2019年3月25日,在Compañía de Inversiones Mercantiles S.A.v. Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua, S.A.B. de C.V., No. 15-CV-02120 (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2019)一案中,原告作为仲裁胜诉方请求美国科罗拉多州地区法院确认针对被告的仲裁裁决,被告则以该仲裁裁决仍处于玻利维亚法院撤销诉讼中为由进行抗辩,并请求法院中止原告的确认仲裁裁决程序。对此,美国地区法院最终认定,同意确认本案仲裁裁决,驳回被告中止当前诉讼程序的请求(“Having considered the parties’ oral arguments, presented on February 13, 2019, and the voluminous filings and arguments contained therein, I now grant CIMSA’s Petition to Confirm a Foreign Arbitral Award (ECF No. 1) and the subsequent Motion to Confirm Foreign Arbitral Award.”)。
一、案情介绍
本案原告Compañía de Inversiones Mercantiles S.A.(以下简称“原告”)为一家玻利维亚最大水泥公司Sociedad Boliviana de Cemento, S.A.(以下简称“SOBOCE”)的控股公司,被告GrupoCementos de Chihuahua, S.A.B. de C.V.(以下简称“被告”)则为一家墨西哥水泥以及混泥土供应商。2005年9月22日,被告的一家全资子公司GCC Latinoamérica获得原告控股公司SOBOCE公司的47%股份,四方签订有《股东协议》(Shareholders’ Agreement),被告为其全资子公司提供担保,协议适用玻利维亚法。
根据该《股东协议》,协议任一方都对对方持有的SOBOCE股份享有优先购买权;任何一方都可在5年后将其股份转让给第三方,但前提是向其他股东提供通知,并给予对方在30天内以相同或更好的条件购买股份的机会(“Under the agreement, either party could “transfer its shares to a third party after a period of five years.” (Id.). However, the party wishing to transfer its shares could only do so after providing notice and “afford[ing] the other party an opportunity to purchase the shares on the same or better terms within 30 days.””)。
此外,《股东协议》还约定有仲裁协议:当事方之间的任何争议应根据“美洲国家商事仲裁委员会”(Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission,“IACAC”或Comisión Inter-Americana de Arbitraje Comercial,“CIAC”)的仲裁规则提交调解和随后的国际仲裁以进行最终解决,并通过双方当事人的互相协议进行修改(“any dispute between the parties would be ‘submitted to conciliation and subsequent international arbitration for final resolution, subject to the rules of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission (IACAC), and as modified by means of mutual agreement between the Parties to the Arbitration.’”);以及,仲裁将由玻利维亚的CIAC国家分会受理(“the arbitration was to beadministered by the national chapter of the CIAC in Bolivia.”)。
2009年,被告通知原告其出售SOBOCE股份的意愿,后双方就股份收购事项进行磋商并达成协议。但玻利维亚政府在交易临近时征用了SOBOCE公司大量业务,由于原告无法支付收购被告股份的款项,最终导致交易失败。2011年,双方再次就收购被告持有的SOBOCE股份进行磋商,双方达成新的协议,但被告于2011年8月18日将其股份转让给了第三方。
故原告在玻利维亚向CIAC提起针对被告的仲裁程序,2013年9月13日和2015年4月10日,仲裁庭分别作出“责任认定裁决书”(Merits Award)和“损害赔偿裁决书”(Damages Award),支持了原告的仲裁请求。
被告不服,分别向玻利维亚法院提起仲裁裁决撤销之诉,请求法院撤销上述两份仲裁裁决。在法院驳回被告撤销“责任认定裁决书”请求后,被告又再次提起“违宪之诉”(Amparo Action),主张法官未充分解释其认定理由,侵犯其宪法权利(Constitutional Rights)。该违宪主张得到玻利维亚宪法法院(Guarantee Court)的支持,并决定发回重审,由另一名法官宣布撤销部分裁决。当该程序还在进行时,玻利维亚最高宪法法院(Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal,“PCT”)又推翻了宪法法院的上述决定。关于“损害赔偿裁决书”,被告于2015年7月向玻利维亚法院请求撤销该裁决,在请求被驳回后被告又提起同上述相似的违宪程序。
在上述玻利维亚法院程序尚未完结的情况下,本案原告(也是仲裁胜诉方)根据《纽约公约》向美国科罗拉多地区法院请求确认上述两份仲裁裁决的效力。
二、美国科罗拉多地区法院认定:同意确认仲裁裁决效力,驳回被告中止本案诉讼请求
(一)关于原告确认仲裁裁决的请求
1. 一般原则
首先,根据《纽约公约》,以及美国《仲裁法》207章(9 U.S.C. § 207)规定,当外国仲裁当事方根据《纽约公约》请求确认仲裁裁决时,法院必须予以确认,除非法院认为存在《纽约公约》第5条规定下的拒绝或推迟承认与执行裁决的理由之一(“When a party to a foreign arbitration moves to confirm an award under the New York Convention, the district court must confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the. . . Convention.”)。
一般情况下,根据判例CEEG (Shanghai) Solar Science & Technology Co., Ltdv. LUMOS LLC, 829 F.3d 1201, 1206 (10th Cir. 2016),法院应当狭义地解释上述抗辩理由,以鼓励承认与执行国际合同中的商事仲裁协议(“Courts construe these defenses narrowly, to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts.”);相应地,根据判例Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A. v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 403 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2005),反对承认与执行仲裁裁决一方有责任证明其中一项抗辩理由的适用,且由于反对请求确认仲裁裁决效力的简要程序的门槛较高,故该证明责任也相对较为沉重(“The party opposing enforcement of the arbitral award has the burden of proving that one of the defenses applies. Id. “[This] burden is a heavy one, as the showing required to avoid summary confirmance is high.”)。
在本案中,被告提出的主要抗辩理由为,根据《纽约公约》第V(1)(e)条,“当裁决对各方尚无拘束力,或业经裁决地所在国或裁决所依据法律之国家之主管机关撤销或停止执行时”,法院应当拒绝承认和执行该仲裁裁决;本案中,请求确认的仲裁裁决的撤销诉讼在仲裁地法院尚未审理完结,故本案法院应当驳回当事人的确认请求。
但是法院认为,根据判例Thai-Lao Lignite Co., Ltd. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s DemocraticRepublic, 997 F.Supp.2d 214, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2014),aff’d 864 F.3d 172 (2nd Cir. 2017)可知,虽然法院一般须尊重主要管辖区内主管当局的决定,但是,当撤销裁决的外国判决与寻求强制执行裁决的国家有关公正的基本概念相冲突,或违背了正义的基本概念时,上述规则也存在狭义的例外(“While deference must generally be afforded to the decision of a competent authority in the primary jurisdiction, there is an arrow exception to this rule when “the foreign judgment setting aside the award is ‘repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought’ . . . or violated ‘basic notions of justice.’”)。
2. 法院对本案的认定
关于“责任认定裁决书”(Merits Award),原告主张,该部分裁决并未在玻利维亚被有效地撤销,即使有关法官作出了同意撤销裁决的决定,但由于存在司法腐败该决定不应被承认;被告则主张,该部分裁决已被玻利维亚法院合法撤销,且不认同原告所主张的司法腐败(“that the Merits Award has been lawfully set aside by a competent authority in Bolivia, and they argue that the judicial corruptional leged by CIMSA does not “warrant ignoring the decisions of the courts of the primary jurisdiction.””)。
关于“损害赔偿裁决书”(Damages Award),原告则主张,该部分裁决并未被玻利维亚法院撤销,仍具有《纽约公约》下的效力;被告则主张该部分裁决由于正在诉讼中,根据玻利维亚法并不具有效力,故即使美国法院即使不驳回原告的确认请求,也应当中止本案诉讼程序以待玻利维亚法院程序完结(“that the Damages Award is not binding under Bolivian law. Respondents argue that if I will not dismiss CIMSA’s Petition, I should exercise my discretion under Article VI of the New York Convention to stay the case pending resolution of their request to annul the Damages Award in Bolivia.”)。
通过对双方提供的关于玻利维亚法专家证言的认定,法院最终作出认定:关于“责任认定裁决书”(Merits Award),法院认为玻利维亚法院并未撤销该份CIA绝,理由是第八法官的裁决驳回了被告撤销仲裁裁决的请求,该份裁决得到了玻利维亚最高宪法法院的确认,而第九法官作出的裁决以及最高宪法法院的程序令并未改变这一结果(“Therefore, I find that the Merits Award has not been set aside by a competent authority in Bolivia. The Eighth Judge Decision denied Respondents’ request to annul the Merits Award, and that decision was ultimately confirmed by the PCT. Neither the Ninth Judge Decision nor the procedural and technical PCT orders undermine that result.”);关于“损害赔偿裁决书”(DamagesAward),法院认为,即使玻利维亚法院不予执行该份裁决,但根据《纽约公约》,仲裁程序已结束,且该裁决为仲裁庭作出的最后裁决,也不存在进一步仲裁程序,故该裁决仍具有约束力(“Therefore, I find that even if a Bolivian court would not enforce the award at this juncture, it is binding under the New York Convention because the arbitration has concluded, a final award has been issued, and there are no further proceedings within the arbitral process.”)。
(二)关于被告中止本案诉讼的请求
关于被告针对处于玻利维亚法院未审结的“损害赔偿裁决书”(Damages Award)提出的中止本案诉讼程序的申请,美国地区法院重点参考了第二巡回法院在Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. MaiellanoTours, Inc., 156F.3d 310, 317 (2d Cir. 1998)(以下简称“Europcar案”)一案中提出的观点,这一观点曾被多个判例所采纳,包括Hulley Enterprises Ltd. v.Russian Fed’n, 211 F. Supp. 3d 269 (D.D.C. 2016);Stati v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 199 F. Supp. 3d 179 (D.D.C. 2016);Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 949 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2013),具体而言,当法院在决定是否中止仲裁裁决确认程序时,需重点结合下述六个要素(Europcar Factors)分析本案:
(1)仲裁的总体目的,即快速解决争议并避免旷日持久和成本高昂的诉讼(“the general objectives of arbitration—the expeditious resolution of disputes and the avoidance of protracted and expensive litigation;”);在本案中,鉴于仲裁程序已经结束了很长时间,且不止在一个国家陷入旷日持久的诉讼,相关诉讼费用也在不断增加,对此,法院认为仲裁的首要目标是赞同确认裁决,反对中止诉讼(“Given the amount of time that has passed since the arbitration concluded and the increasing costs of protracted litigation in more than one country, I find the overarching goals of arbitration weigh in favor of confirmation and against a stay.”)。
(2)外国程序的状况和结束其程序的预计时间(“the status of the foreign proceedings and the estimated time for those proceedings to be resolved;”);在本案中,由于玻利维亚的诉讼程序并未明确地结束,而该诉讼程序已经持续了很久,也确定结束的具体时间,故该因素是赞同确认,反对中止诉讼(“Because there is “no clear end” to the litigation proceedings in Bolivia, this second factor weighs in favor of confirmation and against a stay.”)。
(3)请求执行的裁决是否将在不利的审查标准下,在外国程序中是否接受更严格的审查(“whether the award sought to be enforced will receive greater scrutiny in the foreign proceedings under a less deferential standard of review;”);在本案中,由于前两项因素有利于原告,因此这一因素即使略微有利于被告,不会对最终认定结果有太大影响(“Thus, this factor can only marginally weigh in favor of Respondents and does not tip the scale towards a stay when the first two factors favor CIMSA.”)。
(4)外国程序的特点包括:(i)外国程序是为了执行裁决(这往往有利于中止)还是撤销裁决(倾向于权衡有利于执行的裁决);(ii)外国程序是否是在执行程序之前启动的,以引起对国际礼让的关注;(iii)其是否由目前寻求在联邦法院执行裁决的一方提出;(iv)其是否是在表明有意妨碍或拖延争议解决的情况下提出的(“the characteristics of the foreign proceedings including (i) whether they were brought to enforce an award (which would tend to weigh in favor of a stay) or to set the award aside (which would tend to weigh in favor of enforcement);(ii) whether they were initiated before the underlying enforcement proceeding so as to raise concerns of international comity; (iii) whether they were initiated by the party now seeking to enforce the award in federal court; and(iv) whether they were initiated under circumstances indicating an intent to hinder or delay resolution of the dispute;”);在本案中,法院认为,在考虑该要素时,应当不应轻易地同意中止诉讼程度,以防止鼓励仲裁败诉方程序滥用(“In examining the fourth consideration, I take particular note of the fact that “a stay of confirmation should not be lightly granted lest it encourage abusive tactics by the party that lost in arbitration.””)。
(5)各方可能遇到困难之间的平衡(“A balance of the possible hardships to the parties…; and”);在本案中,权衡双方在本案诉讼面临的困难,法院仍最终认为赞同确认裁决,拒绝中止裁决(“The balance of hardships also counsels in favor of enforcement rather than a stay.”)。
(6)任何其他情况,而该等情况会倾向于将天平转为赞成或反对继续审理(“Any other circumstance that could tend to shift the balance in favor of or against adjournment…”)。在本案中,当事双方均未提出足以改变法院目前态度的其他情况(“Neither party presents any other circumstances that would shift the balance in favor of or against a stay.”)。
结合本案案情,综合考虑Europcar案中的六大因素,法院最终认定,经过权衡同意确认仲裁裁决,不予中止本案诉讼程度(“Because the Europcar factors, on balance, weigh in favor of enforcement and against a stay, I conclude that a stay is unwarranted.”)。
三、评析
本案涉及到一个重要问题:当法院在受理仲裁胜诉方确认仲裁裁决(或承认与执行仲裁裁决)的请求时,而该仲裁裁决在其主要管辖区内法院(即仲裁地法院)尚处于撤销诉讼未终结的状态,那么法院将如何进行认定?一般情况,根据《纽约公约》第V(1)(e)条,“当裁决对各方尚无拘束力,或业经裁决地所在国或裁决所依据法律之国家之主管机关撤销或停止执行时”,法院应拒绝承认和执行该仲裁裁决。但是,《纽约公约》第VI条又规定,“倘裁决业经向第五条第一项(戊)款所称之主管机关声请撤销或停止执行,受理援引裁决案件之机关得于其认为适当时延缓关于执行裁决之决定,并得依请求执行一造之声请,命他造提供妥适之担保。”该条同时赋予了受理承认与执行仲裁裁决法院在面临平行诉讼时拥有的一定自由裁量权。
在本案中,美国地区法院也明确指出,《纽约公约》第V条的抗辩理由也存在例外情形,即虽然法院一般须尊重主要管辖区内主管当局的决定,但是,当撤销裁决的外国判决与寻求强制执行裁决的国家有关公正的基本概念相冲突,或违背了正义的基本概念时,法院亦可自由裁量无需遵循上述原则;另一方面,结合重要判例“Europcar案”中提出的六大考量要素,法院来决定是否同意确认仲裁裁决,或是否中止法院程序。我国法院如遇到类似情形,又当如何进行认定,值得我们进一步反思。