2020年2月27日,在 R v K [2020] EWHC 841 (Fam)一案中,针对申请人H根据《1996年仲裁法》第68条基于存在严重不规范行为对裁决提出的异议,英格兰与威尔士高等法院(以下简称法院)分析后发现,H的不满主要来自仲裁员对事实的调查结果。即使仲裁员没有对证据进行适当的考虑,其做法也没有上升到严重违规的程度。因此,法院驳回了H根据第68条所提出的异议。在第68条申请失败的情况下,作为替代选择,当事人试图说服法官根据《1973年婚姻诉讼法》第25条行使自由裁量权拒绝将裁决作成命令。法院认为,根据《1973年婚姻诉讼法》第25条所享有的自由裁量权可以作为例外情况的保障,但不太可能被用来剥夺裁决的约束力,除非是极端情况或超出《1996年仲裁法》的范围。因此,法院驳回H根据《1996年仲裁法》第68条对裁决提出的异议,并批准将裁决作成命令使裁决生效。
一、背景介绍
本案的基础争议与当事人(即丈夫H和妻子W)在离婚后的经济安排有关。2019年9月13日,当事人根据家庭法仲裁财务计划(“IFLA计划”)提供的样本签署了仲裁协议。仲裁协议确定了财务救济问题,如财产净收益划分、赡养期限和数额以及养老金问题。
在庭审之后,仲裁员向当事人的律师分发了裁决草案。H的律师提出了两页的澄清/解释要求。2019年10月23日,仲裁员以“澄清裁决某些方面的要求远远超出了所允许的范围”为由拒绝对原告的要求予以澄清。
2019年10月23日,仲裁员作出裁决。除W的收入需要和定期付款略微调高一些外,裁决的条款与裁决草案的条款相同。
2019年11月22日,H提出本案申请,根据《1996年仲裁法》第68条或69条请求法院撤销仲裁裁决,并根据《1973年婚姻诉讼法》第25条请求法院行使自由裁量权不以裁决中的条款批准同意命令。
二、法院认定
法院认为,本案的争议事项在于:(1)是否准许根据《1996年仲裁法》第69条上诉;(2)是否根据《1996年仲裁法》第68条基于严重违规行为撤销裁决;(3)是否根据《1973年婚姻诉讼法》第25条以裁决的条款作出命令。
法院认定本案应适用《1996年仲裁法》以下条款:
第57条:
裁决书或其他裁决书的更正(Correction of award or additional award)。
(1)当事人可自由就仲裁庭更正裁决或作出附加裁决的权力达成协议。(The parties are free to agree on the powers of the tribunal to correct an award or make an additional award)
(2)如果没有这样的协议,则适用以下规定。(If or to the extent there is no such agreement, the following provisions apply.)
(3)仲裁庭可主动或应当事方的申请─(The tribunal may on its own initiative or on the application of a party—)
(a)更正裁决,以消除因偶然的疏忽或遗漏而引起的任何文书错误或错误,或澄清或消除裁决中的任何歧义,或(correct an award so as to remove any clerical mistake or error arising from an accidental slip or omission or clarify or remove any ambiguity in the award, or)
(b)就提交仲裁庭但未在裁决中处理的任何索赔(包括利息或费用索赔)作出额外裁决。(make an additional award in respect of any claim (including a claim for interest or costs) which was presented to the tribunal but was not dealt with in the award.)
第68条:
(2)严重不当行为是指法院认为对申请人造成或将导致实质性不公正的下列一种或多种不正当行为—
(2) Serious irregularity means an irregularity of one or more of the following kinds which the court considers has caused or will cause substantial injustice to the applicant—
(d)仲裁庭没有处理所提出的所有问题(failure by the tribunal to deal with all the issues that were put to it;);
第69条:
涉及就裁决所引起的法律观点质疑裁决。这种挑战涉及最初要求许可,然后就上诉的实质进行实质性听证。第69条规定如下:
(3)仅在法院信纳以下情况时,才可给予上诉许可(Leave to appeal shall be given only if the court is satisfied-):
(a)对问题的确定将在很大程度上影响一个或多个当事方的权利(that the determination of the question will substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties,)
(b)该问题是由仲裁庭决定的( that the question is one which the tribunal was asked to determine),
(c)根据裁决中的事实调查结果,─(that, on the basis of the findings of fact in the award-)
i)仲裁庭关于该问题的决定显然是错误的,或者(the decision of the tribunal on the question is obviously wrong, or)
ii)该问题是公众普遍关注的问题,并且该法庭的裁决至少可以引起严重怀疑,并且(the question is one of general public importance and the decision of the tribunal is at least open to serious doubt, and)
(d)尽管当事各方同意通过仲裁解决此问题,但在所有情况下,由法院裁定该问题是公正而适当的。(that, despite the agreement of the parties to resolve the matter by arbitration, it is just and proper in all the circumstances for the court to determine the question.)
(4)根据本条提出的上诉许可申请,应指明待确定的法律问题,并说明据称应给予上诉许可的理由。(An application for leave to appeal under this section shall identify the question of law to be determined and state the grounds on which it is alleged that leave to appeal should be granted.)
1. 不应根据《1996年仲裁法》第69条给予上诉许可
《1996年仲裁法》第69(4)条要求当事人明确其提出的法律问题。H并未在其仲裁申请书中明确指出本案争议涉及的法律问题。仲裁员根据第25条行使自由裁量权在合理范围内。仲裁员已经确定了正确的判例法标准,并且其行使自由裁量权没有明显错误,事实上甚至不存在引起严重质疑的可能性。(the arbitrator's exercise of his discretion under s25 was within the range of that which a reasonable (sometimes called rational) arbitrator could make. The arbitrator had identified the right legal test and his exercise of discretion was not obviously wrong, and indeed not even open to serious doubt.)因此,法院拒绝根据《1996年仲裁法》第69条给予上诉许可。
2. 是否应根据《1996年仲裁法》第68条撤销严重违规的裁决?
H主张仲裁员忽视证据,且未考虑《1973年婚姻诉讼法》第25条的相关问题。H的不满与其所指控的仲裁员的法律错误有关并适用相同的推理。这些不满主要来自仲裁员对事实的调查结果,即仲裁员如何评估证据,应该基于证据得出什么结论,以及应该就公平分配得出什么结论。以下两个重要且相互关联的点值得牢记。首先,第68条是程序性条款,而不旨在讨论仲裁庭是否取得了正确的结果。第二,第68条所规定的权力只能在“仲裁庭的行为错误以致于公平正义要求其得到纠正”的情况下行使。(These criticisms were closely linked tothe arbitrator's alleged errors of law and the same reasoning applies. The complaints were largely going to the arbitrator's findings of fact (namely how he evaluated the evidence, what findings he should have found on the evidence, and what conclusions he should have drawn as to a fair allocation). Two important and linked points are worth keeping in mind. First, section 68 relates to the process, it is not designed to address whether the tribunal reached the right result. Secondly, powers under section 68 are only to be exercised as a longstop where “the tribunal has gone so wrong in its conduct that justice calls out for it to be corrected”.)
法院认为,如果仲裁员开始一个新的论点而不给当事人机会进行处理,就会出现不规范行为。但是,仲裁员不受技术规则的约束,即不要求仲裁员在接受不完全属于一方当事人的证据之前,必须始终询问双方当事人。根据Parra v Parra [2002] EWCA Civ 886案,“法官在辅助救济诉讼中的准询问职能使他有义务调查他认为与结果有关的问题,即使任意一方当事人均未提出。同样,他也没有义务采纳当事人一致同意的结论。”(the quasi-inquisitorial role of the judge in ancillary relief litigation obliges him to investigate issues which he considers relevant to outcome even if not advanced by either party. Equally he is not bound to adopt a conclusion upon which the parties have agreed.)
法院认为,即使仲裁员没有对证据进行适当的考虑,其做法也没有上升到严重违规的程度。在本案中,没有证据表明仲裁员如H所指控的那样忽略或忽视了证据,或没有对证据给予适当考虑。因此,法院认定不存在严重违规行为,故驳回了H根据第68条对裁决提出的异议。
值得一提的是,W提出如下论点认为,由于H未请求根据《仲裁法》第57条寻求更正裁决,故其所提出的第68条和第69条申请将被禁止。针对这一论点,法院指出,如果当事人所抱怨的错误不属于第57条的范围,该当事人不应提出第57条申请。在本案中,H的不满主要涉及仲裁员行使自由裁量权及其对证据的评估。其中一些点(主要是关于对缺乏理由的不满,特别是关于遗漏对费用的推理)可能被称为偶然疏忽。但上诉理由并未提到裁决中具体的模糊或不确定之处。因此,法院认为H在本案申请中所提出的不满没有明确地属于第57条的范围,H不必根据第57条寻求更正裁决。(The complaints raised in H's claim form were largely about the arbitrator's exercise of discretion and his evaluation of the evidence. A few of the points (mainly the complaint regarding lack of reasons, and particularly the omission on reasons on costs) could possibly have been called an accidental omission. The grounds of appeal made no mention of specific ambiguity or uncertainty in the Award. Overall, I considered that the complaints raised in this application do not clearly fall within s57 and it was not necessary for H to seek a correction under s57.)
作为一般规则,如果仲裁员未依当事人的请求对裁决草案进行更正,且当事人认为裁决仍需要更正,则在作出裁决之后再提出请求较为安全。更正请求通常应维持在第57条的范围内,尤其是因为这最有可能获得更正。更正请求不需要明确提及第57条,但仲裁员应知道向他提出的要求是什么,而且最好清楚说明所提出的更正是在第57条的范围内,并应解释为何寻求作出进一步更正。(As a general rule, however, if corrections toa draft award are not made as requested, and a party considers an award still requires correction, it is safer to make a further request after the award has been made. The request should usually be kept within section 57, not least as this is most likely to elicit a correction. A request does not need expressly to refer to section 57 but the arbitrator should know what is being asked of him and it is preferable to make clear that the corrections are within s57, and an explanation should be given as to why a broader correction is sought.)因此,法院认为,H所提出的第68条和第69条申请未因其未根据《仲裁法》第57条寻求更正裁决而被禁止。
3. 关于拒绝将裁决作成法院命令的申请
本案中,H认为,当事人之间的仲裁协议并未剥夺法院根据《1973年婚姻诉讼法》第二部分所享有的管辖权,法院有责任考虑当事人的具体情况。H认为,由于裁决总体不公平,法院不能根据第25条规定的责任作出法院命令令予以批准。(by reason of the overall unfairness of the Award, it is not one which the court can approve within a consent order pursuant to its duty under s25.)
就作出反映裁决的命令的自由裁量权,法院对相关线索进行汇总并认为,根据《1973年婚姻诉讼法》第25条所享有的自由裁量权的行使方式,通常与法院根据《1996年仲裁法》对裁决提出异议时的自由裁量权的行使方式类似。各项干预的标准紧密结合且同样坚不可摧。在签署仲裁协议时,当事人受到《1996年仲裁法》所规定的框架的保护,包括对法律错误和程序不规范的救济。双方当事人应遵守协议,并在法定期限内寻求所有可用的救济。(Taking all these threads together the practical impact is that the court's discretion under s25 will usually be exercised in a similar way to the court's discretion to grant relief on a challenge to an award under the 1996 Act. The tests for intervention are closely aligned and similarly robust (as explained above). In signing up to arbitration a party is protected by the framework laid down under the 1996 Act including relief for errors of law and procedural irregularity. Both parties are expected to comply with it, and seek all available relief within the statutory time limits.)
当事人根据《1996年仲裁法》对裁决提出异议未获成功,却试图说服法官根据《1973年婚姻诉讼法》第25条基于自由裁量权拒绝将裁决作成命令,这种情况实属罕见。如果一方当事人未能根据《1996年仲裁法》对裁决提出异议(或提出异议但未获成功),则该裁决在法律上是终局的并具有约束力。这很可能是一个非常重要的考虑因素,寻求救济的当事人有责任解释在裁决具有约束力的情况下,为何法院要行使自由裁量权不赋予裁决效力。如果当事人在没有正当理由的情况下未能援用《1996年仲裁法》所规定的救济,则有关不公平或极端错误的指控很可能被立即驳回。大多数不满都已得到《1996年仲裁法》的妥善处理,特别是在作出决定的程序方面,因为第25条没有涉及这一点。法院的自由裁量权可以作为例外情况的保障,但不太可能被用来剥夺裁决的约束力,除非是极端情况或超出《1996年仲裁法》的范围(例如随后发生的情况,或涉及第三方的事项,这类事项也可能不属于仲裁协议的范围)。(It would be rare to find a situation where a party who has not succeeded in challenging an award under the 1996 Act can persuade the court to refuse to make that award into an order by reason of its discretion under s25. If a party has failed to challenge the award under the 1996 Act (or been unsuccessful in doing so) then as a matter of statute (s58 of the 1996 Act) the award is final and binding. This is likely to be a very significant consideration and the onus would lie on the party seeking relief to explain why the court should exercise its discretion in not giving effect to that award notwithstanding its binding effect. An assertion of unfairness or extreme error is likely to be rejected summarily if a party has, without justification, failed to invoke remedies under the 1996 Act. Most complaints are properly dealt with by the 1996 Act, especially complaints regarding the procedure of the decision-making since this is not engaged by s25. The court's discretion can operate as a safety net for exceptional cases but it is unlikely to be exercised to deprive an award of binding effect unless the matter is extreme or the complaint is outside the scope of the 1996 Act (for example supervening circumstances, or matters involving third parties- such matters may also fall outside the scope of the arbitration agreement).)
法官通常不应将自由裁量权的行使视为当事人重新陈述事实和提出新证据的机会。法院只需首先考虑裁决是否错误。在大多数情况下,这足以解决问题(答案将与《1996年仲裁法》所给出的答案一致)。根据Piglowska v Piglowski案,如下检验标准体现了行使自由裁量权的性质,即法院的作用不是重新审理事项或寻找潜在的错误,它应当抵制当事人为实现这一目的而作出的任何企图。(the judge should generally not allow the exercise to be treated as an opportunity for one party to re-open the facts and introduce new evidence. It may be sufficient to start by considering whether the decision is wrong. In most cases this will be enough to determine the matter (and the answer will be consistent to that given under the 1996 Act). Whether a decision is "seriously" or "obviously" wrong or such that the error "leaps off the page" is usually a measure of how confidently and promptly a judge can form a view as to whether it is wrong. The test reflects the nature of the exercise: the court's role is not to re-hear the matter or search out potential errors and it should resist any attempt by the parties to achieve this .)
法院认为涉案裁决没有错误,该裁决反映了考虑相关因素后资产的公平分配,并且完全在正确的结果范围内。换一个仲裁庭可能在某些问题上对H更为慷慨,但它也可能采取相反的做法。法院认为应当准予将裁决作成命令。
综上所述,法院拒绝准许H根据《1996年仲裁法》第69条提出上诉,驳回其根据《1996年仲裁法》第68条对裁决提出的异议,并支持W的请求,批准作出使裁决生效的法院命令。
三、评论
在本案中,申请人H根据《1996年仲裁法》第68条基于存在严重不规范行为对裁决提出异议。法院分析后发现,H的不满主要来自仲裁员对事实的调查结果。即使仲裁员没有对证据进行适当的考虑,其做法也没有上升到严重违规的程度。法院认定不存在严重违规行为,并驳回了H根据第68条所提出的异议。
在第68条申请失败的情况下,作为替代选择,H试图说服法官根据《1973年婚姻诉讼法》第25条行使自由裁量权拒绝将裁决作成命令。《1973年婚姻诉讼法》第25条规定了法院在离婚案件中行使权力作出相关命令时应当考虑的因素(如收入能力、年龄等)。H认为,法院应考虑第25条所罗列的因素行使自由裁量权拒绝将裁决作成命令。
法院认为,如果一方当事人未能根据《1996年仲裁法》对裁决提出异议(或提出异议但未获成功),则该裁决在法律上是终局的并具有约束力。这很可能是一个非常重要的考虑因素,寻求救济的当事人有责任解释在裁决具有约束力的情况下,为何法院要行使自由裁量权不赋予裁决效力。法院根据《1973年婚姻诉讼法》第25条所享有的自由裁量权可以作为例外情况的保障,但不太可能被用来剥夺裁决的约束力,除非是极端情况或超出《1996年仲裁法》的范围。