2020年1月31日，在CBPv CBS [2020] SGHC 23一案中，仲裁庭认为没有听取一方当事人的七个证人的证言的必要性，而在仲裁规则有充分的程序授权快速审理仲裁的情况下，仲裁庭裁定不听取证言而书面审理。新加坡高等法院认为这种做法违反了正当程序，仲裁员必须在公平审理规则的约束下行使对证人进行限制的权力。若传唤证人明显与某个特定问题有关，则仲裁庭不能根据其程序权力对证人进行限制，否则损害当事人的实体权利。

一、背景介绍

买方（原告）与卖方之间签署两份煤矿买卖协议，订购两批煤矿，二者都有约定本案依照《新加坡海事仲裁庭仲裁规则》（SCMA规则）解决争议。两份协议都有倒签的问题，而且其中内容也有细微差异，例如第一份协议中无关于允许转让协议权益的规定但是第二份中有。两份协议的付款机制也不同。第一个协议履行顺利，但是第二个协议中出现了问题。买方的说法是，由于卖方仅促成发出20,000吨煤炭中的15,000吨，因此无法从港口对5,000吨煤炭提货。同时，卖方已在银行（被告）开立了应收账款购买融资便利（Accounts Receivable Purchase Facility）账户，将贸易债权转让给被告方银行。根据融资协议，卖方致函通知买方，其根据第二份协议已将其债权转让给银行。之后，银行将要求买方付款。而之后买方银行向银行发送消息，表示买方已经接受了汇票，并将在到期日付款。但是，买方未能如期支付，之后买方通过电子邮件称（1）协议约定的第二批20,000吨煤炭中其仅收到15,000吨，因此其不得不从他处采购5,000吨煤炭（2）煤炭的市场价格下降，其只能以更低的市场价而不是协议中约定的价格进行支付。

随后买方与银行发生争议，在SCMA仲裁。银行向仲裁员主张本案没有必要召集证人，因为当事双方之间的争端仅是对第二份协议的解释，而虽然买方提出了一份证人名单，但其没有解释其召集这些证人的立场和理由；银行方面本身则不提交证人证言，并主张仲裁应仅书面审理。之后仲裁员要求买方说明其要求召集7名证人的必要性，而买方没有提供详细的论据，只是主张证人需要被盘问并且取得其证言以支持买方对于银行的抗辩。独任仲裁员对此并不满意，并再次要求买方提供说明，而买方则主张有必要对证人进行盘问，理由是本案并不是像银行所说的那样是完全基于文件解释的（the Buyer re-asserted that “[t]here is a necessity of examining the witnesses” as “the case does not solely turn on the documents (sic) interpretation as submitted by” the Bank），并且否定对证人的盘问有违自然公正。

独任仲裁员认为其得到SCMA规则第28.1条的充分的程序管理授权，因此有权拒绝听取原告所有七名证人的证言，因而本案书面审理。第28.1条规定如下：

Unless the parties have agreed on a documents-only arbitration or that no hearing should be held, the Tribunal shall hold a hearing for the presentation of evidence by witnesses, including expert witnesses, or for oral submissions.

除非当事各方已就仅书面仲裁或不举行庭审达成协议，否则仲裁庭应举行庭审，以供包括专家证人在内的证人提供证据，或进行口头呈请。

本案仲裁员将该条后半部分的若当事人不同意书面审理的情况下即开庭审理的规定解释为允许仲裁员即使在一方当事人坚持需要证人作证的情况下也有权决定消除证人陈述的必要（Hence,the key dispute in relation to r 28.1 of the SCMA Rules is whether the latter portion, which relates to the conduct of an oral hearing in the event that parties do not agree to a documents-only arbitration, permits the arbitrator to decide to dispense with the need for the presentation of witnesses even where one of the parties insists on the need for witness testimony.）。

裁决作出之后，原告买方败诉。买方主张其与银行之间不存在有效的仲裁协议，并且仲裁员的作法违反了自然公正规则，剥夺其申辩权，并且申请根据《国际仲裁法》第24条第b款和《UNCITRAL国际仲裁示范法》第34条第2款第a项第ii目进行撤裁。

二、法院认定

依照SohBeng Tee & Co Pte Ltd v Fairmount Development Pte Ltd [2007] 3 SLR(R) 86案，以违反自然公正规则而提起的撤裁申请若要成功则需要确立4个要求：（1）违反了哪个自然公正规则；（2）违反的方式；（3）违反自然公正与裁决的作出有什么关系；和（4）违反自然公正如何损害当事人的权利（(a) which rule of natural justice was breached; (b) how it was breached; (c) in what way was the breach connected to the making of the award; and (d) how the breach prejudiced its rights）。

从表面上看，除非各方均同意，否则仲裁庭不能自行决定进行书面仲裁。因此，该规则的通常意思便清楚地表明若当事各方未就书面审理达成一致，则必须进行开庭审理（On its face, this rule appears to be consonant with the commonly accepted understanding amongst arbitration practitioners that, unless all parties agree, the arbitral tribunal cannot decide on its own accord to hold a documentsonly arbitration. Thus, a plain reading of r 28.1 of the SCMA Rules makes it clear that, where parties have not come to an agreement that the arbitration should only be on a documents-only basis, an oral hearing must be held.）。

关于SCMA规则的解释，SCMA程序委员会负责人在《SCMA规则》第三版的评论中提到，第28.1条的后半部分规定的“否则仲裁庭应举行庭审，以供包括专家证人在内的证人提供证据，或进行口头呈请”必须完整解读，而口头呈请不能替代证人提供证言（In Simon Davidson (SCMA Head of Procedure Committee), Commentary on the 3rd Edition of the Rules of SCMA (21 October 2015), it is stated that:76 Unless the parties have agreed documents only, the Tribunal shall hold a hearing for the presentation of evidence by witnesses. However, the testimony of witnesses can be submitted in written form and the Tribunal may place such weight on the written testimony as it thinks fit, in particular if the witness does not attend the hearing to give oral evidence…）。SCMA规则设想的是，若当事人未同意书面审理则必须允许当事人召集证人作证。SCMA规则第30.5条进一步强调了这一点，该规则允许证人以书面形式提交其证据以让仲裁庭对书面证词给予适当的权重（Instead, the SCMA Rules envisage that, where parties have not agreed to a documents-only arbitration, parties must be allowed to call witnesses to give evidence, if they wish to do so. The point is reinforced by r 30.5 of the SCMA Rules, which allows witnesses to submit their evidence in written form, and for the tribunal to place such weight on the written testimony as it thinks fit）。

因此，法院指出，如果一方当事人希望提供证人证言，则必须进行口头审理，无论是作为主盘问还是另一方对其进行的交叉盘问。只有当事各方都决定不提出口头证据或对证人证言不进行交叉盘问时，才可以举行仅针对口头呈请的庭审。在这种情况下，当事各方可能会决定不需要口头审理，而依靠书面陈述即可，因此同意进行书面审理。因此，法院认为，对SCMA规则第28.1条的这种整体解读适当地解释了在“进行口头呈请”之前使用“或”一词（Thus, if a party wishes to present witness testimony, an oral hearing must be held, whether for the leading of oral evidence or for the other party to cross-examine the witnesses on their witness statements. It is only where all parties have decided not to lead oral evidence, or cross-examine any of the witnesses on their witness statements, that a hearing only for oral submissions can be held. Of course, in that situation, the parties may decide that such an oral hearing is not needed and they may be content to rely on written submissions. If that transpires, the parties would then have agreed to a documents-only arbitration. In my view, this holistic reading of r 28.1 of the SCMA Rules appropriately explains the use of the word “or” prior to the words “for oral submissions”.）。

仲裁庭可能被默示授予权力以限制证人的口头证据，而这种权力源自其对仲裁程序的控制权。但是，尽管在仲裁中要快速处理相关事项，但这并不赋予仲裁员以效率为目的而自由拒绝证人证言。SCMA规则第25.1条要求仲裁员“确保公正，迅速，经济和终局地解决争议”（ensure the just, expeditious, economical and final determination of the dispute）。因此，迅速解决争端显然只是仲裁员在确定采用的程序时必须考虑的部分因素；决不能是凌驾于其他因素（如必须确保公正地解决争端）之上的首要因素（This suggests that arbitral tribunals may be impliedly vested with the powers to limit the oral testimony of witnesses, and that such powers flow from their power to control the conduct of the arbitration proceedings. However, while the expeditious disposition of matters is a relevant consideration in arbitration, I think that this does not grant the arbitrator free reign to reject all witness evidence in the interest of efficiency. Rule 25.1 of the SCMA Rules requires the arbitrator to “ensure the just, expeditious, economical and final determination of the dispute” [emphasis added]. It is thus clear that the expeditious resolution of the dispute is but part of the considerations which an arbitrator must have in mind when determining the process to be adopted; it cannot be the paramount consideration above all other considerations, such as the need to ensure a just determination of the dispute.）。

主流观点是，限制证人证言的权力受制于仲裁庭使当事人有公平的机会陈述其主张的责任，而即使仲裁庭具有为提高效率而对证人进行限制的一般权力，这也不是用来推翻自然正义规则的绝对权力，而当事人必须得到公正的庭审（even if arbitral tribunals have the general power to gate witnesses in the interests of efficiency, this cannot be an absolute power that is used to override the rules of natural justice, which demand that parties must be given a fair hearing.）。依照ADGand another v ADI and another matter [2014] 3 SLR 481案，仲裁庭拥有广泛而灵活的程序权力，但该权力并非无条件的，其要遵守自然正义规则所设定的标准，尤其是当事人的申辩权（theright to be heard）。尽管仲裁庭是其程序的主人，但其案件管理权受制于自然正义的规则（The wide and flexible procedural power of the Tribunal is, of course, not unqualified: it is subject to the standards set by the rules of natural justice and in particular the right to be heard.）。

因此，法院裁定，即使仲裁员有权根据SCMA规则而对证人进行限制，其也必须在公平审理规则的约束下行使这一权力。若传唤证人明显与某个特定问题有关，则仲裁庭不能根据其程序权力对证人进行限制，因为这将是利用程序权来压制当事人的实体权利（Therefore,even if I accept that the arbitrator has the power to gate witnesses under the SCMA Rules, this must be exercised subject to the fair hearing rule. If the calling of a witness is plainly relevant to a particular issue, an arbitral tribunal cannot gate the witness on the basis of its procedural powers. Such would be to utilise a procedural power to defeat the substantive rights of the parties.）。

除非仲裁庭可得出实质性结论即当事人提出的证人都与本案不相关或多余，否则不应以效率或节省成本为由而拒绝此类证人出庭。确实，如果当事人提出过多的证人，则仲裁庭可对此施加合理的限制，但仲裁庭不应仅仅以证人与本案无关为由即拒绝所有证人出庭作证。证人限制不得仅用作实现书面审理的间接手段，因为其根本作用是防止不必要的延迟（In my judgment, unless the arbitral tribunal has a substantive basis to conclude that all the witnesses sought to be presented are irrelevant or superfluous, such witnesses ought not to be rejected on the basis of efficiency or savings of costs. Indeed, it is “perfectly acceptable for a tribunal to impose reasonable limits if an excessive number of witnesses are proposed” (Waincymerat p 889), but the tribunal should not reject all the witnesses simply because it is of the preliminary view that all the witnesses would be irrelevant. Gating must not be utilised as an indirect means of achieving a hearing-by submissions only, as its fundamental utility is to prevent unnecessary delay.）。法院还指出，本案取决于关于口头协议主张，在这种情况下，仲裁员排除证人证言是不公平的。

因此，法院认为，仲裁庭的限制证人的权力不是绝对的，只有证人证言与案件显然无关或重复的情况下才得使用该权力。法院承认仲裁庭在行使其案件管理权以确保公正和迅速审理案件时必须考虑多种因素。因此，在基于公平审理规则的撤裁申请中，法院对仲裁庭应谨慎行使监管权。然而，如果涉案行为“足够严重或过分以至于剥夺一方当事人的正当程序”（“sufficiently serious or egregious so that one could say a party has been denied due process”），则法院可能必须介入，以认定仲裁庭违反自然公正规则，特别是公平审理规则。

因此，法院撤销了该裁决，同时裁定仲裁庭违反了自然公正规则，其做法无法基于仲裁员限制证人的权力和仲裁员在仲裁程序中确定程序和证据问题的广泛裁量权而得到合理化。

三、评论

本案争议点是仲裁庭决定不听取某证人证言的权力是否可以凌驾于要求必须对当事人进行公正审理自然正义规则。法院的回答为否，因此可以看出法院在仲裁的公正和效率之间的冲突方面给予公正以特别强的尊重。因此，仲裁庭为了效率而考虑排除某些证人时，必须将仲裁效率方面的考虑因素与仲裁当事人的正当程序保护和有公正的机会陈述其主张的权利相平衡。

因此，本案的启示在于，由于限制证人可能构成撤裁理由，因此仲裁庭在这么做时应充分考虑且格外小心，并且给出有足够说服力的理由，否则将面临撤裁风险。