2020年11月3日，在 Ge Power Conversion India Private Limited   vs Pasl Wind Solutions Private Limited 一案中，印度Ahmedabad古吉拉特邦高等法院裁定，其对于执行仲裁裁决的申请具有管辖权，且涉案域外仲裁裁决不违反印度的公共政策，裁决能够被强制执行。另外，法院认为，《仲裁与调解法》第9条关于临时措施的规定仅适用于国际商事仲裁。本案双方当事人都是印度公司，涉案仲裁并非国际商事仲裁，不适用《仲裁与调解法》第9条的规定。因此，法院裁定准予执行涉案域外仲裁裁决，并裁定驳回申请人依据《仲裁与调解法》第9条要求被申请人提供担保、披露财产信息及不得处分名下财产的申请。

一、背景介绍

申请人GE Power Conversion India PrivateLimited是一家能源基础设施公司，注册地在Chennai（印度）。被申请人PASL Wind Solutions Private Limited是一家注册地在Ahmedabad（印度）的公司。2010年，被申请人向申请人签发三个采购订单，订购了六台转换器。

申请人提出，根据采购订单，六台转换器应在2012年1月2日送达被申请人处。被申请人保留一台950kw的转换器作为样机，同时在2014年7月2日前将其他5台转换器投入使用。三份订单中定有相同的保修条款，规定每台转换器的保修期为将转换器投入使用后的24个月内或发货后30个月内，以先发生者为准。申请人主张转换器的保修期于2014年6月到期，即2012年1月发货后30个月。

双方当事人就转换器的功能产生纠纷。申请人主张转换器的保修期已经届满，而被申请人主张转换器仍处在保修期内。为解决纠纷，双方当事人在2014年12月23日达成《和解协议》，其中第6.2条约定，如果双方不能通过协商解决纠纷，则双方同意此纠纷将在苏黎世通过仲裁解决。申请人由此提出，该纠纷的仲裁地为苏黎世，仲裁协议和仲裁程序适用的法律为瑞士法，仲裁庭的程序将依照国际商会规则进行，《和解协议》适用的实体法为印度法。

2017年7月3日，被申请人向仲裁庭提出仲裁申请。2018年8月，双方同意由独任仲裁员仲裁。仲裁中争议的焦点为对《和解协议》第5.2条的解释。在最后一次听审中，申请人提议将孟买作为听证的方便地点。

2019年4月18日，仲裁员裁决被申请人向申请人支付2,59,76,330.00印度卢比和40,000美元及相应利息（以下该裁决称“域外仲裁裁决”）。直至本案开庭，被申请人始终未履行该裁决。

申请人向法院提交两份申请。申请人在第一份申请中请求法院执行2019年4月18日的仲裁裁决，要求被申请人履行仲裁裁决的内容，即向申请人支付2,59,76,330.00印度卢比和40,000美元及相应利息。在第二份申请中，申请人依据1996年《仲裁与调解法》第9条申请：（1）在法院强制执行2019年4月18日的仲裁裁决前，要求被申请人提供相应担保；（2）要求被申请人在宣誓书中披露其所有的动产及不动产，包括在本申请中第25段所提及的财产；（3）限制被申请人让与、转移、出卖或/和交易自己所有的包括在本申请中第25段所提及的动产和不动产。

本案的争议焦点为：（1）本案中的仲裁裁决是否是域外仲裁裁决？（2）如果该裁决是域外裁决，该裁决在印度是否能够被强制执行？a.该裁决是否满足强制执行的条件？b.该裁决是否违反印度的公共政策？（3）申请人根据1996年《仲裁与调解法》第9条提出的申请是否可以继续进行？

二、法院认定

法院裁定执行域外裁决，驳回了申请人根据1996年《仲裁与调解法》第9条所提出的申请。

1.1996年《仲裁与调解法》的体系

1996年《仲裁与调解法》就国内仲裁、国际商事仲裁、外国仲裁裁决的执行，与调解有关的规则作出了规定。该法第一部分为与国内仲裁及国际商事仲裁有关的法律，第二部分为与外国仲裁裁决的执行有关的法律。该法第2条第2款规定了该法第一部分的适用范围。最高法院在 Bharat Aluminum Company v. Kaiser Aluminum Practical Services Inc  . reported in (2012) 9 SCC 552   （  BALCO) 中认为1996年《仲裁与调解法》采用了属地原则，该法第一部分仅适用于在印度进行的仲裁。最高法院还认定1996年《仲裁与调解法》第一部分和第二部分应在不同领域内适用，二者的适用范围不存在重叠。（[T]he Arbitration Act, 1996 has also adopted the territorial principle, thereby limiting the applicability of Part I to arbitrations, which take place in India … [t]he scheme highlights, if anything, a clear distinction between Part I and Part II as being applicable incompletely different fields and with no overlapping provisions. … the intention of the Parliament is clear that there shall be no overlapping between Part I and Part II of the Arbitration Act, 1996.）

2.涉案裁决是否属于域外仲裁裁决

1996年《仲裁与调解法》第二部分第44条对域外仲裁裁决进行了定义。域外仲裁裁决应满足以下条件：（1）必须是仲裁裁决；（2）该裁决是因对当事人之间的纠纷进行裁决而作出的；（3）该纠纷是由当事人之间的法律关系引起的；（4）当事人之间的法律关系不必然由合同关系产生，但必须具有商业性质；（5）该裁决必须依照适用《纽约公约》的书面协议作出；（6）该裁决必须在中央政府所承认适用《纽约公约》的领土内作出。（It must be an arbitral award • The award must be deduced upon an adjudication of a dispute between parties • Such dispute must be owing to and/or arise from a legal relationship between the parties • Such legal relationship, may or may not be contractual, however must borne out to be commercial in nature • Must be pursuant to an agreement in writing to which the New York Convention applies • Must be made in a territory recognized by the Central Government as a territory to which the New York Convention applies.）

本案中，当事人对仲裁地存在争议。申请人主张根据《和解协议》第6.2条，仲裁地为苏黎世。被申请人则认为，根据 Mankastu Impex Private Limited v. Air Visual Limited ，判断仲裁地的依据为最密切联系原则和当事人双方的意图，因此本案中的仲裁地是孟买。    

法院认为，被申请人提出的当事人双方的国籍等因素与判断一项仲裁裁决是否是域外裁决无关。《仲裁与调解法》第二部分是否适用，仅取决于仲裁裁决的仲裁地是否是《纽约公约》的缔约国。如果是，则《仲裁与调解法》第二部分就会自动适用。（[T]his Court concludes that nationality of the parties has no relevance for considering the applicability of Part II, of the Act of 1996.Applicability of Part II is determined solely based on what is the seat of arbitration, whether it is in a country which is signatory to the New York Convention. If this requirement is fulfilled, Part II will apply.）因此，涉案裁决是否为域外裁决，取决于作出裁决的仲裁地。  

最高法院在2020年 BGS SOMA v. NHEC 一案中确认了判断仲裁地的原则：若当事人明确指定了仲裁地点且没有指定任何其他地点，当仲裁适用跨国机构的规则，并且不存在任何迹象表明存在相反的情形，当事人约定的地点就是法律上的仲裁地。（[W]here there is an express designation of venue and no designation of any alternative place as seat combined with a supernational body of rules governing arbitration and no other significant contrary indicia, the inexorable conclusion is that the stated venue is a juridical seat of arbitration proceedings.）

本案中，《和解协议》第6.2条明确约定仲裁地为苏黎世，并且没有迹象表明存在相反的情形。因此，涉案裁决的仲裁地为苏黎世。（As clear as the plain reading of the above clause would reveal, the express designation of seat of arbitration, which even if it were to be inferred from clause 6.2, is that the seat/venue of arbitration shall be Zurich. This, in addition to the fact that there is no other significant indicia to the contrary. Bearing such designation in mind while being bound by the preposition of law laid down in  BGS Soma (supra) , the inexonerable conclusion is that the juridical seat of thearbitration is Zurich.）

由于苏黎世是中央政府承认适用《纽约公约》的领土，且《仲裁与调解法》第二部分第44条其他条件亦得到满足，法院得出结论涉案裁决为域外仲裁裁决。

3.该裁决在印度是否能够被强制执行？

（1）该裁决是否满足强制执行的条件？

最高法院在 Fuerst Bay Lawson Limited v. Jindal Exports Ltd 中指出域外裁决的强制执行包括两步：（1）法院判断该裁决是否具备可强制执行性；（2）法院裁定该裁决可强制执行。（For the purposes of determining the above question,this Court would be guided by the prescriptions of the Hon'ble Apex Court made in  Fuerst Bay Lawson Ltd. (supra) . It is held therein that there are 2 stages in enforcement of foreign award, Stage 1, where the Court would make an inquiry into enforceability of the Award, and, Stage 2 where the Court holds that the Award is enforceable.）

本案中，法院认为判断该裁决是否具备可强制执行性应考虑《仲裁与调解法》第47条的规定。必须确认法院对于执行仲裁裁决的申请有管辖权。第47条规定对于执行仲裁裁决的申请有管辖权的高级法院应满足：申请执行的标的物位于该法院的管辖范围内，或者该申请从其下级法院上诉至该法院。（The High Court having original jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitral award if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit on itsoriginal civil jurisdiction and in other cases, in the High Court having jurisdiction to hear appeals from decrees of courts subordinate to such High Court.）

本案中的诉讼标的为申请人依据仲裁裁决申请执行的被申请人的财产。由于被申请人的财产位于本案法院的管辖范围内，并且执行请求的第55段已列明其一部分财产，法院对于涉案申请具有管辖权。（The subject-matter of the present proceedings is the assets of the respondent against which enforcement is sought to realize the fruits of the Foreign Award in favour of the Petitioner. This Court has the jurisdiction to hear the present petitions as the assets of the Respondent are located in this Court's jurisdiction and some of these assets have also been identified at paragraph 55 of the Enforcement Petition.）

综上所述，法院认为本案中的域外裁决具备可强制执行性。

（2）该裁决是否能够被强制执行——裁决是否违反印度的公共政策？

在决定一项裁决是否能被强制执行时，或需考虑《仲裁与调解法》第48条的规定。

最高法院在 Shri Lal Mahal Limited v. Progetto Grano SPA  [(2014) 2 SCC 443 ]一案中认为，“《仲裁与调解法》第48条不允许法院对涉案域外裁决进行实体上的审查。同时，域外裁决作出过程中的程序瑕疵也不必然导致该裁决会因违反公共政策而丧失可强制执行性”。（“The scope of inquiry under Section 48 does not permit review of the foreign award on merits. Procedural defects (like taking into consideration inadmissible evidence or ignoring/rejecting the evidence which may be of binding nature) in the course of foreign arbitration do not lead necessarily to excuse an award from enforcement on the ground of public policy.”）

在 Vijay Karia vs.Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi Srl  [2020 SCC OnLine Supreme Court 177]一案中，最高法院强调，只有在反对执行裁决的一方向法院提交证据证明存在第48条规定的情形时，法院才能裁定不予执行域外裁决。任何其他第48条之外的情形都将不予考虑。（… it is clear that enforcement of a foreign award may under Section 48 of the Arbitration Act be refused only if the party resisting enforcement furnishes to the Court proof that any of the stated grounds has been made out to resist enforcement … no ground outside Section 48 can be looked at.）

另一方面，最高法院指出即使存在《仲裁与调解法》第48条规定的情形，若该情形只涉及当事人一方的利益（例如一方当事人未能在仲裁员面前陈述案情），并且当事人可以放弃基于该情形主张不予执行裁决的，或者提出该情形的当事人未因该情形受到损害时，法院仍可以行使自由裁量权裁定准予执行域外裁决。（On the other hand, where the grounds taken to resist enforcement can be said to be linked to party interest alone, for example, that a party has been unable to present its case before the arbitrator, and which ground is capable of waiver or abandonment, or, the ground being made out, no prejudice has been caused to the party on such ground being made out, a Court may well enforce a foreign award, even if such ground is made out.）

另外，即使仲裁员对于协议的解释存在错误，也不能成为法院不予执行域外裁决的理由。（As has been held, referring to some of the judgments quoted hereinabove, in particular  Shri Lal Mahal (supra) , the interpretation of an agreement by an arbitrator being perverse is not a ground that can be made out under any of the grounds contained in Section 48(1)(b) …）同样，仲裁庭遗漏关键证据、仲裁庭对现有证据进行有选择的且错误的分析也不属于《仲裁与调解法》第48条规定的情形。（The Supreme Court further held that an allegation that the tribunal did not consider critical evidence is not a ground available under Section 48 and that any scrutiny of the tribunal's analysis of contemporaneous evidence was selective and perverse is also not available under Section 48.）

综合考虑以上判例，本案中，法院认为被申请人方Mr. Hemani所提出的该域外裁决因违反公共政策而不能被裁定执行的主张是唯一能被接受的抗辩。Mr. Hemani提出如果仲裁协议双方当事人为印度公司，如双方协议约定的仲裁地不在印度，则该协议就违背了《印度合同法》第28条规定，在该法第23条下会被认定为无效，因此也违反了印度的公共政策。（[T]he only argument admissible for resisting the enforcement of the foreign award which is raised by Mr. Hemani, learned advocate for the respondent is the public policy defense where it has been contended that to the extent the arbitration agreement involves two Indian parties who have acceded to designating their seat of arbitration to be outside India, such agreement would be inconsistent with Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act and therefore hit by Section 23 of the Act, rendering the contract to be illegal, hence against the public policy of India.）

最高法院在 Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. vs. General Electric Company  [1994 Supp. (1) SCC 644]一案，以及之后的 Delhi High Court in  GMR Energy Ltd.v. Dusan Power Systems India Pvt. Ltd. and others [2017 SCC OnLine (Del) 11625]一案中提及了以公共政策为由的抗辩。最高法院认为，应对公共政策抗辩做限缩解释。“公共政策”涵盖了“印度法”未涵盖的领域，因此，若要以违反公共政策为由进行抗辩，必须存在比违反法律更严重的情形，仅违反法律不能构成第48条中的“违反公共政策”。同时，“‘印度的公共政策’应被限缩解释为印度的基本政策，如第48条第2款中的解释所规定的，违反公共政策必须牵涉到欺诈或者腐败的情形”。（It has been held in the said decisions, that there ought to be narrow construction of the public policy defence. Also, it is further held that the defence of public policy should be construed narrowly and that the expression 'public policy' covers the field not covered by the words'and the law of India' which follow the said expression. Thus, contravention of law alone will not attract bar of public policy and something more than contravention of law is required. It was also held that "The scope and ambit of the expression 'public policy of India' must necessarily be construed narrowly to mean the fundamental policy of India, and, as clarified by the Explaination to Section 48 (2), conflict with the public policy must involve the element of fraud or corruption".）

综上所述，被申请人提出的仲裁协议违反《印度合同法》，因此也违反印度公共政策的主张不能成立。

另外，从实体上分析，被申请人的主张仍然不能成立。《印度合同法》第28条解释一规定，若当事人在合同中约定将纠纷提交仲裁机构仲裁，则该合同不再适用第28条的规定。（Moreover, even while considering the public policy defense raised by Mr. Hemani, on merits, this Court remains unimpressed since what escapes from the canvas of Mr. Hemani while raising such defense and which is crucial for determining incurrence of the disability under Section 28 is its Explanation 1 which clearly lays down that the disability provided for under Section 28 would exclude from its ambit a reference to arbitration.）因此本案中的《协议》不会因第28条的规定而无效。

综合上述理由，并鉴于《仲裁与调解法》本身并不禁止两个印度当事人协议选择某一外国法院并给予其专属管辖权以监督仲裁程序的进行，本案中当事人选择苏黎世作为仲裁地的行为并不违反任何印度法律，也不为印度法律所禁止。（Together with the above position of law, and the explanation in Section 28 excluding a reference of arbitration from the ambit of Section 28(a), what is also discernible is that the Act, 1996, does not per se prohibit two Indian parties from designating a foreign court and vesting in it exclusive jurisdiction to supervise its arbitration proceedings and therefore even with the parties designating the seat of arbitration at Zurich do not infract any Indian law much less it being forbidden by any Indian laws.）

被申请人试图援引 TDM Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. UE Development India (P) Ltd  . [(2008) 14 SCC 271]一案。该案中法院认为，两个印度主体约定实体法为外国法有悖于印度的公共政策。（The intention of the legislature (Section 28) appears to be clear that Indian nationals should not be permitted to derogate from Indian law. This is part of the public policy of the country.）法院驳回该主张，指出 TDM Infrastructure (P) Ltd. (supra) 所依据1996《仲裁与调解法》第28条仅是关于冲突法的规定，且此规定并不适用于在印度境外进行的域外仲裁。（It deals with the applicable conflict of law rules…this will not apply where the seat is outside India.）

综上所述，法院认为涉案域外仲裁裁决不违反印度的公共政策，该裁决能够被强制执行。

3. 申请人根据1996《仲裁与调解法》第9条作出的申请是否可以继续进行？

由2015年修正案引进的1996年《仲裁与调解法》第2条第2款的附加条款规定：即使国际商事仲裁的仲裁地在印度境外，该法第9条仍可适用，且该仲裁所作的裁决可在《仲裁与调解法》第二部分下得到承认和执行。（The plain language of provision to Section 2 (2)reads to imply that the provisions of sections 9 … shall also apply to international commercial arbitration, even if the place of arbitration is outside India, and an arbitral award made or to be made in such place is enforceable and recognised under the provisions of Part II of this Act.）

本案中，法院支持被申请人的主张，即第2条第2款的附加条款的规定仅适用于满足第 2条第1款(f)定义的国际商事仲裁。第 2条第1款(f)定义的国际商事仲裁要求当事人至少有一方是外国当事人，由于涉案域外仲裁双方当事人皆为印度公司，不属于第 2条第1款(f)定义的国际商事仲裁，因此不能适用第9条规定。

申请人辩称，第2条第2款附加条款中使用“国际商事仲裁”这一词语存在名称错误，考虑到立法意图，应将其宽泛解释为指代所有在印度境外进行的仲裁。申请人的律师提出，在 Trammo DMCC v. Nagarjuna Fertilizers and Chemicals Limited 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 8676   (Trammo) 一案中，法院认为一方当事人在申请执行域外仲裁裁决并行使第9条的权利时，不能被置于没有有效救济措施的境地，因此对第2条第2款的解释必须与保护域外裁决申请执行人的立法意图相一致。（Mr. Thakore submitted that the Bombay High Court in  Trammo (supra) noted that a party in enforcing a foreign award and seeking recourse to Section 9 of the Act, cannot be left without an effective remedy and therefore, the proviso under Section 2(2) must be reconciled with intent of the legislature to protect the foreign award holders.）  

由此，申请人主张立法机关的意图是域外仲裁的当事人也可以依据第9条提出申请（无论当事人是何国籍），这同时也是2015修正案引进第2条第（2）款附加条款的目的。（Mr. Thakore drew attention to, the legislative intent which he perceived was of allowing Section 9 petitions in aid of foreign seated arbitrations (regardless of the nationality of the parties) which is how the 2015 Amendments to the Act came about which introduced the proviso to 2(2) to overcome BALCO's embargo on any Part I proceedings in Part II foreign awards.）申请人援引第246期法律委员会报告主张，只要满足仲裁地在印度境外，第9条就可以适用于域外仲裁裁决，而无需考虑当事人的国籍。（It is then submitted by Mr. Thakore that the only criteria for applicability of Section 9 to a foreign award identified by the Law Commission is that the seat of arbitration should be outside India and nationality of the parties has no role to play in it.）

法院驳回了该主张，认为其违背了法律解释原则。法院指出，判断立法意图的决定性因素是法条本身所使用的语言。法律解释的首要原则是其所主张的立法意图必须是能够从法律条款本身所使用的词语体现出来的意图。申请人试图将没有隐含在第2条第2款所用词句中的其他意图解释成该条款的立法意图，违反了法律解释原则。（The language employed in the statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature itself … Reliance upon  Trammo (supra) and  Avitel Post (supra  )  to the extent that it is intended toread more than what the language of the provisio to Section 2(2) implies is insignificant for the self-same reason.）

另外，申请人方也无法论证本案事实与 Trammo 一案的事实之间的相似性。 Trammo 一案中，一方当事人为注册地在印度外的公司，该案的涉案仲裁为国际商事仲裁。本案中，双方当事人都是印度公司，约定将纠纷提交外国仲裁，涉案仲裁并非国际商事仲裁。法院指出， Trammo 一案的判决理由是根据此案独有的案情作出的。（The above distinction becomes significant because  Trammo and particularly the ratio laid down therein relied upon by Mr Thakore was unique to the facts under consideration in Trammo .）因此，本案法院应根据具体案件事实作出裁决，而不应受 Trammo 一案判决理由的影响。（It shall be needless to be reminded ofthe settled position of law which stipulates that ratios of judgments are to be viewed in the context of the facts of each case and such position would caution this Court and make it circumspect from being swayed by the decision rendered in the case of  Trammo (supra). ）

综上所述，申请人依据《仲裁与调节法》第9条所提出的申请不能继续进行。

三、评论

本案涉及法院是否可准予执行域外裁决，及域外裁决是否适用《仲裁与调解法》第9条的问题。

根据《仲裁与调解法》第二部分第44条，一项仲裁裁决要构成域外裁决，要求其仲裁地是位于印度境外的适用《纽约公约》的领土。在确定仲裁地时，若当事人在协议中明确约定了仲裁地，并且没有任何相反的约定，则仲裁地应为当事人约定的地点。域外裁决是否可以强制执行取决于受理法院对执行申请是否有管辖权，以及是否存在任何第48条规定的情形。本案强调，仅在出现第48条规定情形时，具有管辖权的法院方可裁定不予执行仲裁裁决。同时，仅仅是仲裁协议违反法律规定，并不构成第48条规定的“违反公共政策”从而导致仲裁裁决不可被强制执行。本案中，两个印度当事人协议选择将纠纷提交境外仲裁既不违反印度法律，也不构成“违反印度公共政策”，法院可以裁定准予执行该域外裁决。

本案法院认为，只有当在印度境外作出的仲裁裁决构成《仲裁与调解法》第 2条第1款(f)规定的“国际商事仲裁”时，当事人才能行使其在《仲裁与调解法》第9条下的权利。域外裁决当事人不能依据第9条规定向法院提出申请要求被执行人提供担保或限制其处分财产。