2020年1月16日，在Sukhbir Singh v. M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd O.M.P. 1118/2014一案中，印度德里高等法院以仲裁庭未允许对仲裁胜诉方的证人进行盘问为由，依照1996《仲裁与和解法》第34条的违反自然正义原则撤销仲裁裁决。

一、背景介绍

申请人和被申请人是汽车经销协议的当事人，被申请人在检验从申请人的零售店获取的汽车燃料样本时，在移动实验室测试报告中显示申请人的零售店中汽车燃料样本未通过检测，被申请人因此解除协议。申请人援引经销协议中的仲裁条款，由独任仲裁员审理案件，申请人主张恢复经销协议以及损害赔偿。

被申请人在仲裁中的证据主要是实验室测试结果，并主张测试结果证明了申请人的产品中有掺假和对质量的篡改。申请人提交宣誓证明书作为证据，重申其立场，并指出实验室报告中的种种瑕疵。申请人的具体主张是，日期为2009年1月30日的信件（据称第二个仓库样本已提交给实验室）和日期为2009年4月28日的报告认定第二个仓库样本合规的文件均为伪造文件。因此，申请人请求允许交叉盘问被申请人的证人。独任仲裁员拒绝了该申请，并仅考虑已有材料裁定被告终止经销协议并不违法。

申请人以仲裁庭未允许对仲裁胜诉方的证人进行盘问为由申请撤销仲裁裁决。

二、法院认定

1、自然正义原则

在1996《仲裁与和解法》第34条的违反自然正义原则撤裁方面，印度最高法院在ONGC Ltd. vs. Western Geco International Ltd.,(2014) 9 SCC 263案，Associate Builders vs. Delhi Development Authority (2015) 3 SCC 49案，Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd.vs. National Highways Authority of India, 2019 (3) ArbLR 152 (SC)案等主张中都强调遵守自然正义原则是印度法律基本公共政策的一部分。

在本案中，仲裁胜诉方主张第34条规定的范围有限，而本案不属于其范畴之内，但德里高等法院认为仲裁程序的合法性完全在法院考虑的范围之内，因此本案争议点主要集中在第34条的自然正义适用范围上。

2、1996《仲裁与和解法》第24条第1款的解释

在评估某案的仲裁程序的完整性应适用1996《仲裁与和解法》第18条的指导原则，而其中最重要的则是平等对待各方并给予充分的机会陈述其主张，而仲裁庭根据第19条确定的程序以及在程序事项上的任何裁量权都必须满足这些要求。1996《仲裁与和解法》第24条是基于《联合国国际贸易法委员会商事仲裁示范法》第24条制定的，该条有关内容为：

24 Hearings and written proceedings.—

(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall decide whether to hold oral hearings for the presentation of evidence or for oral argument, or whether the proceedings shall be conducted on the basis of documents and other materials:

Provided that the arbitral tribunal shall hold oral hearings, at an appropriate stage of the proceedings, on a request by a party, unless the parties have agreed that no oral hearing shall be held:

Provided further that the arbitral tribunal shall, as far as possible, hold oral hearings for the presentation of evidence or for oral argument on day-to-day basis, and not grant any adjournments unless sufficient cause is made out, and may impose costs including exemplary costs on the party seeking adjournment without any sufficient cause.

第 24 条. 开庭和书面审理程序

（1）除当事人有任何相反约定外，仲裁庭应当决定是否举行开庭听审，以便当事人举证或进行口头辩论，或者是否应当以文件和其他材料为基础进行仲裁程序。

若仲裁庭进行开庭审理的，应在诉讼程序的适当阶段应当事方的要求举行开庭审理，除非当事各方已同意不得举行任何开庭审理：

若仲裁庭进行开庭审理的以不时审理证据或进行口头辩论，则除非有充分的理由否则不得批准休庭，并且可能在没有任何充分理由而申请休庭的一方施加包括示范性费用在内的费用。

德里高等法院在解释第24条第1款的同时指出，无论是为了供当事人举证还是口头辩论，是否要举行开庭审理是需要各方达成协议来解决的问题。若如此，则依照第24条第1款的开始的表述和当事人自治，主要适用当事人协议。但若无该等协议，则仲裁庭有权自行决定该问题。从第24条第1款的第1项看来，仲裁员在这方面的裁量权取决于要求开庭审理的当事人一方的情况，其原则是若当事方人认为当程序的要求包括在适当阶段进行开庭审理的权利的话，则就该这样。争议点是是否该节允许当事人自行选择开庭审理，还是将这个问题留待仲裁庭自行决定（Whether oral hearings are to be held - either for presentation of evidence or for oral arguments - may be a matter upon which the parties have reached agreement. If so, it is clear from the opening words of Section 24(1), and consistent with the doctrine of party autonomy, that their agreement would prevail. Absent such agreement however, the Arbitral Tribunalis vested with discretion to decide this question. It appears from the first proviso to Section 24(1) that the discretion of the arbitrator in this regard is subject to one of the parties requesting an oral hearing. The principle of the provision is that the requirement of due process includes a right to oral hearing at the appropriate stage, if a party so desires. The question to be decided is whether the proviso entitles a party to oral hearing at its option,or leaves this matter to the discretion of the Arbitral Tribunal.）。

孟买高等法院在Pradyuman Kumar Sharma & Ors. vs. Jaysagar M.Sancheti & Ors., 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 453案中对第24条的解释是认为仲裁员对未经证明的文件的审议将违反自然正义原则，而在Bi-Water Penstocks Ltd. vs. Municipal Corporationof Greater Bombay & Anr., (2011) 3 Mah. L.J. 706案中的结论也相同，法院认定即使仲裁员不受技术性的程序规则约束也必须遵守自然公正的规则，否则仲裁裁决可能会被撤销（Mr.Kumar also relied upon a judgment of the Bombay High Court in Pradyuman Kumar Sharma (supra) (paragraph 33), wherein on an interpretation of Section 24 of the Act, it has been held that consideration of an unproven document by an arbitrator would be in violation of the principles of natural justice. A Division Bench of Bombay High Court in Bi-water Penstocks Ltd. (supra) also came to the same conclusion that even though an arbitrator is not bound by technical rules of procedure, the rules of natural justice must be observed, failing which the award would be liable to be set aside.）。

此外，马德拉斯高等法院在DV Consultant vs. Pioneer Equity Trade (India) Pvt.Ltd., 2009 SCC On Line Mad 1072案中对第24条的解释为，当当事人一方要求开庭审理时，除非经仲裁庭征得当事方的同意不进行开庭审理，否则仲裁庭有责任进行开庭审理（By virtue of the proviso to section 24(1) of the Act, that is, when one of the parties requests for oral hearing, it is the duty of the Arbitral Tribunal to conduct the same unless consent of the parties have been formulated by the Arbitral Tribunal agreeing not to have oral hearing. In the absence of any reason adduced by the learned Arbitrator, it has necessarily to be construed that the denial of oral hearing requested by the petitioner, by the Arbitrator is against the provisions of the Act. In such circumstances, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard has to be accepted.）。

德里高等法院指出，由以上法理可以得出，第24条第1款的第1项是强制性条款，至少在没有事先相反约定的情况下，一方当事人有权对另一方当事人提出的证人进行盘问，这也为Mustill的Boyd的专著《商事仲裁（第二版）》所支持（Mustill & Boyd, Commercial Arbitration, Second edition, 1989, Chapter 22, Paragraph C5 (at pg 308)）（The aforesaid judgments lend support to an interpretation of the first proviso to Section 24(1) in mandatory terms. It may be derived therefrom that a party has a right (at least, in the absence of a prior agreement to the contrary) to cross-examine a witness produced by the other party. The importance of the right to cross-examination has been emphasised in Mustill & Boyd, Commercial Arbitration, Second edition, 1989 ,Chapter 22, Paragraph C5 (at pg 308)）。

但是，马德拉斯高等法院在Anand Viswanathan & Ors. vs. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. & Ors.[O.P. No. 726/2011, decided on 26.02.2019]案中做出相反解释，其认为第24条本身为仲裁庭决定是否必须举行开庭审理提出了裁量余地，只不过这种裁量余地受制于第1项的规定，因此，如果一方当事人提出开庭审理要求，则仲裁庭必须举行开庭审理，而唯一例外是当双方当事人同意不进行开庭审理（A perusal of proviso to Section 24 A& C Act reveals that Arbitral Tribunal should hold oral hearings at an appropriate stage of the proceedings, when a request is made by a party. This is containedin the proviso to Section 24(1) of A & C Act. To be noted, Section 24 assuch gives elbowroom for the Arbitral Tribunal to decide whether oral hearingshas to be held at all, but that is controlled by the proviso. Proviso has to beconstrued strictly. Be that as it may, even with regard to proviso, it is clearthat it is imperative on the part of the Arbitral Tribunal to hold oralhearing, if a request is made by a party and the only exception to this rigouris when parties have agreed that no oral hearings shall be held....）。

此外，孟买高等法院在Vinay Bubna vs. Yogesh Mehta & Ors.,1998 SCCOnLine Bom 399一案中特别指出，依照该条文规定，如果当事方要求提出口头证据，则必须予以批准应双方要求举行庭审。甚至在少数案件中针对“应”（shall）一词而言实际上也不需要对此有任何证据，仲裁庭也可以拒绝这种申请（That takes us to the next challenge namely that thepetitioners were denied opportunity of leading evidence. The proviso tosub-section (1) of section 24 is clear. If the parties before the arbitraltribunal seek to lead oral evidence it must be granted as the expression isshall hold oral hearings at the request of the parties. It may be that even inthe expression 'shall' in a limited number of cases wherein in fact no evidenceis required to be led, the tribunal can reject such an application. In the instantcase, however the petitioner had pointed out the need to examine the witnesses.The tribunal on the express language of the proviso to section 24(1) could nothave denied that opportunity. On that count also the Award is liable to be setaside.）。

德里高等法院在考虑上述两项裁决后认为，这些例外裁决在一般意义上并未脱离之前的别的案件中对第24条的解释，但是这些案件似乎赋予了仲裁员某些剩余裁量权，只有在特殊情况下并且应记录在案时仲裁庭才得拒绝开庭审理的请求。有鉴于此，法院认为，在本案中的以仲裁员未允许对仲裁胜诉方的证人进行盘问为由，以违反自然公正为基础申请撤裁并不属于上述特殊例外类型（These two judgments do not, in my view, depart fromthe above interpretation of Section 24 in general terms. However, to the extentthat they appear to vest some residuary discretion in the arbitrator, therequest for oral hearings can only be declined in exceptional circumstances andfor reasons to be recorded. It is not necessary to consider this issue furtherin the present case as, for the reasons stated below, I find that the presentcase was not one which falls in that exceptional category.）。

3、《示范法》的立法历史

1996《仲裁与和解法》第24条第1款应被解释为强制性条款，这也可以从《联合国国际贸易法委员会示范法》相应条款的立法文件中获得支持。第24条第1款及其第1款以《示范法》第24条第1款为基础。在第24条第1款第2款中使用“应”（shall）一词似乎是故意的以让仲裁庭拥有授权以批准任何一方提出的请求。从联合国国际贸易法委员会审议的《示范法草案》第24条中的规定的用词是“可以”（may），而不是命令性的“应”（may）。见《关于国际商事仲裁示范法文本的分析评论：秘书长的报告》（Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a Model Lawon International Commercial Arbitration: Report of the Secretary-General(A/CN.9/264)）中对此评论如下：“第三种情况是，当事方未对仲裁程序方式作出任何规定。这似乎是所有三种情况中最常见的情况，而此时仲裁庭将根据第1款有权决定是否举行开庭审理。根据第2项，即使当事一方请求开庭审理，仲裁庭也将保留这一裁量权。因此我们认为第2项似乎是立法疏忽的结果，应予以重新考虑，因为其可能与第19条第3款不符。”（The thirdsituation is that the parties have not made any stipulation on the mode of theproceedings. In such case, which appears to be the most common of all threesituations, the arbitral tribunal would have discretion under paragraph (1) todecide whether to hold an oral hearing. According to paragraph (2), it wouldretain this discretion even if a party requests an oral hearing. It issubmitted that this latter rule, which appears to be the result of alegislative oversight, should be reconsidered since it may be regarded as notbeing consistent with article 19(3).）

在联合国国际贸易法委员会秘书处关于1985年《示范法》的解释性说明中指出，第24条的主要是有关平等和充分机会。因此，对《示范法》的上述理解支持将《法令》第24条第1款第1项的规定理解为当事方的“权利”，因此是仲裁庭的职权。

4、结论

德里高等法院裁定，第24条第1款第1项要求当事方在证据或辩论阶段要求开庭审理的请求应被满足。除非当事人之间事先达成相反的约定而放弃了要求口头举证或口头辩论的权利，否则第24条第1款第1项要明确表示立法上存在倾向批准任何一方的请求准予开庭审理的规定。

最高法院对V. Tulasamma & Ors. vs. Sasha Reddy, (1977) 3SCC 99案规定第1项是对主要规定的例外，但着并不有损主要规定本身的效力（The judgment in V. Tulasamma (supra), cited byMr.Srivastava, holds that a proviso carves out an exception to the mainprovision, but cannot destroy the effect of the main provision itself. In myview, this interpretation of the proviso to Section 24 does not fall foul ofthis principle - the proviso provides for an exception to the generalprovision, that the arbitrator has discretion on the question of whether or notto permit oral hearings.）。然而，第24条并不要求仲裁庭容忍无休止的盘问或口头辩论，开庭审理的时间和范围始终由仲裁庭来决定，这取决于每个主张的事实和情况（Having so held, a word of caution is necessary. Theright granted in Section 24 does not require an Arbitral Tribunal tocountenance unending cross-examination or oral arguments. It is always open tothe arbitrator to determine the length and scope of oral hearings, which wouldnecessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. If a partyseeks oral evidence, for example, the Tribunal may be able, after hearing theparties, to determine the points on which evidence is to be led. Similarly,arbitrators can set appropriate time limits for oral arguments.）。例如，如果当事方要求口头举证，则仲裁庭可以在听取当事方之后确定要提出证据的依据。同样，仲裁员可以为口头辩论设定适当的时限。仲裁员可以要求有关当事方提出申请，列出必要的材料，使仲裁庭能够确定这些事项。此外，第24条第1款第2项明确规定了每天举行庭审的时间，而无需休庭。第24条第1款第2项的特别规定超出了《示范法》的框架，这表明了该法针对当事人和仲裁员的快速审理的立法取向。

因此，因为仲裁员未能批准仲裁败诉方提出的要求交叉审查仲裁胜诉方的证人以证明文件真实性的要求，而违反了自然公正，德里高等法院撤消了原裁决。

三、评论

本案中法院认为第24条第1款的第1项是强制性条款，一方当事人有权对另一方当事人提出的证人进行盘问，只是这种权利可被当事人约定排除。因此在没有事先相反约定的情况下，如果当事方要求提出口头证据，例如交叉盘问，则仲裁庭必须予以批准应双方要求举行庭审。虽然存在少数案件中仲裁庭有某些剩余裁量权，例如仲裁庭根据事实和情况来决定开庭审理的时间和范围，而非容忍无休止的盘问或口头辩论，这种情况下仲裁庭可以拒绝开庭审理的请求但其理由应当记录在案。因此在这方面需要仲裁庭在仲裁的自然公正和程序需求之间取得一个平衡点，并且整体而言法院的态度倾向于前者。