2020年5月29日，在Bloomberry Resorts and Hotels Inc and another vGlobal Gaming Philippines LLC and another [2020] SGHC 113案中，案中，仲裁庭在案件审理过程中作出临时措施令以推翻菲律宾法院的初步禁令和查封措施，并在最终裁决中对申请人授予双层“拟制救济”，要求（1）被申请人必须向申请人支付其股份的全部价值；（2）若被申请人决定不遵守该部分裁决，则申请人将获得在市场上出售其股份的自由；且还要求被申请人采取所有使得申请人得以出售其股份的必要措施，包括指示被申请人的代理人与第三方进行合作。被申请人主张拟制救济措施使得临时措施令直接获得执行力，剥夺了其在菲律宾法院对类似情形的陈述权，而且裁决拘束第三人因此仲裁庭越权超裁。法院认为拟制救济的目的是损害赔偿，并不影响他人权利，并且当事人可以对拟制救济第一部分提出异议，而且新加坡的仲裁庭作出的命令不能被当作裁决审查进而被撤销，因此驳回了被申请人的申请。

一、背景介绍

本案与Bloomberry Resorts and Hotels Inc and another vGlobal Gaming Philippines LLC and another [2020] SGHC 1案是关联案件（请参见：20200225仲裁早新闻：仲裁裁决的三个月法定撤销期限不因存在欺诈而延长（新加坡案例））。

被申请人Bloomberry Resorts和申请人GGAM于2011年订立《管理服务协议》， GGAM随后转让了其所有权利于GGAM Netherlands。之后，被申请人试图终止《管理服务协议》，而申请人根据《管理服务协议》中的仲裁协议提起仲裁。

仲裁庭首先认定被申请人不当解除《管理服务协议》，授予申请人部分裁决，并驳回被申请人要求申请人返还其购买的被申请人的子公司的股份（否则构成不当得利）的请求。后来，仲裁庭作出最终裁决，认定申请人可以处分其股份，理由是被申请人并未提出足够强的理由以推翻申请人对股份所有权。

申请人称被申请人阻止其出售股份，而被申请人主张其行为原因是《管理服务协议》已终止。在股份出售方面，菲律宾法院作出初步禁令限制股份的处分，被申请人称该禁令仍然有效并持续限制股份的处分。随后，仲裁庭作出临时措施令，推翻了菲律宾法院的初步禁令和查封措施。

仲裁庭在最终裁决中命令被申请人向申请人及其子公司赔偿管理费损失、终止前的费用损失、以及除成本和利息外的其他费用。仲裁庭就被申请人持续干预申请人出售股份而授予申请人拟制救济（Constructive Remedy），命令被申请人基于临时措施令发布之日的价值购买股份。根据最终裁决，被申请人必须采取一切必要步骤使申请人得以出售股份，例如指示被申请人的代理人和控股股东PMHI进行合作。

被申请人认为，仲裁庭通过授予拟制救济而执行了自己的临时措施令，从而剥夺了PMHI和被申请人的撤裁申请权。

后来，被申请人在Bloomberry Resorts and Hotels Inc and another vGlobal Gaming Philippines LLC and another [2020] SGHC 1案中在新加坡申请撤销和不予执行裁决的申请被驳回，而被申请人在本案针对最终裁决申请撤裁或不予执行裁决。

被申请人主张“拟制救济”超出仲裁范围；违反自然正义；向申请人的子公司给与损害赔偿等同于支持在菲律宾发生的偷税漏税而违反新加坡的公共政策；拟制救济措施使得临时措施令直接获得执行力，因此剥夺了被申请人本应在菲律宾国内法院关于出售股份的陈述权。

二、法院认定

1、仲裁庭是否越权

法院认为，即便以被申请人的主张的最高程度来审查本案——即拟制救济影响非当事方的权利从而越权，其主张也是与仲裁庭错误行使其权力有关，仅构成法律错误甚至是事实错误，而非仲裁庭越权。依照CRW Joint Operation v PT Perusahaan Gas Negara(Persero) TBK [2011] 4 SLR 305案，仅法律错误甚至事实错误本身并不足以达到《示范法》第34（2）（a）（iii）条规定的撤裁标准（With these three points in mind, the question is whether Bloomberry’s assertion that the Tribunal should not have ordered the Constructive Remedy has satisfied the 1egal principles underlying the application under Art 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law and articulated in CRW Joint Operation v PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK [2011] 4 SLR 305 (“Persero”) at [31]– [33]. After making findings of fact and arriving at conclusions on liability and quantum in respect of the claim for obstruction to the sale of the Shares – and for the two reasons set out in [37] above – the Tribunal regarded the Constructive Remedy as the appropriate order to make. In the context of its application to set aside the Final Award on the ground of the Tribunal “exceeding its powers or authority”, even taking Bloomberry’s case at its highest (ie, that the Constructive Remedy affects the rights of non-parties and is hence beyond the Tribunal’s remit), the reality is that its contention has to do with the erroneous exercise by the Tribunal of an available power (ie, constituting a mere error of law or even fact) as opposed to the Tribunal’s exercise of a power that it did not possess. In the circumstances, there is no excess of power to ground an application under Art 34(2)(a)(iii): see Persero at [33].）。

法院认为，与被申请人的主张恰恰相反，拟制救济不对仲裁的非当事方（PMHI）产生拘束力或对其施加义务，也不影响PMHI的权利或利益，而是裁定被申请人应负责对申请人进行损害赔偿。这尤其体现在仲裁程序中，被申请人承认PMHI是其代理人，并且PMHI代表其行事这一点上（Contrary to Bloomberry’s case, on the plain reading of the relief ordered, the Constructive Remedy does not bind or impose an obligation on a non-party (ie, PMHI) to the Arbitration. Neither does it affect the rights or interests of PMHI. Rather, it awards GGAM damages for which Bloomberry is liable. The Tribunal itself explained the context and rationale of the Constructive Remedy at [448]–[449] of the Final Award that “[Bloomberry] have acted contrary to [its] legal obligations under the MSA and the UNCITRAL Rules to be bound by the Tribunal’s IM Order and Liability Award, and this act has caused damage to GGAM Philippines, the rightful owner of the Shares.” Consequently, Bloomberry is required to take all steps necessary to enable GGAM to sell the Shares. That PMHI may have to undertake certain actions is incidental. Seen in this light, the Constructive Remedy directs Bloomberry to pay GGAM the value of the Shares as of 9 December 2014 (after applying a block sale discount) in exchange for GGAM’s transfer of the Shares to Bloomberry.）。

法院认为，仲裁庭的管辖权范围由仲裁协议的措词决定。《管理服务协议》的仲裁协议的用语中包含对不当干扰方面的规定，其中规定：

根据本  19.2  条要求解决的任何争议均应根据  [UNCITRAL  规则  ]  在新加坡通过仲裁解决

any dispute required to be settled in accordance with this Clause 19.2 shall be settled by arbitration in Singapore under [the UNCITRAL Rules]

法院认为，对于仲裁条款中的“争议”（ “dispute”）一词应给与宽泛解释，并且依照[Tjong Very Sumito and others v Antig Investments Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R)732案，“除非被申请人明确承认申请人的主张是正当的，否则法院愿意即时认定存在争议”（will readily find that a dispute exists unless the defendant has unequivocally admitted that the claim is due）。因此，本案争议属于仲裁范围之内（It is not controversial that the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is governed by the precise wording of the arbitration agreement. As Mr Bullargues, the claim for wrongful interference falls within the language of the arbitration agreement in cl 19.1 of the MSA, which states that “any dispute that cannot be settled by mutual agreement within 30 days and such dispute relates to the interpretation, carrying out of obligations, breach, termination or enforcement of this agreement, or in any way arises out of or is related to this agreement … shall be settled exclusively in accordance with Clause 19.2”. Clause 19.2 of the MSA states that “any dispute required to be settled in accordance with this Clause 19.2 shall be settled by arbitration in Singapore under [the UNCITRAL Rules]…”. Mr Bull cites Tjong Very Sumito and others v Antig Investments Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 732 for the proposition that the court will interpret the word “dispute” broadly and “will readily find that adispute exists unless the defendant has unequivocally admitted that the claimis due” [emphasis in original] (at [69(c)]). I doubt Bloomberry can seriously deny the broad terms of the dispute resolution provision since it adopted the very same argument in urging the Tribunal to take into consideration the interconnection between the MSA and the EOA, especially with regard to the Option (see [14] above).）。

2、正当程序问题

仲裁庭关于拟制救济命令是“双层的”（“bifurcated”）。救济措施的第一部分要求被申请人必须“向申请人支付全部股份价值”（“pay to Claimant the full value of the Shares”），而第二部分是被申请人若不遵守救济措施而将产生的救济。

法院认为，拟制救济尚未生效，而被申请人仍可对拟制救济措施的第一部分提出异议，因此其并未剥夺被申请人的撤裁申请权。拟制救济的目的并非使得仲裁庭的命令获得执行，而且在新加坡，仲裁庭作出的命令由于不能依据《国际仲裁法》第24条或《示范法》第34条而受到异议（这些规定只适用于裁决而非命令）。临时措施令是一种临时保护措施，若有需要则可在获得法院许可的情况下如同法院命令一样获得强制执行（To be precise, Bloomberry’s complaint that the Tribunal attempted to enforce its own orders targets the second part of the Constructive Remedy. Yet Bloomberry retains the opportunity to resist enforcement of first part of the remedy. No evidence was placed before me that GGAM had sold the Shares or that GGAM had invoked the second part of the Constructive Remedy. The Constructive Remedy has not yet taken effect, and it remains open for Bloomberry to challenge the first part of the Constructive Remedy. As such, there has been no true denial of a passive remedy. Indeed, in the present proceedings, Bloomberry is exercising both its active and passive remedies in Singapore before the curial and enforcement court.）。

法院认为，由于仲裁庭的拟制救济的目的是补偿申请人的损失，因此其并无惩罚性。仲裁庭的关注点是其用以评估损失的证据，因而被申请人显然有机会发表意见，仲裁庭并未违反自然公正的原则（It is therefore clear from the foregoing that Bloomberry had the opportunity to be heard. The Tribunal’s conclusion that the FCPA Findings did not assist Bloomberry’s case is the result of the Tribunal’s analysis and evaluation of that evidence. It is the Tribunal’s prerogative to determine the relevance of evidence.）。

法院还指出，依照BLC and others v BLB and another [2014] 4 SLR 79案，仲裁庭的事实调查结果即使是错误的，由于法院不应仅基于法律或事实错误而撤销裁决，从而不应在撤裁/申请不予执行的程序的过程中进行修正（At worst, this had everything to do with an error in the exercise of fact-finding powers that the Tribunal undoubtedly possessed and nothing to do with a breach of natural justice. To reiterate, the Tribunal’s factual findings, even if mistaken, are not to be revisited now, for the court is not to intervene to set aside an award on the basis of mere errors of law or fact: BLC and others v BLB and another [2014] 4 SLR 79 at [53].）。

3、公共政策问题

依照BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd and another v PT Bayan Resources TBK and another [2016] 4 SLR 1案，法院不会支持目的在于违反友好国家法律的目的而订立的合同或交易（A court will not uphold a contract or transaction entered into for the object and purpose that would involve breaching the law in a foreign and friendly state: BCBC Singapore Pte Ltd and another v PT Bayan Resources TBK and another [2016] 4 SLR 1 at [174]–[178].）。

因此，法院认为仲裁庭关于申请人的子公司不是以合法形式掩盖非法目的的实体的事实认定结果对被申请人具有拘束力，因此不能在撤裁/申请不予执行的程序中进行重审，被申请人的仲裁庭授予申请人的子公司损害赔偿违反公共政策的主张不成立。

三、评论

本案中仲裁庭在案件审理过程中作出了临时措施令，从而推翻菲律宾法院的初步禁令和查封措施，而由于若该措施由菲律宾法院作出则当事人可对该措施进行互相辩论，但由于该措施在本案中是由仲裁庭作出的，而且该措施并不属于裁决，因此当事人主张其在仲裁程序中无法享受到与在菲律宾法院相同的申辩权。

然而，由于本案是仲裁案件，法院只能从撤销裁决方面对仲裁程序进行监督，而且上述情况即便其有问题也属于仲裁庭错误行使其权力，法院不应在撤裁/申请不予执行的程序的过程中进行修正，由此法院尊重了仲裁庭的决定。

由此可见，本案特别体现了仲裁与诉讼的一些重大区别，特别是当事人在仲裁庭在作出命令的过程中所享有的正当程序权利与其在诉讼中享有的类似权利可能存在区别，法院只审查仲裁裁决的撤销问题，不对这类命令进行审查，从而导致仲裁中的类似程序中的权利的标准可能低于诉讼中的权利标准。