基本的程序规则。

Argentina first submits that the Funding Agreement amounts to a substitution of Burford as the real party in the arbitration, and that agreements based on principles of champerty and maintenance are an abuse of process that is contrary to public policy, as well as to international law and the ICSID Convention. According to Argentina, the Tribunal failed to verify that the Funding Agreement complied with good practices applicable to third-party funding, so as to avoid any situation of conflicts of interest and the improper exercise of an undue control on the arbitration. As a consequence, the Tribunal’s decision to take jurisdiction in spite of the illegal Funding Agreement was a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure.

申请人反驳道，《资助协议》的效力与申请人和阿根廷之间的争议解决无关，仲裁庭不必对《资助协议》的效力采取任何立场。申请人还表示，阿根廷未能确认争议程序的基本规则，没有证据表明Burford对仲裁进行了任何控制。

The Claimants object that the Tribunal did not have to take any position on the validity of the Funding Agreement, which is irrelevant to the resolution of the dispute between the Claimants and Argentina. The Claimants also submit that Argentin afailed to identify the fundamental rule of procedure at issue and that there is no evidence that Burford exercised any control on the arbitration.

（2）委员会的认定

作为一个初步问题，委员会认为《资助协议》可能违反公共政策或国际法，或违反《ICSID公约》的目标和目的，该事实本身不必然足以导致根据《ICSID公约》第52（1）（d）条撤销裁决。要使委员会基于该理由撤销裁决，阿根廷需要证明仲裁程序严重背离了基本的程序规则。《资助协议》可能非法或违反公共政策，不足以表明该协议严重违反基本的程序规则。

As an initial matter, the Committee considers that the fact that the Funding Agreement may be contrary to public policy or to international law and to the object and purposes of the ICSID Convention would not necessarily be in itself sufficient to entail annulment under Article 52(1)(d) of the ICSID Convention. In order for the Committee to annul the Award on that ground, Argentina needs to identify a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure in the arbitration proceedings. The simple fact that the Funding Agreement may be illegal or contrary to public policy does not necessarily imply a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure.

委员会还认定，阿根廷未证明禁止帮诉和助诉的理论适用于基于条约的ICSID仲裁，也未证明第三方资助的最佳做法（如Catherine Kessedjian教授或《诉讼资助者行为准则》（Code of Conduct of litigation）所述），是ICSID仲裁中应强制遵守的基本程序规则。委员会承认，在某些极端的案件中，对公认良好做法的漠视可能与评估适用于仲裁的基本程序规则是否被违反有关。但是，上诉人仍然有责任证明适用于仲裁的程序规则是否已被违反。阿根廷没有在本案中证明存在任何此类违规行为。

The Committee also finds that Argentina has not demonstrated that the prohibition of maintenance and champerty applies in the context of a treaty-based ICSID arbitration. Nor has Argentina demonstrated that the best practices for third-party funding ,such as those identified by Prof Catherine Kessedjian or the Code of Conduct of litigation funders, are a fundamental rule of procedure that should mandatorily be complied with in an ICSID arbitration. The Committee accepts that disregard on the part of the funded party and the funder of recognized good practices may in certain egregious cases be relevant to the assessment of whether a fundamental rule of procedure applying to the arbitration was breached. However, the applicant still has the onus of identifying the rule of procedure applying to the arbitration that has so been breached. Argentina did not identify any such breach in this case.

阿根廷称《资助协议》导致仲裁中诉争权利的转移，故Burford将成为真正的申请人。对此，委员会认为一方在未披露其代表身份并获得相应授权的情况下，不可能代表另一方出席庭审，这是一项基本的程序规则。事实上，当事人有权知道其对方当事人的身份。

As to the allegation that the Funding Agreement entailed a transfer of the rights in dispute in the arbitration, so that Burford would have become the real claimant party, the Committee considers that it is a fundamental rule of procedure that a party may not appear on behalf of another without disclosing the representation and being empowered to that effect. As a matter of fact, a party is entitled to know against whom it is litigating.

在本案中，委员会已经认定《资助协议》不会导致仲裁权利被转移给Burford。《资助协议》第3.1条指出，资助的目的在于“使申请人能够提出其请求”，从而确认申请人对请求具有所有权。第3.2条进一步指出，“申请人可在任何时候未经资助人同意，以任何数额或基于任何条件达成和解”。此外，《资助协议》第6条确认，申请人将获得裁决的收益（“申请人同意在收到全部或部分裁决后立即向资助人支付获偿的金额”），这表明申请人在仲裁过程中始终拥有诉争请求。总之，《资助协议》中没有任何内容表明，诉争权利被转移给资助者。申请人同意向Burford支付其将获偿的数额（如《资助协议》附表2所定义），即裁决的一部分收益，这并不意味着Burford已获得诉争权利的所有权，更谈不上已成为真正的仲裁当事人。委员会的结论是，《资助协议》并未剥夺申请人提出请求的权利。

In the instantcase, however, the Committee already found that the Funding Agreement did not operate a transfer to Burford of the rights in dispute in the arbitration. Article 3.1 of the Funding Agreement states that its purpose is to “enable the Claimant to pursue its Claim”,thus confirming the Claimants’ ownership of the claim. Article 3.2 further states that “the Claimant may at any timewithout the consent of the Funder settle the claim for any amount or on any basis”. Also, Article 6 of the Funding Agreement confirms that the Claimants will receive the proceeds of the Award (“the Claimant agrees to pay to the Funder the Recovery Amount immediately following receipt of all or any part of the Award”), which confirms that the Claimants continued to own the claims in dispute at all times during the arbitration. In sum, there is nothing in the Funding Agreement suggesting that the rights in dispute would have been transferred to the Funder. The fact that the Claimants agreed to pay to Burford the Recovery Amount (as defined in Schedule 2 to the Funding Agreement), i.e. a portion of the proceeds of the Award, does not mean that Burford had acquired ownership of the rights in dispute, and even less that it had become the real party to the arbitration. In conclusion, the Funding Agreement has not deprived the Claimants of their standing to pursue their claims.

在这方面，阿根廷争辩说，《资助协议》不适当地规定由King & Spalding担任代理律师，这等同于对争端实施控制。

Argentina contends, in this regard, that the Funding Agreement improperly imposed the presence as counsel of King & Spalding, which would amount to exercising control over the dispute.

委员会表示，作为一个初步问题，必须注意到King & Spalding在案件中担任申请人代理律师的日期在《资助协议》签订之前。因此，毫无疑问，King & Spalding是由申请人而非由Burford选择。另外，委员会表示其无法理解为何《资助协议》规定负责代表受助方的律师并规定不得未经同意作出变更会等同于资助者对案件的控制。事实上，资助者和受助者就负责案件的律师达成一致意见并将此作为获得资助的对价完全合理。受助当事人承担通知约定律师的义务并不意味着该律师不再代表该受助当事人，也不意味着资助者将控制案件。无论如何，阿根廷未能证明《资助协议》的规定将违反哪些基本程序规则。

As an initial matter, it is to be noted that the presence of King & Spalding as the Claimants’ counsel in the case predates the Funding Agreement. There can therefore be no doubt that King & Spalding was selected by the Claimants, and not by Burford. The Committee, in addition, fails to see why the inclusion in a funding agreement of provisions identifying the counsel in charge of representing the funded party, and providing that there shall be no non-agreed change in representation, would amount to an abusive control of the funder on the case. As a matter of fact, it seems entirely reasonable that funding be released in consideration of an agreement between the funder and the funded party on the identity of counsel in charge of the case. Also, the fact that the funded party assumes the obligation to instruct the agreed counsel does not mean that such counsel would cease to represent that funded party, or that that the funder would in any way take control over the case. In any event, Argentina failed to identify the fundamental rule of procedure that these provisions of the Funding Agreement would offend.

阿根廷进一步辩称，《资助协议》导致Burford对仲裁的不当干预。在这方面，阿根廷所依据的事实包括：《资助协议》规定申请人在某些条件下有义务接受和解协议；《资助协议》规定了合作义务；《资助协议》中存在对申请人提起其他法律程序的权利的限制；以及《资助协议》规定Burford有权获得与案件有关的信息。

Argentina further contends that the Funding Agreement resulted into an undue interference in the arbitration by Burford. Argentina relies, in this regard, on the fact that the Funding Agreement provides for the Claimants’ obligation to accept a settlement agreement at certain conditions, that the Funding Agreement establishes a duty of cooperation, on the existence of limitations to the Claimants’ right to initiate other legal proceedings, and on the fact that Burford had a right of access to information relating to the case.

阿根廷仍然未确认这些《资助协议》的规定将违反的基本程序规则。如前所述，《诉讼资助者协议行为准则》和Catherine Kessedjian教授关于资助的良好做法的意见，以及阿根廷援引的巴黎律师协会的裁定均不是ICSID程序中的基本程序规则。另外，阿根廷未证明《资助协议》中的任何规定可能以任何方式构成Burford对仲裁的不当干预。《资助协议》第3.2条基本上规定了资助者和申请人之间的一项协议，即任何不低于2.5亿美元的和解协议都应被接受，且不需要申请人作出进一步同意。这只不过是《资助协议》当事人之间就合理的和解数额达成的一项协议。委员会表示，这只不过是《资助协议》当事人之间就合理的和解数额达成的一项协议。委员会认定，阿根廷未能证明此种协议将剥夺申请人对案件的控制权。同样，关于申请人合作义务的规定本质上旨在确保申请人为案件的成功而向King & Spalding提供必要的支持和信息。即使存在控制，这些规定也仅表明，King & Spalding始终接受申请人而非接受Burford的指示。申请人承诺将不提起可能损害仲裁程序的其他法律程序似乎完全合理。最后，委员会表示其无法理解，资助者获取与案件有关的信息为何会等同于对由King & Spalding代理的申请人的抗辩行为的不当干预。

Argentina, again,does not identify the fundamental rule of procedure that these provisions ofthe Funding Agreement would breach. As said above, the Code of Conduct of the Litigation Funders Association is not a fundamental rule of procedure in anICSID proceeding. Nor are the opinion of Prof. Catherine Kessedjian on funding good practices or the ruling of the Paris Bar referred to by Argentina. In addition, Argentina does not show that any of the provisions of the Funding Agreement it criticizes could amount in any way to an improper interference by Burford in the arbitration. Art. 3.2 essentially provides for an agreement between the Funder and the Claimants that any settlement agreement for an amount at least equal to USD 250 million shall be accepted with no need of a further agreement on the part of the Claimants. This is no more than anagreement between the parties to the Funding Agreement on what a reasonable settlement amount would be. The Committee does not find in Argentina’s case any demonstration that such an agreement deprives the Claimants of their control over the case. Likewise, the provisions relating to the Claimants’ duty of cooperation essentially aim at ensuring that the Claimants will provide King& Spalding with the necessary support and information for the claim to succeed. If anything, these provisions demonstrate that King & Spalding was at all times being instructed by the Claimants, not by Burford. The fact that the Claimants undertook not to initiate other legal proceedings that could prejudice the arbitration also seems to be entirely reasonable. Finally, the Committee fails to understand why the Funder’s right to receive information relating to the case would amount into an impermissible interference in the conduct of the Claimants’ defence by King & Spalding.

最后，阿根廷指出，《资助协议》可能导致King & Spalding与资助者之间的利益冲突，但并未说明其指的是哪种冲突以及为何此种冲突应与委员会的决定有关。阿根廷确实没有任何证据证明《资助协议》会引起任何涉及申请人、King & Spalding或仲裁庭任何成员的利益冲突。

Finally, Argentinahas referred to the possibility that the Funding Agreement would result in conflicts of interest between King & Spalding and the Funder.244 Argentina, however did not specify to what conflicts of interests it referred to, and why they should be relevant to the decision of the Committee. There is indeed no demonstration whatsoever by Argentina of any conflict of interest arising from the Funding Agreement, involving either the Claimants, King & Spalding or any member of the Tribunal.

综上所述，委员会认为，阿根廷未能证明《资助协议》违反任何基本程序规则。阿根廷也没有提供任何证据证明为什么《资助协议》会构成Burford对案件的不当控制或滥用。委员会的结论是，关于《资助协议》和Burford的角色，仲裁庭没有违反任何基本程序规则。

In sum, Argentina has not identified any fundamental rule of procedure that would be inconsistent with the Funding Agreement. It has also not provided any demonstration of the reason why the Funding Agreement amounted to an improper or abusive control on the case by Burford. Based on the foregoing, the Committee concludes that the Tribunal did not depart from any fundamental rule of procedure with respect of the Funding Agreement and the role of Burford.）

因此，阿根廷以存在第三方资助将违反基本程序规则为由请求撤销裁决的论点被ICSID临时撤销委员会驳回。

四、评论

ICSID临时撤销委员会在本案中阐明，《资助协议》可能违反公共政策或国际法，或违反《ICSID公约》的对象和目的，该事实本身不足以导致裁决被撤销。上诉人若要基于该理由撤销裁决，就需要证明仲裁程序严重背离了基本的程序规则。《资助协议》可能非的或违反公共政策，不足以表明该协议严重违反了对基本的程序规则。在本案中，阿根廷未能证明《资助协议》违反任何基本程序规则，也没有提供任何证据证明为什么《资助协议》构成Burford对案件的不当控制或滥用，故其以存在第三方资助将违反基本程序规则为由提出的撤销裁决的请求被驳回。

另外，ICSID临时撤销委员会在本案中阐明，《诉讼资助者协议行为准则》和Catherine Kessedjian教授关于资助的良好做法的意见，以及阿根廷援引的巴黎律师协会的裁定均不是ICSID程序中的基本程序规则。只有在某些极端的案件中，对公认良好做法的漠视可能与评估适用于仲裁的基本程序规则是否被违反有关。对于这种极端情况，仍需由上诉人证明适用于仲裁的程序规则是否已被违反。由此可知，在关于资助的良好做法未强制适用于ICSID仲裁的情况下，当事人以关于资助的良好做法未被遵守为由撤销裁决的可行性很低。

最后，值得一提的是，在基础仲裁程序中，申请人在达成《资助协议》后并未主动对资助的存在及资助者的身份进行披露，该信息是由阿根廷通过报纸刊物得知后通知ICSID及其仲裁庭。经过当事人提出的一系列关于提供文件的请求与抗辩中，《资助协议》的条款才在仲裁程序中披露。本案也侧面反映出，获得资助的当事人主动披露资助的存在及资助者的身份还不是一种通行做法。另外，阿根廷在本案中认为仲裁庭应核实《资助协议》是否遵守适用于第三方资助的良好做法，以避免出现任何利益冲突和对仲裁进行不当控制的情况。对此，ICSID撤销委员会阐明，提出主张的一方应“说明其指的是哪种冲突以及为何此种冲突应与委员会的决定有关”。在本案中，阿根廷未能证明《资助协议》会引起任何涉及申请人、律师或仲裁庭任何成员的利益冲突，故阿根廷关于第三方资助导致利益冲突的主张被驳回。此外，在基础仲裁程序中，受助当事人没有提出补偿第三方资助费用的请求，此种请求能否得到仲裁庭的支持无从得知，需要通过更多的判例求证。

阅读原文：http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C520/DS12192_En.pdf